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Abstract 
 
Why the Passion?:  Bernard Lonergan, S.J. on the Cross as Communication 
by Mark T. Miller, directed by Frederick Lawrence 
 
 
This dissertation aims at understanding Bernard Lonergan’s understanding of how 
the passion of Jesus Christ is salvific.  Because salvation is of human persons in a 
community, a history, and a cosmos, the first part of the dissertation examines 
Lonergan’s cosmology with an emphasis on his anthropology.  For Lonergan the cosmos 
is a dynamic, interrelated hierarchy governed by the processes of what he calls “emergent 
probability.”  Within the universe of emergent probability, humanity is given the ability 
to direct world processes with critical intelligence, freedom, love, and cooperation with 
each other and with the larger world order.  This ability is not totally undirected.  Rather, 
it has a natural orientation, a desire or eros for ultimate goodness, truth, beauty, and love, 
i.e. for God.  When made effective through an authentic, recurrent cycle of experience, 
questioning, understanding, judgment, decision, action, and cooperation, this human 
desire for God results in progress.  However, when this cycle is damaged by bias, sin and 
its evil consequences distort the order of creation, both in human persons and in the larger 
environment.  Over time, the effects of sin and bias produce cumulative, self-feeding 
patterns of destruction, or decline.   In answer to this distortion, God gives humanity the 
gift of grace.  Grace heals and elevates human persons.  Through the self-gift of divine, 
unrestricted Love and the Incarnate Word, God works with human sensitivity, 
imagination, intelligence, affect, freedom, and community to produce religious, moral, 
and intellectual conversion, and to form the renewed, renewing community Lonergan 
calls “cosmopolis” and the body of Christ. 
Building on this cosmology and anthropology, the second part of the dissertation 
turns to the culmination of God’s solution to the problem of sin and evil in the suffering 
and death of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, on the cross at Calvary.  The cross does not 
redeem creation by destroying its order, nor does it redeem humanity by revoking its 
freedom.  Rather, the cross redeems the world by working with the order and freedom of 
creation and humanity to fulfill their natural processes and purposes.  Just as from all 
possible world orders, God chose the order of emergent probability and human freedom, 
from all possible ways of redeeming that order, God chose the way of the cross.  How 
does the cross redeem a free humanity in a world of emergent probability?  For Lonergan, 
the best way to understand the cross is through the analogy of communication.  This 
communication is in two parts.  First, the cross is a communication, primarily, of 
humanity to God.  Lonergan calls this part “vicarious satisfaction.”  He takes the general 
analogy from Anselm of Canterbury’s Cur Deus Homo?.  But rather than understanding 
satisfaction primarily in an economic context of debt (as Anselm does), Lonergan situates 
it in the higher context of interpersonal psychology:  Sin creates a rupture in the 
relationships between human persons and God, among human persons, and among all 
parts of creation.  Christ’s vicarious satisfaction flows from a non-ruptured relationship.  
It expresses a perfect concord of the human and the divine, through its threefold 
communication of (1) a perfect knowledge and love of God and humanity, (2) a perfect 
knowledge and sorrow for the offense that sin is, (3) and a perfect knowledge and 
detestation of the evil sin causes.  Conceived as a communication in the context of 
ruptured interpersonal relationships, Lonergan’s analogical understanding of the cross as 
vicarious satisfaction avoids Anselm’s understanding’s tendency to be misinterpreted as 
“satispassion” or “substitutionary penal atonement.” 
The other major part to Lonergan’s analogy of the cross as communication is 
called the “Law of the Cross.”  While vicarious satisfaction is mainly Christ’s 
achievement prescinding from the cooperation of human freedom in a world of emergent 
probability, the Law of the Cross proposes that Christ’s crucifixion is an example and an 
exhortation to human persons.  On the cross, Jesus wisely and lovingly transforms the 
evil consequences of sin into a twofold communication to humanity of a perfect human 
and divine (1) knowledge and love for humanity and (2) knowledge and condemnation of 
sin and evil.  This twofold communication invites a twofold human response:  the 
repentance of sin and a love for God and all things.  This love and repentance form a 
reconciled relationship of God and humanity.  Furthermore, when reconciled with God, a 
human person will tend to be moved to participate in Christ’s work by willingly taking on 
satisfaction for one’s own sin as well as the vicarious satisfaction for others’ sins.   Such 
participatory vicarious activity invites still other human persons to repent and reconcile 
with God and other persons, and furthermore to engage in their own participatory acts of 
satisfaction and communication.  Thus, Christ’s own work and human participation in his 
work are objective achievements as well as moving or inspiring examples.  However, 
while Christ’s work and our participation are moving, their movements do not operate by 
necessity.  Nor are the appropriate human responses of repentance, love, personal 
satisfaction, and vicarious satisfaction in any way forced upon human persons.  
Consequently, the cross as communication operates in harmony with a world of emergent 
probability and in cooperation with human freedom.  With the cross as communication, 
redemption is reconciliation, a reconciliation that spreads historically and communally by 
human participation in the divine initiative.  This is God’s solution to the problem of evil, 
according to Lonergan.  Because God wills ultimately for human persons to be united to 
God and to all things by love, God wills freedom, and God allows the possibility of sin 
and evil.  But sin and evil do not please God.  Out of infinite wisdom, God did not do 
away with evil through power, but converted evil into a communication that preserves, 
works with, and fulfills the order of creation and the freedom of humanity. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
How does Christ’s cross save?  This is the primary question driving this 
dissertation.  The tortured body of Jesus Christ nailed to the cross is the primary symbol 
for Christian understanding of God’s relationship to humanity and the world.  This is 
particularly true for the Catholic church, whose churches, classrooms, and members 
display the crucifixion on their walls and around their necks.  At the beginning and end of 
our prayer, whether alone or in community, we make the Sign of the Cross, tracing its 
image over heads, hearts, and shoulders. 
In doctrine as well as in practice, the church affirms the salvific significance of 
Christ’s suffering and death, his passion.1  That the cross saves is a central teaching of 
the Christianity, but we must ask how does it save?  The exigency for understanding how 
the crucifixion works comes from both a natural human desire to know and to 
understand, but also from the practical implications of human knowledge and 
underst
f 
                                                
anding. 
In terms of the need for knowledge and understanding, the affirmation that the 
cross saves is problematic for human hearts and minds.  When viewed in relation to other 
teachings, such as the unity of God, the infinite wisdom of God, the unconditional love o
God, and the omnipotence of God, we might wonder such things as, What is the role of 
the Father in the Son’s passion?  Why would God choose to redeem the world through 
 
1 Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, trans. Roy Deferrari (St. Louis:  B. Herder Book Co., 
1957), 2, 6, 54, 86, 302, 304. 
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the cross?  Additionally, the persistence and perhaps the intensification of suffering, sin, 
and evil in the world might well give rise to such questions as, What actual effect(s) has 
the cro
 even sadistic 
God?  
 to a 
 
d 
o 
acts not only in 
Christ’
 
ss had, if any, on human history? 
We cannot help but to wonder, to seek answers to our questions.  Moreover, we 
cannot help but to live by our answers.  In other words, there are practical applications to 
our theories.  For example, if one chooses to believe that the Father demanded the death 
of the Son to quench his thirst for human punishment, one might be tempted to abandon 
Christianity:  Why would one worship this bloodthirsty, unjust, and perhaps
Why would one belong to a community that worshiped such a God? 
A turn toward atheism is just one possible result of poor understanding of 
Christian redemption.  In the efforts to salvage one’s belief in God, one might turn
number of other misunderstandings of God’s relationship to the crucifixion.  For 
example, if one still believed in God, and if one thought that all power was like military 
power, one might conclude that God is not all-powerful, since God died on the cross, and 
sin and evil persist in the world.  Thus, one might retreat to an image of God as a helpless
but loving parent, watching our misery with a shared misery.  Conversely, if one wishe
to hold on to the belief that God is omnipotent, one might abandon either the belief in 
divine love and wisdom, or the belief that divine love and wisdom bear any relation t
human love and wisdom.  Either way, one would conclude that God 
s suffering on the cross but also in the sins of his tormentors. 
What are the possible consequences of such possible notions about God and 
God’s relationship to sin, evil, and suffering?  In my view, the consequences would be
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enormous, for we live according to our answers and beliefs, not merely in our private 
lives as avowed theists or atheists, but also in our actions in relationship with others.  
Those who perceive and accept the Father as imposing suffering in an unjust, cruel way 
might take this as their ideal, imitate this God, and impose suffering unjustly and cruelly. 
On the other hand, those who perceive the Son as passively receiving unjust sufferin
please a sadistic Father might imitate the Son and passively accept being oppressed 
themselves.  Such understandings of the cross might also affect the actions of third pa
witnesses to oppression.  What kind of consolation could one offer to another in that 
person’s moments of suffering, if one believed either that God was powerless or that God 
was completely responsible?  Furthermore, if one sought to explain the cross by claiming 
its wisdom and intelligibility are totally foreign to human wisdom and intelligibility, o
might separate totally one’s faith and one’s reason.  Given this division, some would 
choose sides rather than try to reconcile what has been determined irreconcilable.  The 
practical and political consequences of this separation would be far-reaching.  For 
would those who rejected the Christian G
 
g to 
rty 
ne 
how 
od and Christian communities related to 
Christi
 and 
e 
t 
an belief and Christian believers? 
Such possibilities are not merely abstract, and such questions are not merely 
academic, in my opinion.  They have had a tremendous impact on human history,
they will continue to influence the world, for our practice is in part based on our 
understanding.  If we are to continue to affirm that the cross saves and that it is truly th
work of God—the product of infinite wisdom, love, and power—then we must seek a 
proper understanding of how the cross saves.  It is also my opinion that the work of Jesui
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theologian Bernard Lonergan provides a helpful, satisfactory way of understanding this 
teaching in a way that does justice to divine wisdom, love, and power, as well as to the 
current
is 
) it reveals 
the rela
  For 
an I in chapter four of the 
Dog
, attains 
nderstanding of mystery “rests on the analogy 
 state of the human affairs in the world, a state that remains sinful 
As we have seen, how the cross saves is complicated.  Lonergan affirms that it 
not only complicated, but also a mystery, for three reasons:  (1) it comes from infinite 
wisdom and goodness, (2) it reveals “the mystery of human iniquity,” and (3
tionship between divine wisdom and goodness and human iniquity.2 
This dissertation is an effort to understand this complicated mystery by 
understanding Lonergan’s understanding.3  But how can we understand a mystery?
this, I rely, as Lonergan does, on the statements of Vatic
matic Constitution concerning the Catholic Faith: 
[R]eason illustrated by faith, when it zealously, piously, and soberly seeks
with the help of God some understanding of the mysteries, and that a most 
profitable one, not only from the analogy of those things which it knows 
naturally, but also from the connection of the mysteries among themselves and 
with the last end of man; nevertheless it is never capable of perceiving those 
mysteries in the way it does the truths which constitute its own proper object.  
Lonergan writes that such fruitful u
                                                 
2 Bernard Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato, Third edition (Rome:  Pontifical Gregorian University, 1964
557.  I rely on Charles Hefling’s excellent translation, henceforth to be referred to as “DVI (trans., 
Hefling).”  Please note that in this list, the term “mystery” is used differently for infinite wisdom and 
goodness as for human iniquity.  Divine wisdom and goodness are intelligible beyond
), 
 human knowing, but 
ile 
ne of 
d 
ergan, Method in Theology 
y of Toronto Press, 1994), particularly Chs. 7, 13-14. 
sin is unintelligible in itself.  More will be said in the first chapter of the second part. 
3 The question may arise as to which of Lonergan’s eight functional specialties this work is located.  Wh
its primary goal is to understand the doctrine of redemption, and thus would seem to be an effort in the 
specialty called “systematics,” I have not put in the painstaking work to understand and evaluate many 
other authors’ contributions to the field (though part 1, chapter 3 does try to account for one major li
understanding).  Thus, this work is largely a work in “interpretation” that focuses on understanding 
Lonergan’s systematics.  Additionally, I have sought keep my writing style clear, well-organized, an
relatively comprehensive in order that the work might be accessible to those not very familiar with 
Lonergan.  For more on Lonergan’s functional specialties, see Bernard Lon
(Toronto:  Universit
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of
another and with man’s last end.  
Just as the mystery the cross is complicated, so too is Lonergan’s understanding 
of it complicated.  It involves multiple analogies, and it can only be understood in light of 
Lonergan’s complicated cosmology and anthropology.   The cross, after all, is God’s 
solution to the problem of sin and evil in creation, and particularly in human persons and 
human communities, as they exist in creation and in history. Consequently, I believe that 
to understand Lonergan’s understanding of the cross, it is essential to understand 
Lonergan’s understanding of creation in general and of humanity in particular. 
In line with this belief, the dissertation is divided into two main parts, the first on 
Lonergan’s cosmology and anthropology, and the second on his soteriology.  The first 
part consists of three chapters, Progress, Decline, and Redemption.  These correspond to 
the traditional categories of nature, sin, and grace.  For Lonergan, these elements are 
related dynamically in the world as it exists.  The second part contains four chapters.  The 
first examines Lonergan’s notion of Mystery.  The second chapter considers some Basic 
Analogies taken from scripture.  The remaining two chapters consider Lonergan’s 
primary analogies for gaining some measure of fruitful understanding of Christ’s work on 
the cross, namely, Satisfaction and the Law of the Cross. 
                                                
 things known naturally and on the interconnection of the mysteries with one 
4
 
 
4 Denzinger, 1796. 
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PART 1.  LONERGAN’S ANTHROPOLOGY:  
A THREEFOLD DIALECTIC OF HISTORY 
 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to understand better the mystery of salvation by Christ's 
death on the cross.  Toward that end, we seek to understand Bernard Lonergan’s 
understanding of the mystery.  Because the cross is a solution to a problem, I believe it is 
indispensable to consider first the problem for which the cross is a solution.  That 
problem is the human situation.  
Consequently, this initial part of the dissertation will present a basic yet solid 
introduction to Lonergan’s thought on humanity, his anthropology.  It seeks to answer the 
question: If the cross is to save humanity in this world, then what is humanity and its 
world like?  My aim is to summarize Lonergan’s anthropology in as clear and as simple a 
manner as this difficult and complicated topic allows.  Lonergan was a profound thinker.  
A committed Roman Catholic philosopher and theologian, his thought was catholic in the 
broader sense, too, seeking to account for and to affirm all that is true about a topic.  
While this alone would be a major achievement, Lonergan’s thought attempts to go one 
step further:  to discover and to present the complex network that relates these truths.  
Thus, Lonergan’s anthropology endeavors to account for all that is true about humanity 
and to present these truths and their relations in a systematic fashion.   
Of course, Lonergan could not account for everything there is to know about 
being human.  Instead, his analysis yielded general categories that account for human 
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achievement and for human failure on the individual level, on a communal level, and on 
an historical level.  My presentation of Lonergan’s anthropology follows what I take to 
be the largest, most encompassing framework, that of his tripolar dialectic of history:5  
progress, decline, and redemption. 
 Lonergan came upon this tripolar dialectic early in his studies, in the late 1930’s, 
and it remained a recurring theme throughout his work.  Progress, decline, and 
redemption answer questions about human living that were pressing for Lonergan during 
a worldwide economic depression and the build-up to World War II.  In this context, 
Lonergan wondered about the underlying causes for such catastrophic historical change. 
On a global scale, Liberalism and Marxism were the most influential systems of 
thought competing for dominance in the realm of social organization and direction.  
Lonergan thought that the core of these theories was their philosophy of history, and he 
felt that both were inadequate for guiding long-term social progress, since both of them 
failed to acknowledge the evils of egoism and the need for a supernatural or religious 
component in history.6   
The liberalism that arose in the eighteenth century advocated progress, but it also 
contained a mistaken faith in individual self-interest, thinking that unfettered, competitive 
                                                 
5 In his work Insight:  A Study of Human Understanding (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 749, 
Lonergan mentions the shift to a tripolar dialectic with the addition of the supernatural dimension of 
redemption.  He does not comment on the oddity of a dialectic with more than two principles.  However, 
previously in the book, on page 242, he discusses many different definitions of dialectic. For Plato it is 
philosophical dialogue contrasted with eristic, or specious reasoning.  For Aristotle it is a process of 
reviewing opinions to discover the truth.  Only in Hegel and Marx is it an opposition of two poles to 
produce a third.  Lonergan’s own definition is “a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of 
change.” 
6 As early as 1933 or 34 Lonergan wrote, “[T]he hope of the future lies in a philosophic presentation of the 
supernatural concept of social order…” in an unpublished essay called “The Philosophy of History,” p. 
117, as quoted by Michael Shute in The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History (Lantham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1993), 59, ft. 70. 
 
 8
egoism could drive automatic progress.7  The Marxism ascendant in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries correctly criticized some aspects of liberalism, but it was 
flawed in its belief that the group self-interest of a revolutionary proletariat and its 
expression in violent class conflict would accelerate progress and produce an ideal 
classless and stateless society.8  While the early twentieth century was marked by rapid 
material progress, it saw unparalleled totalitarianism, violence, and horror. 
Between the two World Wars and during the Great Depression, Lonergan strove 
to understand human history in order to facilitate ethical action in global society, or more 
specifically a “Christian praxis.”9  In 1937-38, he had a breakthrough when he adopted 
an analogy from Newton's analysis of the motion of planets.10  The advantage of 
Newton’s analysis was that it explained a complex movement or a concrete, dynamic 
process.  No less than the motions of the planets, human history is a complex, concrete, 
and dynamic process. 
                                                
Newton explained the irregular ellipses of each planet’s motion by abstracting 
three distinct forces.  He conceived of each of these forces as moving in straight lines, or 
 
7 Lonergan thought liberals were right to speak of progress, but wrong to believe it could be driven merely 
by self-interest, for in a capitalist context  even “enlightened self-interest easily comes to mean really 
profitable self-interest” (Bernard Lonergan, “Questionaire on Philosophy: Response,” Philosophical and 
Theological Papers, 1965-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 368.  Cf., Insight, 260, 710-
11; Shute, 6-7.). 
8 Insight, 260, 265-66, “Questionnaire,” 366-70. 
9 “Questionnaire,” 370.  Lonergan follows Aristotle in contrasting praxis and poesis, doing and making, 
conduct and product.  Praxis is a kind of practice, the deliberation, choice, and conduct that falls “under the 
guidance of the practical wisdom that Aristotle named phronesis and Aquinas named prudentia.” In this 
Lonergan would include the praxis of liberation theology.  Bernard Lonergan, “Theology and Praxis,” A 
Third Collection, Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 184. 
10 Bernard Lonergan, “Insight Revisited,” A Second Collection, Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 271. 
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“vectors.”11  The three vectors accounted for the differences in planetary motion, and are, 
therefore, also known as “differentials.”12  Individually, none of the three straight 
vectors, or differentials, corresponded to the actual, elliptical movement of the plane
But together, in a unified theory, they explained the concrete motion of the planets in a 
way that was reasonably accurate and empirically verifia
ts.  
ble. 
                                                
Like the reality of the planets, human reality is in motion.  It is a history.  To 
study it, Lonergan appropriated Newton’s vector or differential analysis.  Thus, 
Lonergan's philosophy of history is comprised of three vectors or differentials:  progress, 
decline, and redemption.  These three differentials are a transposition of the three 
traditional, rather static, metaphysical categories of nature, sin, and grace, into a more 
dynamic and historical context.  Taken individually, none of them provides an accurate 
account of human history.  They are abstractions of partial, particular aspects of that 
complex reality.  But taken together as a dynamic whole, they provide a full and highly 
verifiable framework for Lonergan’s anthropology.  
Lonergan’s anthropology provides key concepts that will be fundamental to our 
understanding of Lonergan’s soteriology; consequently, we shall examine it in some 
detail.  Our starting point is nature in general.  Nature for Lonergan is an intricate, 
interdependent order in which lower orders set the conditions for the possibility of new, 
 
11 The three Newtonian vectors are: 1. the forward momentum of moving bodies, i.e., the law of inertia, 2. 
the pull of gravity between the sun and each planets, 3. the pull of gravity among planets.  Together the 
three vectors result in the irregular ellipses in which the planets actually move. Ibid. For more background 
information on Lonergan’s development of the dialectic of history, see Shute; Richard Liddy, Transforming 
Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1993) 
84-87; William A. Mathews, Lonergan’s Quest, A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005), 88-92. 
12 Lonergan discusses the role of differentials in a context of mathematics in Insight, 42, 62-4.  In Topics in 
Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 27, he says simply, “What makes the difference in 
the human good at different times we call a differential.”   
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more complicated, and higher orders to emerge.  Human beings are relatively late 
developments.  They (We) are subject to natural laws, but by their experiences, 
intelligences, judgments, decisions, and actions they can not only discover the course of 
creation but also contribute to its direction and unfolding.  Driving these human 
operations is a fundamental desire, a natural desire for sense stimulation, understanding, 
knowledge, moral responsibility, and love.  This desire is one, because ultimately it is a 
desire for God.  Authentic operation involves a fidelity to this good natural desire.  
Lonergan situates human individuals and their operations in human communities and in 
human history.  Authentic individual operation and authentic social cooperation drive 
progress. 
Human individuals, communities, and histories can be authentic, but they (we) 
can also fail in their operations and cooperations.  This failure is sin.  It causes and is 
caused by bias.  As authentic operations shape and are shaped by human communities, so 
too does inauthentic activity have negative consequences on human societies, and the 
resultant negative situations increase the probability of further failure, sin, and 
inauthenticity.  Over history, this causes decline. 
But the concrete human situation is a product not simply of nature and sin but also 
of grace.  In the world as it exists, God has given us the divine redeeming love, a love 
that bears fruit in conversion—a healing of nature from the effects of sin and an elevation 
to the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity.  Redemption is not merely an 
individual affair.  It takes place in a graced community, the church, the Body of Christ.  
Its goal is the total redemption of all humankind. 
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We shall consider nature, sin, and grace in terms of progress, decline, and 
redemption.  Within each chapter the movement is from the basic to the complex, from 
basic metaphysical generalities to individual persons to human communities to 
communities in history.  Each chapter and section builds on the previous section(s) or 
chapter(s).  For example, the principle of emergent probability is discussed as a general 
metaphysical principle in nature, then this principle is applied to the human person, 
human societies, and human history, as natural, sinful, and graced. 
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Chapter 1.  Progress: Nature as Good
 
 
 
1.1.  Two Views on Nature: Classical and Historical 
 Progress is Lonergan’s transposition of classical, static, and abstract concepts of 
nature into a newer, dynamic, and historical context.13  This transposition of the classical 
view of nature into an historical framework is neither a total repudiation nor a complete 
elimination of that earlier view.  The transposition is more of a “transcendence”14 of that 
view.  In other words, Lonergan’s account of the human person includes aspects of both 
classical definitions of human nature and more contemporary ideas about humanity as 
historical.  The historicity of humanity forms the larger context for the study of human 
nature, but both are valuable, as Lonergan said at a 1977 address to The American 
Catholic Philosophical Association: “A contemporary ontology would distinguish 
between two components in the concrete human reality:  on the one hand, a constant 
                                                 
13 Lonergan once said that his whole work had been to introduce history into theology.  Curiousity at the 
Center of One’s Life:  Statements and questions of R. Eric O’Connor, Ed. J. Martin O’Hara (Montreal:  
Thomas More institute, 1984) 427.  See also, Frederick E. Crowe, “‘All my work has been introducing 
history into Catholic theology,’” Lonergan Workship: The Legacy of Lonergan, vol. 10, ed. Frederick 
Lawrence (1994): 49-81. 
14 “Transcendence” is a central term in Lonergan’s work.  Basically, it means “going beyond.”  One thing 
can go beyond another in a way that the first has nothing to do with the second.  However, for Lonergan 
transcendence indicates that a second thing goes beyond a first by lifting the first into a greater and richer 
context that preserves and fulfills the first’s proper features.  This view of transcendence is closely related 
to the term, “sublation,” as used by Karl Rahner, the German, Jesuit theologian and contemporary of 
Lonergan.  Method, 241.  See also Bernard Lonergan, “Horizons,” Philosophical and Theological Papers, 
1965-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 23.  This was a lecture given at the Thomas More 
Institute, Montreal in 1968.  During a question and answer period that followed, Lonergan contrasts 
transcendence in cognitive theory and theories of relationships with an immanence that knows only 
appearances and leads to relativism and atomistic individualism. 
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human nature; on the other hand, a variable human history.  Nature is given man at birth.  
Historicity is what man makes of man.”15  Both are valid. 
 Lonergan regards highly Aristotle’s classical view of human nature as the zôon 
logikon16  and the zôon politikon,17 the “logical” or “rational animal” and the “political” 
or “social animal.” As rational and social animals, humans are complex realities.  Like all 
of being, human beings are governed by metaphysical laws; like all of being that is in 
motion, human beings are governed by physical laws; like all of being in self-motion, or 
life, human beings are subject to biological laws; like all sensitive beings in self-motion, 
or animals, human beings are subject to zoological laws.18  However, we human beings 
are unique, according to Aristotle’s classical view of human nature, inasmuch as we are 
rational (obey the rules of reason and conceive of rational rules)19 and social (the good 
life is lived in community with friends).20  As rational and social, humans attain their 
end, i.e., happiness, primarily through friendship and arête, which is translated as 
“virtue” or “excellence.”21 
                                                
 Lonergan’s view of the human person is to some degree based on these elements 
of Aristotle’s classical conception of human nature: a complex being governed by rules 
 
15 Bernard Lonergan “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” A Third Collection, Papers by Bernard 
J.F. Lonergan, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 170.  Lonergan’s thought on history was influenced 
by his reading of Christopher Dawson’s The Age of the Gods in the early 1930’s and Arnold Toynbee’s A 
Study of History in 1940-41.  See Liddy, 84; Mathews, 50-51, 110-11. 
16 Aristotle, De Anima, III.  Lonergan, Topics in Education, 80. 
17 Aristotle, The Politics, I. 2, 1253a3.  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I. 7, 1097b11.  Lonergan, Insight, 
211. 
18 De Anima, II. 
19 Nicomachean Ethics, I. 7, 1098a4. 
20 Ibid., Bks. I and IX. 
21 Ibid., Bk. I.  In addition to virtue and friendship, Aristotle names other requirements for happiness 
including health, some measure of respect from one’s peers, a moderate amount of material goods, and 
friends (including family) who are virtuous, healthy, respected, and a moderate amount of material goods. 
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affecting beings; an animal that is rational, social, and capable of attaining excellence.  
This forms some of the basis for Lonergan’s thinking of the human person as human 
nature or human substance.  But Lonergan acknowledges that there are limits to this type 
of thought.  It does not tell us much about the actual, concrete person, or what Lonergan 
sometimes calls the human subject:   
Of the human substance it is true that human nature is always the same; a man is a man 
whether he is awake or asleep, young or old, sane or crazy, sober or drunk, a genius or a 
moron, a saint or a sinner.  From the viewpoint of substance, those differences are merely 
accidental.  But they are not accidental to the subject, for the subject is not an abstraction; 
he is a concrete reality, all of him, a being in the luminosity of being….  The being of a 
subject is becoming.22 
 
 Consequently, Lonergan believes that any adequate account of humanity, any 
anthropology that wishes to study humanity in its concreteness, must consider the human 
being in flux.  It must be an historical anthropology.  We shall examine the first part of 
Lonergan’s historical anthropology, i.e., progress, in four parts:  1) emergent probability, 
2) intelligence, 3) authenticity, and 4) the human good. 
Lonergan defined progress as “a cyclic and cumulative process in which concrete 
situations give rise to insights, insights to new courses of action, new courses of action to 
changed situations, and changed situations to still further insights.”23  The following 
section on emergent probability will explain what Lonergan means by “concrete 
situations” and “a cyclical and cumulative process.”  It will present the global or 
cosmological context of what is strictly human or anthropological.  The next section 
focuses on the “rise” of “insights.”  Our third section on transcendental method relates 
                                                 
22 Bernard Lonergan, “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” Collection, Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., 
ed. Frederick Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 241. 
23 “Questionnaire,” 366, emphasis added. 
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insight to experience, knowledge, choice, and “action.”  The chapter’s final section on the 
cooperating human community will discuss how the concrete situation, the cyclical and 
cumulative process, the rise of insights, and the courses of action are all related in a nexus 
that is social, cultural, and historical. 
1.2.  Emergent Probability: A Dynamic World Order 
 
 Human beings are part of whole.  This whole is sometimes called a “world.”  The 
world sets the basic conditions and norms for the possibility of human progress.24  Thus, 
a study of human nature and history, of human being and becoming, must be situated in 
the larger, more fundamental context of the world’s nature and history, its being and 
becoming.  In other words, an anthropology is situated within a cosmology.   
According to Lonergan, cosmology is of two types: “It may be placed in universal 
propositions, self-evident truths, naturally known certitudes.  On the other hand, it may 
be placed in nature itself, in nature not as abstractly conceived, but as concretely 
operating.  It is, I believe, the second alternative that has to be envisaged if we are to 
determine norms in historicity.”25  In this section we to answer such questions as, How 
does the world operate concretely?  What are its norms?  How do these operations and 
norms ground human progress? 
1.2.1.  Determinism, Indeterminism, and Emergent Probability 
Emergent probability is Lonergan’s term for the operation of a world process that 
sets some norms for human life and for human progress.  To gain a clearer view of 
emergent probability it is helpful to contrast it with an opposed worldview: mechanistic 
                                                 
24 Although, humans also have the ability to transform the world, as following sections will discuss. 
25 “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 172. 
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determinism.  Mechanistic determinism is a classical, but still common, theory that 
conceives of the world as a closed, controlled system.  Everything important in the world 
has existed since its beginning, and the relations of all things are predetermined from the 
beginning of the world.  These relations are expressed in unchanging, universal, and 
necessary laws.26 
Such a worldview is compatible with a kind of theism, in particular the deism 
popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and embraced by America’s founding 
fathers.  The deistic image of God is that of a removed watchmaker.  For the creation 
process, deism imagines that the individual forms of things or “Plato’s ideas are in the 
divine mind pretty much as the animals were in Noah’s ark.”27  It conceives of finite 
natures as prior to world orders.  The relationships of things in a world order are 
necessary and determined by the individual natures of finite things, as required by the 
finite things’ natures. 
In contrast, Lonergan’s worldview of emergent probability affirms that world 
order is prior to finite natures.  “God sees in his essence, first of all, the series of all 
possible world-orders each complete down to its least historical detail” and in knowing 
world orders, God knows finite natures.28  By placing the priority on world orders, 
Lonergan is able to understand the world as dynamic.  The finite natures of individual 
                                                 
26 To some degree this view has its roots in Aristotle, who distinguished between necessary and contingent 
laws and believed that the necessary movements of the heavens caused contingent movements on the earth.  
It was furthered by Galileo’s distinction between secondary causes that are mere appearance, known by the 
senses, and primary qualities that are objective and known mathematically. Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume made abstract classical rules concrete, thus completing the mechanistic worldview.  
Insight, 138, 151-54. See Method, 280. 
27 Bernard Lonergan, “The Natural Desire to See God,” Collection, Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.: 
Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 88. 
28 Ibid. 
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things do not fix the relationships of things and thus do not require a static world order.  
A dynamic world order with its own intrinsic intelligibility provides for the emergence of 
new things.  What is that world order? 
In some ways, it is similar to Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution.  Since Darwin 
(1809-82), natural science has understood that the world is not populated by a fixed, 
unchanging assembly of plant and animal species.  New plants and new animals emerge, 
and existing ones become extinct.  Further more, their emergence and extinction is not 
based on necessity but on probability.  The probability for new life-forms to emerge or 
not to emerge, to survive or to become extinct, depends on a host of underlying factors in 
the natural environment.  These underlying factors do not exist in the same amounts in 
different places and at different times.  Thus, the probabilities for a plant’s or an animal’s 
emergence and survival are not universal but localized.29  Darwin’s discoveries and 
several successive advances, notably by Freud in psychology and Einstein in physics, 
have contributed to a general discrediting of mechanistic determinism.  Consequently, 
despite the persistent temptation, contemporary thinkers may no longer imagine the world 
as a watch with all its parts related and governed by unchanging, universal, and necessary 
laws.30 
However, there is a temptation to move from the one extreme of mechanistic 
determinism to another, a relativistic indeterminism. According to this latter view there is 
no worldview; there is no world order; there are no intelligible relationships, necessary or 
                                                 
29 Insight, 154-55. 
30 Ibid., 448-49.  Freud discovered that psychological disease has properly psychological causes.  Einstein’s 
quantum mechanics “removed from science the relevance of any image of particles, or waves, or 
continuous process.” Cf., Method, 280 where Lonergan discusses such changes in math and economics as 
well as physics. 
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contingent. Or at least, if they do exist, there is no way for anyone to know them with any 
accuracy or certainty.31 
Lonergan’s emergent probability is a middle ground that seeks to retain the good 
of both classical and indeterministic worldviews. Thus, Lonergan does not seek to 
discover necessary, universal, and unchanging laws relating things with eternally fixed 
natures.  Nor does he abandon the quest for understanding.  Rather, Lonergan seeks to 
discover the intelligible relationships governing the world order as it concretely exists, an 
order in which new things have various probabilities of emerging.   
1.2.2.  Classical and Statistical Law 
Lonergan acknowledges that there are both systematically intelligible and non-
systematically intelligible relationships in the world as it exists concretely.  Emergent 
probability is not a fixed system, but it is not an abandonment of systematic 
understanding.  It is an open, heuristic structure for anticipating a world order that is both 
intelligible and dynamic.  It seeks both “classical” laws (that identify systematic 
relationships) and “statistical” laws (that look at actual occurrences or events and seek 
ideal frequencies, or probabilities, from which actual frequencies may diverge but only 
non-systematically).32  Both classical and statistical laws seek to explain world processes, 
to be empirically verifiable, and to be practically applicable.  For example, in medicine, 
classical researchers analyze how pulmonary or digestive systems function in general, 
while statistical researchers determine normative or ideal frequencies at which these 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 157-61. 
32 Ibid., Chs. 2-4, particularly pp. 126-139. 
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systems function in actual populations.  Doctors use both sets of information to diagnose 
and treat patients.33 
1.2.3.  Schemes of Recurrence:  Emergence and Survival 
Emergent probability is a generalization and an expansion, or transcendence, of 
the Darwinian, evolutionary worldview.  Darwin focused on probabilities for the 
emergence and survival of successive species of plants and animals, given various 
underlying environmental factors.  Lonergan’s emergent probability considers the 
probabilities for the emergence and survival of successive things and groups of things, 
given various underlying other things and groups of things.34  These underlying things 
and groups of things may be plants or animals, but they need not be.  Lonergan tends to 
refer to them as “operations” and “events.”  This emphasizes the dynamism of each thing 
and allows for a more complete account of reality that includes non-physical realities.  
These operations and events can be grouped into what Lonergan calls “schemes of 
recurrence” or “recurrent schemes.”  A recurrent scheme is simply a series or a pattern of 
interdependent, regularly recurring events, i.e., a cycle.  When one event arises, it may 
lead to another event, which may lead to a third, which may lead to a fourth, which may 
lead back again to the first, and so on.  There may be more or fewer than four events in a 
recurrent scheme, but what is important is that the events occur, that they are linked 
interdependently in a circular way, and that they reoccur. 
                                                 
33 Joseph Flanagan, Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan's Philosophy (Toronto:  University of 
Toronto Press, 1997), 99. 
34 Insight, 156-57.  Another difference, as I see it, is that Darwin gives struggle and competition a more 
fundamental role than does Longergan. 
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Such schemes of recurrence are the common “building blocks” of our universe.  
They are operative, for example, in the recurrent “perturbed ellipses” of the planets in our 
solar system, in water’s circulation around the earth, in the nitrogen cycle necessary for 
earthly life, in animal digestive rhythms, and in human economic cycles of production 
and consumption.35 
The emergence and the survival of various schemes of recurrence do not occur by 
necessity.  Rather, there is a probability for events to emerge and a further probability for 
these events to group together into emerging schemes that may or may not recur.  Many 
diverse factors need to occur in the right amount and in the right order for the events in 
any scheme of recurrence to emerge and survive.  Given such uncertainties, in some 
sense, there is an almost miraculous character to much of our world.  This said, however, 
when given very large numbers, distributed across very large areas, over a very long 
period of time, even events with very low probabilities for emergence and survival are 
virtually certain to emerge and survive.  For example, a scheme of recurrence with a one 
in a million probability of occurring will occur a million times if given “a million 
million” simultaneous or successive opportunities for emergence.36 
1.2.4. A Dynamic, Interdependent Hierarchy:  Transcendence, Sublation, and Vertical 
Finality 
The previous section discussed how in a world governed by emergent probability, 
things and events are related to each other dynamically and interdependently in various 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 141. 
36 Ibid., 146. 
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schemes of recurrence.  In this section, we shall see how schemes of recurrence 
themselves are related in a dynamic and interdependent way. 
Some schemes of recurrence arise earlier than others.  Often, earlier schemes set 
the “conditions of the possibility” for the emergence of later schemes.37  In other words, 
just as some events are dependent on the prior existence of other events, some recurrent 
schemes of events aree dependent on the existence of other schemes.  In the section 
above, the motion of the planets, of water, of nitrogen, of digestion, and of the human 
economy represented examples of recurrent schemes of events.   The order in which they 
were presented reveals an order of their dependence.  Planetary motions set the 
conditions for chemical cycles (such as water and nitrogen), which set the condition for 
biological functions (such as digestion), which set the condition for human economic 
activities as well as other aspects of human life. 
The earlier, more fundamental schemes, Lonergan calls “lower,” and the later 
schemes that depend on and build on the lower, Lonergan calls “higher.”38  Higher 
schemes are not merely later but also higher, because in some ways they add qualitatively 
different relationships, functions, and events not possible on the lower levels.  In some 
ways, these higher schemes encompass and go beyond or “transcend”39 the lower 
schemes.  So, for example, the human schemes of intelligence, affect, and love include 
“lower” biological and chemical operations but go beyond them. 
                                                 
37 It is important perhaps to note that while Lonergan and Karl Rahner share the use of the phrase 
“conditions of the possibility,” Rahner tends to use it in the sense of “a priori” or prescinding from the 
particularities of concrete reality, and Lonergan tends to use it to identify the concrete conditions required 
for the emergence of particular events or things.  For more on the relationship between Rahner and 
Lonergan, see Otto Muck, The Transcendental Method, (Herder and Herder, 1968). 
38 Ibid., 148. 
39 See footnote 10, above, for a discussion of transcendence as used by Lonergan.  
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Furthermore, while higher schemes are dependent on lower ones for their 
emergence and survival, in some ways lower schemes depend on the higher.  A higher 
scheme goes beyond or transcends the lower, and in doing so, the higher lifts up or 
“sublates” the lower into a new context (the higher scheme), in which the lower scheme 
is able to find a flourishing and a fulfillment that it could not have attained on its own.40 
There is, in short, a mutual relationship of dependence between higher and lower 
schemes of recurrence.  The higher schemes would not exist if the lower ones did not first 
exist.  Without material, plant, and animal schemes of recurrence, human schemes of 
commerce, culture, etc. could not emerge.  On the other hand, higher schemes emerge as 
a more systematic patterning of lower schemes in ways that promote more sophisticated 
relationships and more fulfilling operations.  In animals and plants, chemicals come alive. 
At times people may wonder which levels are more important—the higher, more 
advanced levels, or the lower, more fundamental levels?  For Lonergan, they are equally 
important, but differently so.  Consequently, he speaks of the lower as more “essential” 
and the higher as more “excellent.”41 
These interdependent levels of recurrent schemes, with some schemes higher than 
others, form a united whole as an interdependent, dynamic hierarchy.  Because the 
schemes in a series are related as progressively ascending, the whole is a hierarchy.  
Because lower schemes ground the higher ones and the higher schemes order the lower, 
                                                 
40 In understanding “sublation,” Lonergan relies to a degree on Hegel.  See Insight, 446-47. 
41 Bernard Lonergan, “Finality, Love, Marriage,” Collection, Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. 
Frederick Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 17, 22. 
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the parts are interdependent. Because there is change or motion both within individual 
schemes and among groups of schemes, the hierarchy is dynamic. 
What all of this means is that the world order of emergent probability is one of a 
dynamic, interrelated hierarchy of recurrent schemes.  The dynamic relations among 
levels of schemes result primarily from what Lonergan calls “vertical finality.” 
“Finality” denotes a thing’s goal, purpose, or end.  The scholastic theology of 
Lonergan’s early education included two notions of finality: “ultimate” or “absolute” and 
“proportional” or “proximate.” For Christians, God is the ultimate, absolute end of all 
things in creation.42  In other words, the ultimate finality of all created beings is directed 
toward God.  Proportional, proximate finality is the orientation toward a more immediate 
goal, particularly one proper to a thing’s or a group of things’ inherent capacities or 
potentialities.  For example, an apple tree’s ultimate end is to serve the glory of God, but 
its proximate end is to produce apples and eventually more apple trees. 
Vertical finality introduces a third type of goal, an in-between end. In a world 
characterized as an interdependent, dynamic hierarchy, a thing’s proportionate/proximate 
end is called its “horizontal” end.  God remains the ultimate, absolute end.43  Between 
these two, vertical finality indicates that, everything in a horizontal recurrent scheme has 
ends that are properly fulfilled on a higher-level recurrent scheme.  Continuing the 
                                                 
42 Following Thomas Aquinas, Lonergan affirms that “man and, as well, all creatures according to their 
mode naturally love God above al things.  And, of course, this love of God above all is only a particular 
case of the general theorem that absolutely all finality is to God.”  Ibid., 25, citing Summa Theologica, 1-2, 
q. 109, a. 3 c.; Questiones quodlibetales, 1, a. 8 c. & ad 3m. 
43 If one were to imagine the three types of finality as vectors, horizontal finality is well imagined as a 
horizontal line.  Ultimate finality is perhaps best imagined, to the degree possible, as an infinite vertical 
line.  Vertical finality may be imagined as either a short vertical line directed from a lower level to a higher 
one, or as a short diagonal line directed from a lower level to a higher one, as Lonergan depicts in “Finality, 
Love, Marriage,” 42. 
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example above, we might say that the apple tree’s vertical finality includes providing 
sustenance and shelter to birds and other animals (sensitive life-forms) whose proper 
existence rests on a higher scheme of recurrence.  Of course, birds and other higher 
animal life cycles depend not merely on apples, but on the entire hierarchy of physical, 
chemical, and biological cycles that make up the earth. 
Lonergan’s most common example of vertical finality is that of oxygen.  Its 
horizontal, or essential, end is “to perform the offices of oxygen as oxygen, but its more 
excellent [vertical] end is its contribution to the maintenance of human life and this end 
attains not in isolation nor per se but in combination with other elements and within the 
human biological process.”44  
Vertical finality is studied not by scholastic philosophy and theology, but by 
natural science.  Abstractly, any thing can be considered in isolation and known to have 
absolute and horizontal ends, but vertical finality is discovered only by considering the 
dynamic whole, for “vertical finality seems to operate through the fertility of concrete 
plurality.”45  A cosmology that accounts for this “fertility of concrete plurality” does 
better justice to the actual cosmos than an abstract cosmology.  “For the cosmos is not an 
aggregate of isolated objects hierarchically arranged on isolated levels, but a dynamic 
whole in which… one level of being or activity subserves another.”46  
Lonergan summarizes emergent probability as “the successive realization in 
accord with successive schedules of probability of a conditioned series of schemes of 
                                                 
44 “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 22. 
45 Ibid., 20. 
46 Ibid., 21-22. 
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recurrence.”47  The world order it envisions is a dynamic world process, characterized by 
(1) “successive world situations,” (2) an “initial world situation” valued only for the 
possibilities it contains and the probabilities for these possibilities’ realization, (3) an 
openness to new possibilities emerging according to probability (versus determinism and 
indeterminate change or merely random chance), (4) increasingly systematic relations,  
(5) the possibility of “enormous differentiation” especially given large numbers, large 
spaces, and a long time, (6) the possibility of breakdown, since survival is only probable, 
(7) the possibility of “blind alleys,” or a stunted development, since material that might 
be used in higher schemes can get bound in earlier schemes, (8) later schemes having 
narrower distribution, (9)  long periods of time being required for less probable later 
schemes to emerge, (10) larger initial absolute numbers required to offset blind alleys and 
breakdowns, (11) generic intelligibility, since it anticipates classical and statistical laws 
but leaves the “determinate content” of particular laws to natural science.48 
In sum, emergent probability is Lonergan’s cosmology.  It is an account of the 
ordering of the cosmos as a result of the divine wisdom that makes world order prior to 
individual things.  It understands the cosmos as fertile and dynamic, as providing 
conditions for the possibility of its elements to combine in unpredictable but intelligible 
ways that are creative49 of new levels of interdependent recurrent schemes. 
                                                 
47 Insight, 148-49. 
48 Ibid., 149-50. 
49 From the old, new things arise. From the elements of lower levels, there is an emergence of new sets of 
intelligible relationships, new wholes drawn from previously non-systematically related elements.  But this 
is not in the strict, theological sense of creation ex nihilo, or from nothing.  See “Healing and Creating in 
History,” A Third Collection, Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 102.  
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1.3.  Insight and The Self-Correcting Process of Learning 
The previous section considered Lonergan’s understanding of the cosmos as a 
dynamic order governed by emergent probability.  Human beings are part of this cosmos.  
We have emerged from the creative world-process of emergent probability.  As a 
relatively late emergence, humanity is a complex entity subject to the classical and 
statistical laws on its physical, chemical, biological, and higher levels.  While humanity is 
subject to the laws and ordering of the cosmos, with the advent of humanity arrive two 
things new to creation:  (1) a creature’s ability to discover and to work with classical and 
statistical laws, and thus to guide and to accelerate emergent probability, and (2) the 
possibility of the rejection of creation’s order, i.e., sin.  Without humanity, any progress 
or positive emergence in the world would be more limited (without the acceleration of 
self-aware guidance).  On the other hand, there would be no decline (brought about by 
sin).50  The remainder of this chapter will discuss humanity’s unique role in creation and 
progress, through insight, a broader transcendental method, and a still broader 
cooperating human community.  Sin and decline will be studied in the next chapter. 
1.3.1.  Insight into Insight 
 In a world organized hierarchically on physical, chemical, and biological levels, 
humanity adds levels of intelligence,51 reflectivity, responsibility, civilization, culture, 
and religion.  In Lonergan’s view, human intelligence is a basic category applicable in all 
human endeavors.  It gives humanity the unique ability to discover, to guide, and to 
                                                 
50 Would there be redemption without humanity?  There certainly would not be a redemption from sin. 
51 Lonergan did not write much if anything about animal intelligence and the boundaries between it an 
human intelligence. 
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accelerate world processes of emergent probability.  Thus, human intelligence is perhaps 
the main engine for human progress.52  At the same time, however, human intelligence is 
itself a developing entity.  We are intelligent in our potential more than in actuality.  
Consequently, human beings are in the difficult position whereby our intelligence must 
guide our activity before that intelligence is fully formed.53  Nevertheless, there is a great 
freedom and responsibility that comes with the use of the human intellect, both for the 
individual and for society.  Through recurrent human schemes of “insight, 
communication, persuasion, agreement, decision,” the binding significance of underlying 
planetary, chemical, and biological schemes diminishes.54  This is not to say, however, 
that these underlying schemes are ever completely transcended. 
 If human intelligence is fundamental to human development, and if there is 
indeed a way in which intelligence itself must develop, then how does it develop?  How 
does it function? And how can we best harness it for the good of human society?  
Lonergan’s largest and perhaps most famous work, Insight, A Study of Human 
Understanding, is—as its title indicates—a study of human insight, the primary product 
of human intelligence.  Its purpose, as Lonergan explains in its preface and introduction, 
is “to thoroughly understand what it is to understand,” to gain “insight into insight.”55  
Highly abstract and theoretical, Insight is not merely an abstract, theoretical work.  Its 
ultimate aim is pedagogical and practical.  It is pedagogical because “the aim is not to set 
                                                 
52 This is true for Lonergan  in Insight.  Method in Theology, published almost fifteen years after Insight, 
gives a broader picture of human progress that includes the human response to value, the exercise of 
freedom, and the effects of love, as we shall see in section 1.4. 
53 Insight, 711; “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 24. 
54 Insight, 236. 
55 Insight, 22, 8. 
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forth a list of the abstract properties of human knowledge but to assist the reader in 
effecting a personal appropriation of the concrete dynamic structure immanent and 
recurrently operative in his [or her] own cognitional activities.”56  A personal grasp of 
one’s “own cognitional activities” is practical, because these activities produce the 
understanding or misunderstanding that results in progress or decline.  By heightening 
one’s awareness of the processes that can generate insight and thus progress, one 
increases the likelihood of successfully generating insight and progress.57  Insight is so 
central to progress that Lonergan states, “insight into insight brings to light the 
cumulative process of progress.”58  So just what is insight?  What does it mean to 
understand? 
Insight, or at least the cognitive process of coming to insight, begins with the 
conscious desire to understand.  Human beings are not, however, always conscious.  
Lonergan contrasts human “consciousness” or “subjectivity” with human “nature” or 
“substance.”  Fundamentally and at all times, the human person is substance, or an 
instance of being.  When one lies in a dreamless sleep, one is alive, but barely conscious, 
and thus not fully a subject as Lonergan defines it. 
The beginnings human subjectivity come in conscious dreams.  Then, upon 
waking, our consciousness leaps to a new level.  Even on waking one is not immediately 
intelligent, Lonergan says.  It is only gradually that one comes first to a basic, sensitive 
awareness of her/his surroundings.  With this sensitive awareness, one may seek 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 12. 
57 Ibid., 6. 
58 Ibid., 8. 
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intelligible patterns in the environment.  If this environment is familiar, one will 
recognize it as normal, as understandable.  But if it is unfamiliar, even in just a single 
element, one will spontaneously wonder: What is that?  Before a person figures out what 
the unfamiliar element actually is, how it got there, why it got there, what it has to do 
with everything else, the person will feel tense due to a deep and spontaneous desire to 
understand his or her situation. 
This desire to understand is not limited to intellectuals or geniuses.  It is not a 
culturally conditioned characteristic.  Rather, it is a normal, natural aspect of human 
personhood and of the subject as conscious.59  This natural desire to understand is 
absolutely fundamental to Lonergan’s philosophy and theology.  He does not attempt to 
prove it but rather invites his reader to attend to her/his own interiority and verify this 
yearning within him or herself.60 
Insight is the proper fulfillment of this basic human desire.  It is what wonder 
seeks.  The arrival of insight releases the tension that accompanies the desire to know.  
Insight, or understanding, is the patterning or relating of distinct elements into an 
intelligible whole.  It is a central part of how human persons come to know and to do just 
about anything.  For example, to understand this text, or any text, one cannot rely merely 
on seeing the text or running one’s eyes over the page.  Taking a good look does not—by 
itself—bring knowledge.  A further step needs to be made.  This step is taken not by the 
senses but by the mind.  Human intelligence relates lines into letters, letters into words, 
                                                 
59 “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 241; Insight, 372-74. 
60 The entire book, Insight, is an invitation to this personal exploration.  Lonergan reveals his pedagogical 
method in the introduction (pp., 11-24). 
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words into sentences.  One understands the meaning of letters, words, and sentences 
through one’s mind and not just with one’s eyes.  Knowing begins with experience 
(either sense experience or the experience of one’s interiority or inner experience61), but 
it is realized only in the further operations of authentic questioning, understanding, and 
judging.62 
To portray dramatically the characteristics of insight, Lonergan tells the famous 
story of Archimedes leaping naked out of the Syracuse baths to run around yelling, 
“Eureka!”  King Hiero had charged Archimedes with discovering whether a crown was 
pure gold. Archimedes puzzled intently over the question until the answer struck him as 
he was entering the baths.  The story brings to light five characteristics of insight.  In the 
first place, insight 
comes as a release to the tension of inquiry.… Deep within us all, emergent when the 
noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to 
discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain. … It [inquiry, the desire to know] can 
fill his [or her] waking thoughts, hide from him the world of ordinary affairs, invade the 
very fabric of his dreams.  It can demand endless sacrifices that are made without regret 
though there is only the hope, never a promise of success.  What better symbol could one 
find for this obscure, exigent imperious drive, than a man, naked, running excitedly 
crying, “I’ve got it”?63 
 
Secondly, insight comes suddenly, unexpectedly, “Archimedes’ insight did not 
occur while he was in the mood and posture that a sculptor would select to portray “The 
Thinker.”  It came to him in a flash, on a trivial occasion, in a moment of relaxation.”64  
Insight is reached 
                                                 
61 Lonergan discusses both the data of sense and the data of consciousness (Insight, 95-97, 206-7, 260-61, 
299-300). 
62 To be discussed in section 1.4. of this chapter. 
63 Insight, 28-29. 
64 Ibid., 29. 
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in the last analysis, not by learning rules, not by following precepts, not by studying any 
methodology.  Discovery is a new beginning.  It is the origin of new rules that 
supplement or even supplant the old.  Genius is creative.  It is genius precisely because it 
disregards established routines, because it originates the novelties that will be the routines 
of the future.65 
 
Third, insight is a function more of inner conditions than of outer circumstances.  
Insight is not the product of mere sensation.  Many people can share an experience, but 
each can come to different interpretations of the experience depending on their 
intelligence, attentiveness, and inquisitiveness.  Many people shared the baths with 
Archimedes, but only he had the question. 
Fourth, insight “pivots” between the concrete/particular and the abstract/universal. 
Insights arise in particular, concrete situations, as possible solutions to particular 
problems, but they tend to have “a significance greater than their origins and a relevance 
wider than their original applications.”66  One needs concrete images and other data from 
the senses to get insight, but insight is best expressed in the abstract language such as that 
of math and science.  So Archimedes’ insight provided a concrete solution to a concrete 
problem, but it has general implications that can only be expressed in “the abstract 
formulations of the principles of displacement and specific gravity.”67 
Fifth, though an insight is initially surprising, it becomes rudimentary. Before one 
solves a problem, the problem is difficult.  “But once one has understood, one has crossed 
a divide.  What a moment ago was an insolvable problem now becomes incredibly simple 
and obvious.  Moreover, it tends to remain simple and obvious.”68  Once Archimedes had 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 30. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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his insight, he could explain it readily to the king.  A similar process happens in diverse 
areas of human inquiry. 
1.3.2.  Insight and Progress: Common Sense and Science 
Such is insight, but how does insight drive progress?  Early in the book Insight, 
Lonergan answers briefly and compactly: 
[C]oncrete situations give rise to insights which issue into policies and courses of action.  
Action transforms the situation to give rise to further insights, better policies, more 
effective courses of action.  It follows that if insight occurs, it keeps recurring; and at each 
recurrence knowledge develops, action increases its scope, and situations improve.69 
 
 “Concrete situations,” are the real, everyday events and occasions any person, 
anywhere, at any time might encounter.  Concrete situations give rise to questions, 
concerns, problems, and opportunities.  Each person encounters unique situations in 
unique ways, but there is some overlap.70   In the task of everyday living, all people 
wonder: What’s going on?  What should I do?  How I should live?  How can we make 
things better?  Everyone comes to some ideas or insights about how to live, and we all act 
on those ideas.  Our ideas and our actions change the situations.  New situations cause us 
to wonder anew: What’s going on?  What should I do?  How should I live? How can we 
make things better? 
 The process by which living gives rise to questions, questions lead to answers, 
answers lead to new ways of living, and new ways of living lead to new questions, and so 
forth, Lonergan calls the “self-correcting process of learning.”71  This process works in 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 8. 
70 “[O]ur separate, unrevealed, hidden cores have a common circle of reference, the human community, and 
an ultimate point of reference, which is God, who is all in all” (“Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 240, “Self-
Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious,” 314). 
71 “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 174; Insight, 197-98, 311-12, 314-16, 325, 328-29, 370, 729) 
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all fields, no matter what a person may do—from farming and construction to baseball 
and rap to brain surgery and rocket science.  Thus, Lonergan affirms that “one meets 
intelligence in every walk of life.”72  The pursuit and the implementation of insight are 
fundamental to human endeavors, because they are essential to human nature.  In support 
of this, Lonergan affirms that the “light and drive of intelligent inquiry” may be most 
visible in little children, particularly in their “secret wonder that, once the mystery of 
language has been unraveled, rushes forth in a cascade of questions…. The child would 
understand everything at once.”73 
This self-correcting process of learning, with insight at its core, occurs on a 
communal level as well.  Human living is communal living.  Through communal 
experimentation, discussion, and collaboration, ideas are tested and refined.  Society is 
not static but an ongoing project spanning generations.  The social self-correcting process 
of learning produces “a common fund of tested answers.” Though it may be the product 
of thousands of years and millions of people, this fund remains ever incomplete and thus 
ever subject to the self-correcting process of learning.  In other words, on a social scale, 
the natural human tendency toward spontaneous questioning, answering, testing, and 
collaborating leads to a “public store” or “common fund” that Lonergan calls “common 
sense.”74 
Common sense is common, but it is not general in the way math or science is 
common.  Algebra and chemistry, for example, are not bound to a local community and 
                                                 
72 Insight., 196 
73 Ibid., 196-97. 
74 Ibid., 197-98.  Common Sense is the main topic of chs. 6 and 7.   
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local culture to the degree that common sense is.  This is not so much a flaw of common 
sense, but an aspect of its purpose.  Common sense specializes in answering particular 
and practical questions that people face in their everyday, concrete living.  Though 
particular situations are never exactly the same, there is a great degree of commonality in 
the daily routines followed by people living within a given natural or social environment.  
Different groups distinguished by location, or even by occupation and other social 
arrangements, will each have distinct versions of common sense.75  Individuals who 
operate in multiple communities will have to master multiple common senses, such as 
those found at home, in the workplace, at church, and in the nation. 
A common sense is simply a common fund of insights, a general storehouse of 
tools developed over time by a community.  To make a standing, common fund relevant 
and applicable to a new, particular problem, one normally will need to add at least one 
new insight into the current situation.76  This is true because each concrete situation will 
have some conditions similar to other situations encountered by the community, but it 
will also have some conditions that are unique. 
Due to this combination of similarity and uniqueness, or the general and the 
particular, common sense works through hints and pointers more than by necessary rules.  
Its tools are proverbs and stories rather than scientific theories.  As a common fund, 
common sense is not the same as the communal discourses of academic research.  It does 
not aspire to the systemization or the universality of science.  Its language is not technical 
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76 Ibid. 
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or formal.  “As the proverb has it, a wink is as good as a nod.”77  To convey meaning, 
common sense uses the imprecise but effective expressions of body language, gesture, 
pause, tone, and volume.  Common sense is temendously resourceful in dealing with the 
vast and varied exigencies of human communication, which often is not simply the 
communication of concepts but a self-communication.  For such a task, common sense 
must be adaptable to situation and audience:  “For common sense not merely says what it 
means; it says it to someone; it begins by exploring the other fellow’s intelligence; it 
advances by determining what further insights have to be communicated to him [or her]; 
it undertakes the communication, not as an exercise in formal logic, but as a work of 
art…”78 
Common sense is logical in the sense of “intelligent and reasonable,” but its logic 
is not formal and scientific in the sense of conforming to “a set of general rules valid in 
every instance of a defined range.”79  Science, as defined by Lonergan, seeks to 
understand things as they exist in relation to each other, while common sense is content 
to know things as they are related to us or to oneself.  Thus, for example, common sense 
describes the weather as “hot” or “cold,” and science explains the weather by measuring 
one temperature in relation to other temperatures, such as 28º or 98º Fahrenheit. 
Another aspect of the common-sense focus on things as they are related to oneself 
is a single-minded concern for the practical application or “usefulness” of knowledge.  
This is perhaps the most significant difference between common sense and science.  A 
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scientist may very well be interested in the technological application of his or her 
research, but s/he may also be motivated by a “pure desire to know” a desire for 
knowledge for its own sake rather than for its usefulness.80  Common sense, on the other 
hand, is “bounded by the interests and concerns of human living, by the successful 
performance of daily tasks, by the discovery of immediate solutions that will work.  
Indeed, the supreme canon of common sense is the restriction of further questions to the 
realm of the concrete and particular, the immediate and the practical.”81 
This focus on the concrete, particular, immediate, and practical is the strength of 
common sense—all people, including scientists, philosophers, and mystics, use common 
sense to navigate their daily lives.  However, this focus is also its weakness.  Lonergan 
emphasizes that common sense is an indispensable aspect of knowing, but he also 
stresses that it is not the only aspect of knowing.  There is more to life than what is 
immediately practical.  If one over-emphasizes the role of common sense, one will 
behave like a ten year old in math class, asking:  Who cares?  What difference does that 
make?  “[A]nd if the answer is less vivid and less rapid than an advertisement,” a person 
bound by common sense will not care about it.  There are many practical applications to 
math, science, history, philosophy, and other academic disciplines, but these are longer-
term developments not quickly recognized by common sense.82  Lonergan dramatizes the 
                                                 
80 See Insight, 372-74, and Bernard Lonergan, “Openness and Religious Experience,” Collection, Papers by 
Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 198. 
81 Insight, 201. 
82 More on the relation of common sense to other forms of knowing will follow in section 1.5.5. of this 
chapter. 
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tendency of common sense to restrict one’s interest to the immediately practical:  
“Rockets and space platforms are superfluous if you intend to remain on this earth.”83 
1.3.3.  Common Sense, Sensitivity and Spontaneous Intersubjectivity  
As a public fund of traditional insights into a community’s daily concerns, 
common sense is indispensable for human progress.  Common sense intends to stay “on 
this earth,” because that is its role—it specializes in serving the community’s everyday 
needs and desires.  On a basic level there are needs for particular goods—goods needed 
not once and for all but repeatedly and regularly.  In addition to such frequency, we 
desire not only the familiar but also the novel.  Moreover, not even a steady flow of novel 
and familiar goods will keep us satisfied, for the human person spontaneously and 
naturally desires to craft a dignified living, to become the kind of person s/he can be 
happy with and proud of.  Such a craft is complicated, for on multiples levels, each 
person has individual “needs and wants, pleasures and pains, labor and leisure, enjoyment 
and privation.”84  Finally, there is a natural human need and desire for community, for 
falling in love. 
As discussed in the previous section, common sense is a common fund that grows 
from the self-correcting process of learning, i.e., social situations lead to questions, 
questions lead to insights, and insights transform the social situation.  A significant 
element of the social situation is the community’s needs and desires.  Thus, common 
sense develops in relation to a community’s needs and desires.  It is not merely the 
servant of these needs and desires; it exists in a creative tension with them. 
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Although insight is a significant component of human progress, human beings are 
not simply cool and rational.  There is more to our decisions than a self-correcting 
process of learning.  Both individually and socially people tend to make decisions 
spontaneously.  We typically identify the good not with an answer to a question but with 
some immediate object of desire.85 
Lonergan locates the source of such desire as well as other spontaneous feelings 
in what he calls “sensitivity and spontaneous intersubjectivity.”86  They form a kind of 
pre-critical, pre-reflective level of human living.  They are natural and personal, but they 
are not simply natural or purely individualistic, neither “animal impulse” nor “egoistic 
scheming.”87 
To some degree the individual’s spontaneous desires, feelings, and preferences 
are natural, but to some degree they are habituated by society.  As with common sense 
and science, the relation between common sense and “sensitivity and spontaneous 
intersubjectivity” is not one of competition but of cooperation. Common sense seeks 
ways to fulfill spontaneous needs and desires, but it must also arbitrate between 
competing needs and desires.  In serving and arbitrating a community’s needs and 
desires, common sense works with natural human needs and desires and it forms a 
community’s aesthetic taste, food preferences, physical habits, daily routines, and more.  
So, for example, the members of one culture may prefer spicy food, afternoon naps, and 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 237-239, 723.  Lonergan recognizes multiple kinds of feelings as we shall see in section 1.4.1.3 of 
this chapter. 
87 Insight, 711. 
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late workdays, while another will prefer salty food, no naps, and an early end to the 
workday. 
Not only are our needs and desires not purely natural, they are not entirely 
individualistic or egotistical. Rather, Lonergan affirms, there is a spontaneous 
intersubjectivity that binds persons in community: 
Prior to the “we” that results from the mutual love of an “I” and a “thou,” there is 
the earlier “we” that precedes the distinction of subjects and survives its oblivion.  This 
prior “we” is vital and functional.  Just as one spontaneously raises one’s arm to ward off 
a blow against one’s head, so with the same spontaneity one reaches out to save another 
from falling.  Perception, feeling, and bodily movement are involved, but the help given 
another is not deliberate but spontaneous.  One adverts to it not before it occurs but while 
it is occurring.  It is as if “we” were members of one another prior to our distinctions of 
each from the others.88 
 
The spontaneous, intersubjective bonds are most clear in the family, but they also 
provide the basis for civilization, and they remain even when a civilization assigns other, 
non-spontaneous social relationships (such as formal relations between teacher and 
student). 
Although they can reinforce cultivated social bonds and common sense, 
sensitivity and spontaneous intersubjectivity may be in tension with common sense 
reasoning.  For example, after years of scientific research, health campaigns, and 
shifting public opinion, a person may know that regular exercise is good and want to do 
it, but s/he could spontaneously avoid it.  In addition to natural spontaneous desires, 
there are learned habits and desires that become spontaneous.  So common sense can tell 
one that smoking is bad, but one may still crave a cigarette.  Such oppositions between 
what a person or a society knows to be good and what is spontaneously desired is 
                                                 
88 Method, 57.  One may recognize the language of Martin Buber.  See also, Insight, 237 and “Finality, 
Love, Marriage,” 24. 
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problematic, because human beings are naturally inclined to act in harmony with both 
spontaneous desires and common sense insight.89 
On a social level there might form subgroups with desires, feelings, and ideas that 
are more or less in harmony with the good of the whole society.  In the ideal situation 
society maintains harmony among various subgroups by peaceful means: 
It commands their esteem by its palpable benefits; it has explained its intricate demands in 
some approximate yet sufficient fashion; it has adapted to its own requirements the play of 
imagination, the resonance of sentiment, the strength of habit, the ease of familiarity, the 
impetus of enthusiasm, the power of agreement and consent.  Then a man’s interest is in 
happy coincidence with his work; his country is also his homeland; its ways are the 
obviously right ways; its glory and peril are his own.90 
 
Even in this ideal situation of harmony between the individual and the group, the 
group and the larger society, common sense will still remain in a kind of creative tension 
or “dialectic” with sensitivity and spontaneous intersubjectivity.  Lonergan defines 
dialectic as “a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change.”91  In this 
case, common sense92 and sensitivity and spontaneous intersubjectivity are the main 
principles of social progress.  They are “linked” because common sense is an effort of 
human intelligence to order things practically, and intersubjective desires and fears form 
the basis of what common sense orders.  They are “opposed” because as common sense 
advances in insight and in the technological, economic, and political ways of organizing a 
society, its member’s sensitivities and spontaneous intersubjectivities either lag behind in 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 241. 
90 Ibid.  The opposition of groups within society is discussed at greater length in the next chapter, as “group 
bias.” 
91 Ibid., 242. 
92 Here Lonergan speaks of common sense in a broad sense that includes the applied or practical aspects of 
natural and human sciences, such as technology, economics, and politics (Ibid., 242-43). 
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habituation, or they speeds ahead with desires and fears that common sense cannot yet 
meet.93 
Although a dialectical relationship between common sense and sensitivity and 
spontaneous intersubjectivity drives progress, it can also result in problems and even 
decline.  Decline is the subject of our next chapter, but let us consider how a problem 
might arise out of this dialectic.   In a given situation desires and fears arise from 
sensitivity and spontaneous intersubjectivity.  These desires and fears call for changes in 
the situation. Common sense seeks new insights into the situation and figures out what to 
do.  Acting on these insights transforms the situation, and once the situation is altered, it 
calls again for further adaptations to human spontaneity and sensibility and for new 
desires and fears.  For example, the need for food led to technological changes in food 
production.  For parts of the world, this has resulted in increased food production and 
decreased physical labor.  A negative aspect of such progress is the rising rate of obesity 
in societies where common-sense standards of self-moderation and spontaneous cravings 
have not yet adapted to the new bounty. 
The adaptation of sensitivity and spontaneous intersubjectivity requires a long and 
laborious process of discovery, teaching, learning, writing, reading, and persuasion.  “So 
it is that the present is ever a pattern of lags.  No one can postpone his [or her] living until 
he has learnt, until he has become willing, until his sensitivity has become adapted.”94  In 
                                                 
93 The demand for sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) provides a contemporary example.  When gas prices were 
low and environmental concerns were not widespread, SUVs became popular.  But with rising gas prices 
and global warming becoming accepted as fact, demand is falling.  Some members of society lag behind 
the shift, continuing to spontaneously desire an SUV, while others speed ahead, demanding imperfect 
hybrid cars. 
94 Ibid., 711. 
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other words, human beings must live before they have learned to live.  Providentially, we 
have other resources built into emergent probability beyond common-sense insight and 
beyond the desires and fears of sensitivity and spontaneous intersubjectivity.  There is 
more to human progress than insight and its creative tension with sensitivity and 
spontaneous intersubjectivity. 
1.4.  Transcendental Method:  The Larger Picture of Self-Transcendence 
 As we learned from the cosmological context of Lonergan’s anthropology, the 
world is orderd as a dynamic, interdependent hierarchy.  Lower levels of recurrent 
schemes set the conditions for the more or less probable emergence and survival of 
higher recurrent schemes.  Higher levels depend on the lower levels, but they also 
transcend, or go beyond them.  And they they do so in a way that sublates the lower ones, 
or lifts them up into a greater, richer context that preserves and fulfills them.  Lower 
levels are more essential to the whole, and higher levels are more excellent. 
 Humanity is a later and higher emergence in the cosmos.  It transcends and 
sublates material, chemical, and biological recurrent schemes into a larger psychological 
context.  We have considered insight and its role in the community’s and the world’s 
development, but insight is not the entire human contribution to emergent probability.  
The human person is complex.  Not only are we comprised of material, chemical, 
biological, and psychological levels, but on the psychological level there are is a 
multiplicity to the human person.   
Thus far, we have seen how on the lower, more essential of the psychological 
levels, the human person has spontaneous needs, desires, and fears.  We have seen how 
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on a higher intellectual level, one seeks to order those spontaneities in ways consistent 
with communal needs and common sense.  Finally, we have seen that these two levels 
exist in a creative, dialectical tension that can produce both progress and decline.  This is 
a rich picture, but it is not the full picture. 
1.4.1.  Four Levels of Conscious Intentionality 
Published fifteen years after Insight, Method in Theology extends Lonergan’s 
coverage of cognitive theory, epistemology, and metaphysics95 into the realms of ethics, 
or decision-making in a social context, and religion, or relationship with the absolutely 
transcendent.96  To Insight’s account of the human person as sensitive, spontaneously 
interpersonal, and intellectual, Method adds a more developed consideration of the person 
as concerned with value, exercising freedom, and falling in love. 
The core of Method’s anthropology is an analysis of human psychology or 
“conscious intentionality” according to four levels.  In each of the four levels, a person is 
conscious in the sense of being self-aware or self-present97 and intentional in the sense of 
seeking a goal.98  The four levels are:  (1) empirical, (2) intelligent, (3) rational,99 and (4) 
responsible.  Accordingly, each level is designated by one crucial kind of operation, 
namely experience, understanding, judgment, and decision.  Furthermore, each of these 
                                                 
95 Studies that answer, respectively:  “What am I doing when I am knowing?  Why is that knowing?  What 
do I know when I do it?”  Method, 25. 
96 Insight ends with relatively brief yet still very fruitful discussions on the “possibility” of ethics, and a 
general notion of and heuristic for transcendental, religious knowledge; see chs. 18-20. 
97 More will be said on this in section 1.4.1.1., below.  See also sections 1.1. and 1.3.1., above. 
98 See Method, 7-8.  The goals of each level will be discussed below. 
99 Lonergan distinguishes between reason/rationality and logic.  Reason is a broader term.  It can be both 
logical and non-logical. “The logical tend to consolidate what has been achieved.  The non-logical keep all 
achievement open to further advance.  The conjunction of the two results in an open, ongoing, progressive 
and cumulative process” (Ibid., 6). Logic operates on propositions, providing control and coherence.  
Reason facilitates discovery by an advertence to experience.  It judges ideas based on both empirical 
evidence and logical coherence with known truths.  More will be said in the following sections. 
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overarching operations, or levels, is comprised of multiple sub-operations.  Lonergan 
summarizes: 
There is the empirical level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move.  
There is an intelligent level on we inquire, come to understand, express what we have 
understood, work out the presuppositions and implications of our expression.  There is a 
rational level on which we reflect, marshal the evidence, pass judgment about the truth or 
falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement.  There is a responsible level on which we 
are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about 
possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions.100 
 
The operations relate to each other as levels generally do in a world of emergent 
probability:  by transcendence and sublation.101  Responsible decisions presuppose and 
go beyond rational judgments about reality. Rational judgments presuppose and go 
beyond intelligent understanding.  Understanding builds on experience.  Lonergan uses 
the term “levels” because a person’s movement from one operation to another expands
his/her consciousness.  Movement from one level to another constitutes personal grow
and ultimately social progress.  As in the self-correcting process of learning, experien
understanding, judgment, and decision both emerges from and transforms the concrete, 
social situation. 
 
th 
ce, 
                                                
The four levels do not constitute a rigid set of rules.102  Lonergan’s term for the 
four levels as a whole is “method,” which he defines as “a normative pattern of recurrent 
and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”103  Lonergan affirms 
 
100 Ibid., 9. 
101 Higher levels presuppose and build upon the lower.  The higher include but go beyond the lower, and 
the higher lift the lower to a greater context that fulfills the potential of the lower in ways the lower could 
not achieve on its own.  The “normal” movement is from the lowest level to the highest, but there are two 
exceptions to this general rule, by which the movement is from the higher levels down to the lower.  And 
while they are the exception, they actually form the larger context for the movement from below upwards, 
since much of what we know we do not first experience, we believe.  Method, 123-24, 41-47. 
102 Ibid., 6 
103 Method, 4. 
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that experience, understanding, judgment, and decision are operations performed by 
people of all walks of life throughout their daily lives.104  The operations are used in 
every human enterprise, from playing soccer to debating metaphysics.105  The method is 
a kind of “third way” between art and science and fundamental to both.106  Because the
method is (1) used in all fields, (2) comprised of operations that include and go beyond 
each other, and (3) the means of personal growth and social progress, Lonergan calls it a 
“transcendental method.” 
 
                                                
Let us examine the operations of this transcendental method in greater detail. 
1.4.1.1.  Experience 
 Lonergan’s use of the term “experience” differs in two ways from contemporary 
usage.  First, in everyday language, one might call someone “a person of experience” and 
mean that s/he has encountered a wide variety of situations and events, successes and 
failures, and thus has a great deal of “first-hand knowledge” as opposed to “mere book-
smarts.”  Lonergan’s use of experience is narrower than this.  For Lonergan, experience 
is much more basic.  It does not necessarily lead to knowledge, but it can be a first step.  
Two people can have the same experience and not come to the same conclusions.  For 
example, a two year old and a twenty-two year old watching a movie share an 
experience.  But they will learn very different things from the movie.  Experience for 
Lonergan does not yield knowledge but data. 
 
104 Ibid., 3-4. Lonergan does not attempt to prove this method.  Rather, he invites us in Method (14-21), as 
he did in Insight, to attend to our own consciousnesses and verify, augment, modify, or seek to deny his 
account. 
105 Religion and theology, however, are more than human achievements.  This method, thus, provides the 
“basic anthropological component” but not the “specifically religious component” (Method, 25). 
106 Method, 4.   
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While in this way Lonergan’s use of the word “experience” is narrower than 
contemporary usage, Lonergan’s is in some ways broader.  We tend to think of 
experience as the product of the physical senses—one experiences what one sees, hears, 
tastes, smells, or touches.  This is experience for Lonergan, but Lonergan would broaden 
the term from simply the realm of sense data to include what he calls the “data of 
consciousness.”  Consciousness, for Lonergan is the self-awareness or self-presence that 
occurs to some degree in dreams but more completely when one awakens.  The data of 
consciousness is what one gains when attending to one’s own conscious operations of 
desiring, fearing, questioning, understanding, judging, deliberating, deciding, loving, etc. 
For Lonergan, thus, experience is two-fold.  There is the presence of physical 
objects through the data of our physical senses.  Then there is the larger, more basic self-
presence gained in the data of consciousness.  Neither in itself is knowledge, but both 
may constitute a beginning of knowledge. 
1.4.1.2.  Understanding 
 A person’s experience gives rise to questions.  By our nature we wonder.  We 
desire to understand.  We want to know.  The human experience is the source of a 
potentially endless number of questions; however, Lonergan asserts that all questions can 
be divided into two main types:  Quid sit? (What is it?) and An sit? (Is it so?)107  The first 
is a question for intelligence.  It aims at insight, at understanding intelligible 
relationships, or, more traditionally, at the grasp of essences.  The second question is for 
                                                 
107 Ibid., 335. Lonergan follows Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas in distinguishing the two.  Cf., Insight, Ch. 
9. 
 
 47
reflection, for rational judgment.  It rests not in insight, intelligible relationships, or 
essences, but in reality, the facts, or existence. 
This is not to say that understanding and judgment are opposed.  However, the 
distinction between understanding and judgment or between “What is it?” and “Is it so?” 
is crucial for Lonergan.  The difference is similar to that between “hypothesis” and 
“conclusion” in modern scientific method.108  The former is a more or less interesting 
idea and the latter is (ideally) the knowledge of truth.  
Thus, as with experience, Lonergan uses the term, “understanding,” in a specific, 
technical sense that differs from the typical meaning.  In the common usage, when one 
says, “I understand,” one means, “I get it.  I know what you mean.  I know what’s going 
on.”  It could also express sympathy, indicating that one feels somewhat how the other 
feels.  By “understanding” Lonergan means neither knowing nor sympathizing. 
We have distinguished Lonergan’s use of understanding from both the common 
meaning of the term and his own use of the term, “judgment.”  But what does Lonergan 
mean by “understanding”?  Simply put, understanding is insight as well as the operation 
that grasps an insight.  Insight, as we have discussed in section 1.3.1, is the patterning or 
relating of multiple things (shapes, colors, words, events, etc.) into an intelligible whole.  
One understands what a thing is by grasping the relationships of the thing’s parts as well 
as the relationships of the thing to other things.  Complete understanding, of course, is 
had by understanding all things in all of their relationships, and such understanding is 
                                                 
108 Method, 5. 
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enjoyed by God alone.109  The absence of complete understanding does not, however, 
preclude the possibility of any understanding. 
1.4.1.3.  Judgment: Fact and Value 
  Knowledge, according to Lonergan, comes not in understanding, but in 
judgment.  Again, Lonergan uses the term in a particular, technical sense.  For Lonergan, 
knowledge is not a product of experience alone, of understanding alone, or of experience 
and understanding combined.  Rather, knowledge is a composite of experience, 
understanding, and the further step called judgment. 
Lonergan’s distinction between understanding and judgment may seem abstract 
and unhelpful.  But philosophers and thinkers influenced by philosophy, including 
theologians, spend much time and energy debating the nature of reality and how it can be 
known.  There are perhaps two dominant schools, materialists/empiricists (who believe 
reality physical and is known through the senses) and idealists (who believe the physical 
world is deceptive appearance and the real world of unchanging ideas is known by reason 
or intuition).110 
Lonergan acknowledges the important roles of both experience and understanding 
while avoiding the temptations to totalize the significance of either.  Experience provides 
the data (of sense and consciousness).  Understanding takes the data and uses questions to 
come up with ideas or insights.  Insights, however are “a dime a dozen.”111  
Understanding attains only possible intelligible relationships, while only judgment 
                                                 
109 See Insight, Ch. 19. 
110 Method, 213-14. 
111 Method, 13. 
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apprehends actual intelligible relationships, the facts, or the truth.  Insights are important, 
but they are simply ideas, and our ideas are often wrong.  There are many possible ways 
of understanding one’s experience, but reality is one.  To know the facts about reality, a 
person must correctly judge the correctness of his/her understanding of experience.112  
This process reflects the drama that plays out in courts of law.  The witnesses 
provide the experiential data.  Lawyers present different understandings or interpretations 
of the data.  The jury or judge attempts to judge impartially which lawyer’s interpretation 
is closest to the truth. Lawyers ask multiple questions of their witnesses, but there is only 
one question asked of the jury:  Is the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?113 
Clearly, if judgment is the way people come to know reality in all areas of human 
living, it is very important to determine the standards for making correct, reasonable, or 
impartial judgments.  If experience and intelligence alone are not reliable standards for 
objectivity, then what is?  Instinct?  Imagination?  Gut feelings?   An external authority 
(such as scientific experts, the wisdom of the ages, tradition, scripture, and revelation)?    
Lonergan affirms that these are invaluable for human living,114 however, the problem 
with these and other sources is that they too must be experienced, understood, and judged 
by a human person—if they are to be known by that person.  Thus, Lonergan’s standard 
for making a correct judgment is not some element of human subjectivity or some 
                                                 
112 Ibid., 230-33. Lonergan acknowledges that while reality is one, people’s understanding and judgment of 
reality is multiple.  Many will be correct but incomplete.  Then there is the possibility of error and bias.  
Lonergan asserts that error and bias are not necessary consequences of human subjectivity but failures and 
aberrations.  Thus, Lonergan takes a position against extreme forms of deconstruction, hermeneutics of 
suspicion, relativism, etc.  Chapters 10 and 11 of Method (“Dialectic” and “Foundations”) provide tools for 
identifying the causes of differences and promoting authentic agreement.  We will discuss bias in section 
2.2. of this chapter. 
113 There is, of course, a fourth step:  the judge has the responsibility to decide what to do based on the 
jury’s verdict.  This will be discussed in the next section, 
114 The importance of belief for Lonergan follows in section 1.5.3. of this chapter. 
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external authority.  Rather it is the whole person, what he calls “the authentic subject.”  
As Lonergan writes, “Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity.”115  
Authenticity is our topic for a future section (1.4.2), however, let us consider now the 
basic question:  How does one make a judgment?   
Judgment presupposes and builds upon experience and understanding.  Just as 
wonder or questioning provides the transition from experience to understanding, so a 
question raises one’s consciousness from understanding to the level of judgment.  The 
question that provides this transition is, Is it so? or Is it true?  When a person comes to 
some idea about her/his experience, s/he would fittingly begin to wonder whether or not 
his/her idea or insight is correct.  Lonergan calls this the question for “reflection” or 
“critical reflection.”116   To answer this question, a person must “marshal the 
evidence”117 or gather the empirical data involved in the situation.  Then s/he must 
compare the data to his/her insight or hypothesis. Does the data support the hypothesis?
If the evidence or data is deemed “sufficient” for supporting the insight or hypothesis, 
then a person makes a judgment of fact 
  
about the insight.118 
                                                
If the sufficiency of evidence grounds judgment of fact, then what determines 
sufficiency?  There are two factors involved:  (1) the verification of empirical conditions 
for the existence of a thing, and (2) the absence of “further pertinent questions” that 
might challenge the truth of an insight.119   For the first, Lonergan makes a distinction 
between the “formally unconditioned” and the “virtually unconditioned.”  The formally 
 
115 Ibid., 292. more on judgment and objectivity, see Insight, Ch. 10. 
116 Insight, 295-301; Method, 9-11. 
117 Method, 9. 
118 Insight, 304-05. 
119 Ibid., 309, 661-62, 105-6, 296-99.  Cf., Method, 35. 
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unconditioned exists with no conditions, period.  Only God exists as formally 
unconditioned.  Creation as a whole and any part of creation exists as virtually 
unconditioned.  There are conditions for its existence, but when the conditions necessary 
for its existence are fulfilled, it is called “virtually unconditioned.”120  When a person 
knows the conditions for the existence of something and can verify the conditions for its 
existence, then the person can know or judge for a fact that the thing exists.  To take a 
simple example, if I know that the conditions to judge a TV as working are that the TV 
turns on and that it receives and communicates images and sounds from a broadcast 
station, and if I have indeed verified that the TV turns on and is receiving and 
broadcasting images and sounds, I know that the TV works. 
The second factor, the absence of further pertinent questions illustrates the 
subjective aspect in authentic judgment.  It also illustrates Lonergan’s trust in the natural, 
human unrestricted desire to know.  Wonder, for Lonergan is an immanent standard for 
knowing the truth.  He believes that if a person does not have sufficient evidence for 
judging his/her idea as true, then s/he will reserve judgment, ideally.  If further pertinent 
questions arise, then the person will know that the evidence is not sufficient.121  There are 
many subjective conditions for a sufficient amount of pertinent questions to arise.  A 
person, by temperament, may be “rash” or “indecisive.”122  He or she may not have the 
prior experience, understanding, and judgments necessary for further questions to arise, 
and/or s/he may simply not have enough time to allow them to emerge.  Despite this 
                                                 
120 Ibid., 305; Method, 75-76. 
121 Insight, 308-09. 
122 Ibid., 312. 
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fragility of judgments, people make concrete judgments and live their lives by them all 
the time.  One can increase the probability of correct judgments “by intellectual alertness, 
by taking one’s time, by talking things over, by putting viewpoints to the test of 
action.”123  There are difficulties in making judgments of truth, however; Lonergan 
maintains the possibility of correct judgments from the fact that we make several of them, 
large and small throughout our daily lives. 
When one has correctly made a judgment and reached knowledge of an aspect of 
created reality or of the virtually unconditioned, one has completed what Lonergan calls 
“intellectual self-transcendence.”  The process begins in experience; it makes qualitative 
leaps in questions for intelligence, insights, and questions for reflection; however, one 
attains a complete stage of intellectual or “cognitive” self-transcendence only in the 
judgment of fact or truth.  “For a judgment that this or that is so reports, not what appears 
to me, not what I imagine, not what I think, not what I wish, not what I would be inclined 
to say, not what seems to me, but what is so.”124 
 Though judgment of fact is the fullness of intellectual self-transcendence, it is not 
the fullness of human self-transcendence as a whole, for human living does not consist 
merely in understanding and knowing but also in valuing and doing.125  Building on and 
going beyond intellectual self-transcendence is “moral self-transcendence.”126  The 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 310. 
124 Method, 104-05. This quote from Method is taken almost verbatim from “Horizons,” 9. 
125 Ibid.  In addition to “Horizons,” see “What are Judgments of Value?” one lecture in a series given at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1972, published in Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-
1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 140-56. 
126 And beyond moral self-transcendence, there is “religious self-transcendence,” to be discussed in section 
3.  For a wonderful, concise exposition of this three-fold self-transcendence, and an excellent introduction 
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“initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence” occurs after intellectual self-
transcendence, and is “constituted by the judgment of value.”127  In Method in Theology 
Lonergan builds on the cognitive analysis of Insight, adding an analysis of feelings as 
“intentional responses to value” and the judgment of value.128 
As judgments of truth judge insights, so judgments of value judge feelings.  
Feelings in Method play an expanded and perhaps substantially different role from that in 
Insight.  Whereas Insight discusses feelings as arising from sensitivity and spontaneous 
intersubjectivity on a level before and below the intellectual search for intelligibility and 
truth, Method distinguishes between two types of feelings,  “non-intentional states and 
trends” and “intentional responses,”129 the first of which seems to function before and 
below understanding and knowledge, while the second operates on a higher level than 
insight and judgment of fact.  For example, irritability is an example of a non-intentional 
state.  One typically will feel irritability before one understands what the cause is.   
Hunger is an example of a non-intentional trend.  Hunger, in general, does not intend a 
particular object.  It is not the result of intentionally apprehending and desiring some 
object.  On the other hand, one may have a very specific, intentional longing for a 
particular type of food after seeing, smelling, imagining, conceiving, or discussing it.  
                                                                                                                                                 
to Lonergan’s thought in general, see his essay, “Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious” (full 
reference above, at note 47).   
127 Method, 38. 
128 Only once does Lonergan mention judgment of value in Insight, and that is in the limited context of a 
judgment of the value of belief (p. 730).  Again, much of Method’s discussion of feelings and judgment of 
value is taken almost verbatim from “Horizons,” cited in full above.  A helpful secondary source on moral 
self-transcendence, feelings, and judgments of value is Brian Cronin, Value Ethics: A Lonergan 
Perspective (Nairobi: Consolatia Institute of Philosophy, 2006). 
129 Ibid., 30-31.  Lonergan cites his dependence for these distinctions on Dietrich von Hildebrand’s 
Christian Ethics (New York: David McKay, 1953). 
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This particular, intentional longing is the type of feeling that arises after and above 
experience, understanding and judgment of fact.130 
Such an intentional feeling is subject to a judgment of value in a way parallel to 
how insight is subject to a judgment of fact.  As insight grasps possible truth, so 
intentional feelings apprehend possible value.131   Lonergan attributes an indispensable 
role to such feelings, calling them “the mass and momentum and power of … conscious 
living.”132  However, he asserts that a person’s desires may exceed an object’s actual 
value, or one’s fears may be misplaced.  “What is agreeable may very well be what also 
is a true good.  But it also happens that what is a true good may be disagreeable.”133   
Hence the expression, “bitter medicine.” 
Because feelings apprehend only apparent or possible value, the further step of a 
judgment of value is required if one wishes to reach true values, or goods that exist in this 
world as independent of oneself or as “virtually unconditioned.”  Good judgments of 
value are not arbitrary impositions of the will.  Rather, they build on a person’s past 
experiences, insights, and judgments of both fact and value.  Furthermore, “the judgment 
of value presupposes knowledge of human life, of human possibilities proximate and 
remote, of the probable consequences of projected courses of action.”134  Ideally, it 
considers not simply personal preferences, but the entirety of creation and history. 
The identification of a virtually unconditioned value is achieved in a “simple” 
judgment of value.  Additionally there is a “comparative judgment of value” that 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid., 37. 
132 Method, 65. 
133 Ibid., 31. 
134 Ibid., 38. 
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determines which value or values is/are better or more urgent in general or in a particular 
circumstance.135  Life does not just involve choices between apparent and actual goods 
but also choices among various true goods.  Comparative judgments perform the needed 
task of sorting out values.  As a general scheme, Lonergan orders values in a dynamic, 
interdependent hierarchy, parallel to emergent probability’s hierarchy of being.136  He 
calls this hierarchy a “scale of values.”  On the first level are “vital values,” such as 
physical health.  Then come “social values,” particularly the good of order that relates 
vital values and provides the context for their fulfillment—the economy, for example.  
Thirdly, “cultural values” are grounded on vital and social values, yet they stand in 
judgment over vital and social goods, assigning meaning and value in community.  
Freedom of speech would be an example.  Fourth are “personal values,” the values of 
persons themselves, persons as self-transcendent, as loving and beloved, as creative, as 
originator of value.  Finally, there are “religious values,” which regard ultimate value, the 
divine.137 
It is the role of the compound judgment of value to order and relate values, ideally 
according to their relationship to all things in the created world and to God.  Judgments 
of value, both simple and compound, are, as stated above, the “initial thrust to moral self-
transcendence.”  The fullness of moral self-transcendence lies not in judgments, however, 
but in decision and action. 
1.4.1.4.  Decision, Liberty, and Moral Self-Transcendence 
                                                 
135 Ibid., 31, 39; “Horizons,” 16-17 
136 discussed above in section 1.2.4. 
137 Method, 31, 39. 
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 Together with value judgments, decision constitutes the fourth and final level of 
Lonergan’s transcendental method—a method human persons use in all walks of life to 
effect personal and social progress.  Decision builds upon the knowledge gained by a 
person’s experience, understanding, and judgment.  In decision one broadens one’s 
consciousness from a “disinterested” focus on the true and the good independent of me 
and my desires, to an “existential” concern for my concrete role in relation to the whole.  
One becomes interested not simply in knowing reality but in transforming reality.  There 
is a shift from intellectual self-transcendence to moral self-transcendence.  As the older, 
faculty psychology would have put it, decision is an activity of the will.138 
The turning point from judgment to decision, or from knowing to doing is a 
question—just as it was for the transitions from experience to understanding and from 
understanding to judgment.  However, the question for decision does not arise so much 
from the pure, disinterested desire to know, but from a personal and existential concern.  
After the unrestricted desire to know has brought one to relatively objective judgments 
about reality and the possibilities for reality, one spontaneously begins to wonder in a 
more subjective manner:   What should I do?139 
Typically, a person becomes aware of multiple possible courses of action, of 
many options to choose from.  The decision-making process, or “deliberation,” requires 
that a person evaluate each course carefully.  An authentic, morally self-transcendent 
                                                 
138 Faculty psychology is based on the Aristotelian, metaphysical view of the soul as comprised of various 
metaphysical faculties, including the intellect and the will.  See Method, 95-96, 259-60, 
139 Lonergan discusses the four levels in a series throughout the first chapter of Method.  The spontaneity of 
deliberative wonder is found on p. 18.  Lonergan acknowledges the possibility that one may not care to ask 
what one should do.  The extreme of this he calls “psychopaths” and a milder type, the “drifter”  (On 
psychopaths see Method, 18.  On drifters see Method, 40; “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 242; Topics in 
Education, 46.)  More will be said on the drifter in section 3.2.2. 
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decision is made in accord not simply with a calculus of pleasure and pain, but with one’s 
prior judgments of fact and value.140  However, while decision is based one’s prior 
judgments, it has a very different character from judgments.  A judgment is made in light 
of the unconditional desire to know.  This desire drives one with a certain necessity to 
assent to the virtually unconditioned truth or value of an existing thing.  A decision, 
however, does not have the same exigent character of necessity.  Rather, there is a great 
degree of personal freedom in decision. 
 This is not to say that decisions are completely unguided or open-ended.  As 
mentioned above, they are based on and should be made in accord with one’s prior 
judgments of truth and value.  Moreover, the existential character of decision gives it the 
weight of personal responsibility.  When making a choice, a person is choosing not 
simply one good among other goods, but also what to make of him/herself and of her/his 
world.141  Thus, decision is an exercise of freedom, but it can also transform the future 
context of one’s freedom and decision.  Due to this reciprocal relationship between 
freedom and decision, Lonergan distinguishes two types of freedom.  There is the 
“essential freedom” that human beings have in the abstract, simply by nature of being 
human.  In the concrete, however, a person’s choices can expand or limit her/his actual or 
“effective” freedom.142 
Applying a spatial metaphor, Lonergan demonstrates the existential significance 
of decision.  He distinguishes between (1) the freedom to choose a particular good from a 
                                                 
140 Method, 50.  Authenticity is the topic of the next section. 
141 Ibid., 121. 
142 See Insight.  643-47. 
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set of goods and thus to transform the set, and (2) a related but greater ability to choose 
oneself and thus to transform one’s entire world.  It is the distinction between choosing 
from particular goods within a horizon and choosing the horizon itself.  “Horizon” is 
Lonergan’s term for the scope of a person’s or a group’s knowledge and interest.  
“Horizontal liberty” enables a person to select particular things within a given horizon.  
The positive exercise of “vertical liberty” is a wondrous leap of freedom, a whole new 
level of self-transcendence that allows for the broadening one’s whole horizon and thus a 
radical increase in the available goods to be known, desired, loved, and served.143 
In other words, morally self-transcendent decision and action would increase a 
person’s “effective freedom.”  Morally speaking, an exercise of vertical liberty increases 
not only the selection of particular goods available for the choosing, but it also increases 
one’s future ability to make good choices.  Over time, a person grows in the discernment 
of values.  Her/his feelings change.  Ideally, true goods that once felt dissatisfying 
become satisfying, and lesser goods that were overvalued become viewed in proper 
perspective.144  With this development of knowledge and feeling, one grows in liberty.  
One becomes less and less a slave to one’s satisfactions and less and less attracted to 
merely apparent goods. 
When we decide to do the good that we have judged, and when we act on this 
decision, we achieve a full measure of moral self-transcendence, and we become 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 40-41.  Lonergan credits Joseph de Finance for the insights into vertical and horizontal liberty and 
refers us to de Finance’s book, Essai sur l’agir humain (Rome: Presses de l’Université Grégorienne, 1962), 
287 ff.  Cf., Method, 235-37; Topics in Education, 88-91; and the entire essay, “Horizons.”  
144 Method, 32. 
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“principles of benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and of true 
love.”145 
1.4.2.  Authenticity 
The key to Lonergan’s ideas about transcendental method and human progress is 
the notion of authenticity.  Thus far, we have used the term “authentic” to identify correct 
judgments and good decisions, and we have said Lonergan’s standard for achieving 
objectivity is the authentic subject.  Authenticity, thus, identifies both a type of operation 
and a type of person.  Furthermore, it is the result of, the cause of, and in some ways the 
same as personal self-transcendence and social progress.146 
The notion of authenticity underlies Lonergan’s rather sunny views on human 
nature and human history.  As stated at the beginning of this chapter, nature and progress 
are theoretical abstractions.  The current, concrete reality of human existence is always a 
mixture of nature, sin and grace—or progress, decline, and redemption.  Reality is 
complex.  Perhaps surprisingly, however, Lonergan believes that precisely because 
reality is complex, it is helpful to abstract particular aspects of reality in order to facilitate 
clear consideration of concrete problems and thereby to increase the likelihood of solving 
these problems. 
In order not to gain an unrealistically positive image of the human situation, or an 
equally unrealistic and negative view of Lonergan’s thought, it is important to remember 
that authentic human operation is an abstraction, merely an aspect of the whole picture.  
                                                 
145 Ibid., 35.  Cf., 104, 289. 
146 See Method, 104: “Man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence;” and Ibid., 228: “Authenticity can 
be shown to generate progress…”  (Complete quote to follow.) 
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As Lonergan writes, “Authenticity can be shown to generate progress, unauthenticity to 
bring about decline, while the problem of overcoming decline provides an introduction to 
religion.”147 
Authenticity is an ideal.  But it is an ideal that can be very helpful for human 
living—just as while nothing falls at 9.8 meters per second squared, the abstraction of 
earthly gravity is helpful for technological development.  In reality, authenticity is not 
merely the product of natural human capabilities but also of divine grace.  We shall leave 
the graced aspects of authenticity to the third chapter of this part and focus now on three 
natural aids to promoting authenticity. 
First, and very practically, Lonergan presents four guidelines for authentic 
observance of the transcendental method.  They are called the “transcendental precepts”:  
be attentive; be intelligent; be reasonable; and be responsible.148 
On an empirical level one should be attentive in order to get the most out of one’s 
experience.  One pays attention by directing one’s intentional consciousness to an object 
or objects and thus shifting one’s awareness of an object from the “background” of one’s 
mind to the “foreground.”  By paying attention, one gathers more data on the world, 
including oneself.  On the next level, when understanding, it is best to be intelligent.  
Intelligence is the ability to grasp patterns or relationships.  It is manifested in 
spontaneous questions.  By intelligent wonder, one comes to better ideas.  To make the 
best judgments, one should be reasonable.  Being reasonable does not mean abiding 
always by logic but making critical conclusions based on the best ideas verified by solid 
                                                 
147 Method, 288. 
148 Ibid., 53, 55, 231. 
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evidence.  In reasonable judgment one comes to know truth.  Finally, good decisions 
require that one be responsible.  Responsibility is the ability to conform one’s actions to 
one’s knowledge and values, as well as the awareness that one’s choices affect not 
merely the objects that one chooses but also oneself and the entire world.  Ultimately, 
personal responsibility entails acting out “of benevolence and beneficence, of honest 
collaboration and of true love.”149 
 These precepts are of fundamental import not only to academic disciplines or to 
personal self-transcendence but to the entire range of practical and social progress: 
Being intelligent includes a grasp of hitherto unnoticed or unrealized possibilities.  Being 
reasonable includes the rejection of what probably would not work but also the 
acknowledgement of what probably would.  Being responsible includes basing one’s 
decisions and choices on an unbiased evaluation of short-term and long-term costs and 
benefits to oneself, to one’s group, to other groups.   
Progress, of course, is not some single improvement but a continuous flow of 
them….  So change begets change, and the sustained observance of the transcendental 
precepts makes these cumulative changes an instance of progress.150 
 
The transcendental precepts are internal commands, built into human 
consciousness.  When followed, they move us beyond ourselves to authenticity in our 
experience, understanding, judgment and decision.  They are rooted in a vague awareness 
of a reality beyond our knowing. No matter how much a person knows or even how much 
society as a whole knows, there are limits to this knowledge.  When we become aware of 
our limits, we encounter a “known unknown,” which we can probe in our questions.151  
Though our encounter with the known unknown may only be a vague awareness, we will 
not be content to rest in ignorance, for the known unknown causes a “radical intending 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 104.    Collaboration and love are topics for our next section. 
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that moves us from ignorance to knowledge” and to conscientious action in line with this 
knowledge.152  This radical intending of the unknown that drives us through questions to 
increase our knowledge Lonergan calls the “transcendental notions.” They are our second 
natural aid in authenticity: 
The transcendental notions are the dynamism of conscious intentionality.  They promote 
the subject from lower to higher levels of consciousness, from the experiential to the 
intellectual, from the intellectual to the rational, from the rational to the existential.…  
Not only do the transcendental notions promote the subject to full consciousness and 
direct him to his goals.  They also provide the criteria that reveal whether the goals are 
being reached.153 
 
There is a dual meaning in the transcendental notions.  On the one hand “they 
intend everything about everything” and on the other “it is by them that we intend the 
concrete, i.e., all that is to be known about a thing.”154  They are both “the very dynamism 
of our conscious intending”155 and “what is intended”156 by our conscious operations.  
Lonergan states clearly that the transcendental notions are “beauty,” “the intelligible,” 
“the true,” “the real” or “being,” and “the good” or “value.”157 
The first four notions, beauty, the intelligible, the true, and the real/being are 
intended on the first three levels of consciousness:  experience, understanding, and 
judgment.  This means that we are not content to appreciate and to know one thing or one 
                                                 
152 Ibid., 11.  See also 34-35. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 23, emphasis added. 
155 Ibid., 12, emphasis added. 
156 Ibid., 34, emphasis added.  I believe this dual meaning has something to do with Aristotle’s notion of the 
final cause—a good which is both the final goal and the original mover/motive. 
157 Method, 13, 34, 36.  Lonergan cautions against confusing these transcendental notions with often 
mistaken, rigid concepts of them (Ibid., 12). 
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aspect of a thing.  Deep down, when the noise of the world is stilled, we naturally want to 
know and to appreciate “everything about everything.”158 
On the fourth level, decision-making, the transcendental notion of value or the 
good prevents one from finding peace until one has acted in a way that is truly good for 
all people, in both the short term and the long run.  The notion of transcendent value 
drives consciousness into conscience.  “The nagging conscience is the recurrence of the 
original question that has not been met.  The good conscience is the peace of mind that 
confirms the choice of something truly worthwhile.”159 
Lonergan summarizes his position that the transcendental notions function as 
standards for authenticity immanent in human consciousness: 
The drive to understand is satisfied when understanding is reached but it is dissatisfied 
with every incomplete attainment and so it is the source of ever further questions.  The 
drive to truth compels rationality to assent when evidence is sufficient but refuses assent 
and demands doubt whenever evidence is insufficient.  The drive to value rewards 
success in self-transcendence with a happy conscience and saddens failures with an 
unhappy conscience.160 
 
This quote makes it seem as though a human person has multiple drives and 
desires, the desire for intelligibility, another one for truth, and a final one for value.  In 
some ways this may be true, however Lonergan writes that “the many levels of conscious 
intentionality are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the 
human spirit.”161  This “eros of the human spirit” is the third natural aid for authenticity 
                                                 
158 Method, 23; “Openness and Religious Experience,” 200.  Cf., Insight, 373. Beauty, art, and aesthetics 
play interesting but relatively undeveloped roles in Lonergan’s thought.  See Insight, 208-12, 291-92, 315; 
Method, 13, 61-4, 73-74, 272-4; Topics in Education, Ch. 9, “Art.” 
159 “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 174.  The “original question” is, What should I do?  Cf., 
Method, 35, 40. 
160 Method, 35. 
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and perhaps the most important and most fundamental of the three.  It grounds and 
pervades all of Lonergan’s thought. 
In Insight Lonergan speaks of this eros as a “pure,” “unrestricted,” “detached,” 
and “disinterested,” desire to know.  This fundamental human desire impels a person 
from experience to understanding and from understanding to judgment, prodding the 
person to perform each operation correctly.  Lonergan expounds: 
By the desire to know is meant the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for 
intelligence and for reflection ….  The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and 
critical spirit of man.  By moving him to seek understanding, it prevents him from being 
content with the mere flow of outer and inner experience.  By demanding adequate 
understanding, it involves man in the self-correcting process of learning in which further 
questions yield complementary insights.  By moving man to reflect, to seek the 
unconditioned, to grant unqualified assent only to the unconditioned, it prevents him from 
being content with hearsay and legend, with unverified hypotheses and untested 
theories.162 
 
The domain of the pure desire to know is not limited to cold facts about existing 
realities, it seeks also to discern the value of things163 and to identify various “practical 
possibilities”164 for transforming the world.  Lonergan asserts that human beings are 
doers as well as knowers, and that the pure desire to know unites these aspects of the 
human person, promoting a desire for harmony between them.  In other words, “from that 
identity of consciousness there springs an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and 
doing.”165 
By our very nature, we human beings desire not only to know and to value reality 
wisely, we want to choose in line with this wisdom the best possible course of action, and 
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finally we wish to actually follow this wisely chosen course of action.  Without such 
“self-consistency” a person is tempted to do one or more of three things:  (1) to “avoid 
self-consciousness” and the “precept of the sage… ‘Know thyself,’”166 (2) to rationalize 
his/her inconsistencies, i.e., dishonestly tell oneself that one’s actions are not vicious or 
even that vices themselves are virtuous, and/or (3) perhaps most commonly, to face one’s 
wrongdoings and acknowledge that they are a vices, but in an act of “moral 
renunciation… [give] up any hope of amending” and claim, “If you please, it is very 
human.”167 
In Method, the “pure” and “detached” desire to know of Insight, with its 
complementary exigence for self-consistency, becomes unified and filled out in a broader 
moral, existential, and even religious context as “a single thrust, the eros of the human 
spirit.” This unified eros drives human self-transcendence.  In fact, it is called the 
“unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence.”168  And because   the human person “achieves 
authenticity in self-transcendence,” this eros is the drive and the standard for authentic 
self-transcendence.  In its augmentation of Insight’s focus on the desire to know, Method 
reveals that a relationship of love, a “being in love,” is the final fulfillment of pure desire 
or of self-transcendence:  “Just as unrestricted questioning is our capacity for self-
transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper fulfillment of that 
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capacity.”169  This quote demonstrates that the roots of Method’s language of self-
transcendence lie in Insight’s language of question and insight.  It also discloses that 
while Insight’s pure desire to know is fulfilled in infinite Understanding, Truth, and 
Being,170 Method’s expanded, unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence finds its term in 
relationship with an “other-worldly” Love.171  For Lonergan, this realm of unrestricted, 
otherworldly love is the realm of relgion. 
Just as there is a unity in the eros of the human spirit, there is a unity in its 
apparent goals.  Those with training in traditional Catholic philosophy or theology will 
recognize the seeming multiplicity of human fulfillment—in transcendent Being, in 
Beauty, in Intelligibility, in Intelligence, in Truth, Reality, Goodness, Value and Love—
to in fact be one fulfillment, namely God.  Thus, the natural eros of the human spirit is a 
natural desire for God. 
In Method, Lonergan makes it clear that the transcendental notions are notions of 
God, that the pure desire to know and the erotic thrust to self-transcendence are the desire 
for God, and that the natural human desire for unity with God has precedent in traditional 
Catholic theology when he acknowledges his debt in this manner to Thomas Aquinas.  
Lonergan connects his pure desire to know with Thomas’s language of the “beatific 
                                                 
169 Method, 106, emphasis added.  Cf., 242: “Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation 
reveal the eros of the human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self-transcendence.  But that capacity 
meets fulfillment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into 
a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love.” 
170 Insight, 372-76, 680-708. 
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vision,” i.e., an intimate unity with God conceived of as knowledge of God, neither by 
likeness nor by faith, but by some sharing in and understanding of God’s own essence.172 
Never is this belief in a natural desire for God explicitly traced back to 
Augustine’s famous words at the opening of the Confessions:  “You are great, Lord, and 
highly to be praised,… you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it 
rests in you.”173  However, Lonergan alludes to it.  Discussing a “disenchantment” that 
arises when a person compares her or his limited achievements with the transcendental of 
the good, he mentions the possibility of rest in a perfect goodness: 
That disenchantment brings to light the limitation in every finite achievement, the stain in 
every flawed perfection, the irony of soaring ambition and faltering performance.  It 
plunges us into the height and depth of love, but it also keeps us aware of how much our 
living falls short of its aim.  In brief, the transcendental notion of the good so invites, 
presses, harries us, that we could rest only in an encounter with a goodness completely 
beyond its powers of criticism.174 
 
Eternal rest in loving relationship with God is the ultimate aim of human self-
transcendence.  In this life, however, God has given human beings not rest but a natural 
desire.  It is a natural desire for a supernatural fulfillment, a human yearning for perfect, 
unrestricted Love, Good, Truth, Being, Intelligibility, and Beauty.  This unified, 
transcendent desire underlies all human activities.  It underlies the “going beyond” that 
begins when one opens ones eyes or when one attends to one’s own feelings and sense of 
wonder.  It is the source of spontaneous questions, of the search for satisfying answers, 
and of the exigence toward conscientious action in society.  The natural desire to know 
                                                 
172 Topics in Education, 91, 173, 224.  On p. 91 Thomas’s work on the matter is located in the Summa 
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grounds transcendental precepts: Be Attentive! Be Intelligent! Be Reasonable! and Be 
Responsible!  It works with transcendental notions, providing a peace when one has 
authentically carried out the operations of conscious intentionality. 
“Man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence.”175   Self-transcendence is the 
process of four transcendental operations guided by four transcendental precepts, seeking 
four levels of transcendental notions, and driven by a single thrust of the erotic human 
spirit. 
Even with these natural aids and impulses, authenticity is not automatic.  It is 
rather, a constant struggle against inauthenticity, against complacency, mistakes, and 
sins.  It is, as Lonergan writes, “never a permanent achievement.  It is ever precarious, 
ever to be achieved afresh, ever in great part a matter of uncovering still more oversights, 
acknowledging still further failures to understand, correcting still more mistakes, 
repenting more and more deeply human sins.”176 
In human history, there is progress, and there is decline.  The full account of 
human authenticity involves not merely the natural process of transcendental method and 
transcendent desire, but also the failures of that method and the infidelity to that desire.  It 
would also include an account for divine redemption, for God’s gifts of grace and self-
communication, for conversion of human persons on intellectual, moral, and religious 
levels.  But since sin, grace, and conversion belong to distinct vectors of Lonergan’s 
analysis of human history, we save them for chapters two and three on decline and 
redemption.  Let us now turn to another natural aid in human development, the original 
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and larger context of personal transcendental operations:  the cooperating human 
community. 
1.5.  The Cooperating Human Community 
In the preceding section, we considered the “larger picture” of Lonergan’s 
account of anthropology, his transcendental method.  We discussed how an unrestricted 
desire for ultimate truth and goodness drives the human person through multiple 
operations on four levels of conscious intentionality.  But this larger picture is 
incomplete, for progress is driven, not by the operations of isolated individuals, but by 
the cooperation of persons bound by love and mutual meaning into a communal matrix 
Lonergan calls “the human good.” 
1.5.1.  Love 
Authenticity in experience, understanding, judgment, and decision lead to 
intellectual and moral self-transcendence.  But there is a third transcendence Lonergan 
calls “affective.”  It transcends intellectual and moral self-transcendence, advancing 
beyond their limits.177 
Affective self-transcendence and moral self-transcendence are intimately linked.  
The peak of moral self-transcendence reaches to the base of affective self-transcendence.  
Thus, as quoted earlier, Lonergan wrote that it is through morally self-transcendent, 
responsible decision that people “can be principles of benevolence and beneficence, 
capable of genuine collaboration and of true love.”178  Moral self-transcendence does not 
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178 Ibid., 35, emphasis added.  Cf., 289.  It was quoted at the end of section 1.4.1, above. 
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seem in itself to be benevolence and beneficence or collaboration and love.  Rather, it is 
the condition for the possibility of these things and for affective self-transcendence.  As 
Lonergan states in a very similar passage later in Method, “moral self-transcendence is 
the possibility of benevolence and beneficence, of honest collaboration and true love, of 
swinging completely out of the habitat of an animal and becoming a person in human 
society.”179 
What is affective self-transcendence?  Simply put, it is falling in love, staying in 
love, and growing in love.180  There is, however, a great complexity to love.  First of all, 
love is of many types: “There is the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, of parents and 
children; the love for one’s fellow men with its fruit in the achievement of human 
welfare.  There is the love of God with one’s whole heart and whole soul, with all one’s 
mind and all one’s strength (Mk. 12, 30).”181 
                                                 
179 Ibid., 104.  It is important to note, however, that in concrete reality, love actually precedes moral deeds, 
as we shall see in the next section on “the way from above downwards” and in section 3.2. on conversions. 
180 Some scholars believe Lonergan’s affective self-transcendence and affective conversion to be the same 
as eminent Lonergan scholar Fr. Robert Doran’s “psychic conversion.”  Based on a limited knowledge of 
Fr. Doran’s psychic conversion, I would disagree.  It is clear that affective self-transcendence, conversion, 
and development pertain to feelings.  However, it seems that Lonergan distinguishes between affective 
development on the one hand and affective self-transcendence and conversion on the other.  The former 
pertains to Insight’s pre-cognitive spontaneous sensitivity and intersubjectivity or to Method’s non-
intentional states and trends, while the latter deals with higher feelings, the post-cognitive, intentional 
response to value and love.  On Method, 289 Lonergan discusses affective self-transcendence in a trio with 
intellectual and moral self-transcendence and in “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 179, Lonergan 
mentions affective conversion in a trio with intellectual and moral conversions.  In both cases, the affective 
component relates to interpersonal love, between people and with God.  Thus, I contend that affective self-
transcendence and conversion are like religious conversion/self-transcendence, but broader, because they 
include falling in love with other people as well as with God.  Religious conversion does include falling in 
love other human people, but it stresses the priority of the relationship with God.  Fr. Doran’s psychic 
conversion, on the other hand, seems to pertain not directly to love, but to pre-cognitive, non-intentional 
feelings.  These are notional distinctions, and of course, concretely, feelings are mixed and love, while a 
higher-level operation, may precede knowing. 
181 Ibid., 105; cf., 289.  This is the love of charity, to be discussed below in section 3. 
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When speaking of moral and affective self-transcendence, Lonergan is building 
on Aristotle’s, Augustine’s, and Aquinas’s discussions of virtue, love, and friendship.  At 
the end of his presentation of moral self-transcendence, Lonergan mentions that the 
fundamental principle of morality is the authentic person or “a fully developed self-
transcendent subject.”  He states that this morally developed, authentic person is what 
Aristotle named a virtuous person.182  This is similar to Augustine’s claim that “if one 
loves God, one may do as one pleases, Ama Deum et fac quod vis.”183  Love helps one to 
order values correctly.  This is particularly true if one is in love with God.  Thomas 
Aquinas brings the two together in his belief that the love of God, charity, is a virtue 
(infused or theological) and “the mother and root of all virtues”184 
Additionally, when Lonergan speaks of the possibility of “benevolence and 
beneficence” and “of genuine collaboration and of true love,” he is speaking of the 
mutual love that Aristotle called friendship, particularly the friendship of shared virtue or 
excellence.185  Like friends who share virtue, those in love treat one another as valuable, 
not simply for what each brings the other, but because each person is valuable, in and of 
her/himself.  Good friends collaborate with one another, wishing each other well and 
working for the good of each other. 
                                                 
182 Ibid., 41.  In a footnote Lonergan adduces a few references from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, 
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183 Method, 39.  Lonergan is paraphrasing Augustine’s “Dilige et quod vis fac,” found in his seventh homily 
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three of this dissertation. 
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25.  See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, particularly Bks. 8 and 9. 
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True love is the peak in the development of feelings as intentional response to 
value.  It is “the supreme illustration” of “feelings so deep and strong… that they channel 
attention, shape one’s horizon, direct one’s life.”186  For Lonergan love is a feeling, an 
intentional response to value, but it is also much more than a feeling.  It is the fullness of 
human authenticity, self-transcendence, and the unrestricted desire.  It is a dynamic state 
that is at once a principle of rest and of movement.187  Lonergan writes most eloquently 
of love—in a kind of breathless and bursting way:188 
One can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up 
in oneself.  A first step towards this liberation is the sensitivity we share with the higher 
animals.  But they are confined to a habitat, while man lives in a universe.  Beyond 
sensitivity man asks questions, and his questioning is unrestricted…. 
 The transcendental notions, that is, our questions for intelligence, for reflection, and 
for deliberation, constitute our capacity for self-transcendence.  That capacity becomes an 
actuality when one falls in love.  Then one’s being becomes a being-in-love.  Such being-
in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions.  But once it has 
blossomed forth and as long as it lasts it takes over.  It is the first principle.  From it flow 
one’s desires and fears, one’s joys and sorrows, one’s discernment of values, one’s 
decisions and deeds.189 
 
For self-transcendence reaches its term not in righteousness but in love and, when 
we fall in love, then life begins anew.  A new principle takes over and, as long as it lasts, 
we are lifted above ourselves and carried along as parts within an ever more intimate yet 
ever more liberating dynamic whole.190 
 
A man or woman that falls in love is engaged in loving not only when attending to 
the beloved but at all times.  Besides particular acts of loving, there is the prior state of 
being in love, and that prior state is, as it were, the fount of all one’s actions.  So mutual 
love is the intertwining of two lives.  It transforms an “I” and “thou” into a “we” so 
intimate, so secure, so permanent, that each attends, imagines, thinks, plans, feels, speaks, 
acts in concern for both.191 
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190 Ibid., 175. 
191 Ibid., 32-33. 
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Love for Lonergan is at the crossroads of a person’s conscious intentionality and a 
society’s common good.  It overlaps the natural process of progress and the supernatural 
graces of redemption.  In this chapter on progress we must limit ourselves to the love that 
is theoretically possible to a nature that itself is a theoretic construct yet immensely 
helpful.192  In the third chapter we will examine the supernatural aspects of love, i.e., the 
summit of being in love with God.193 
1.5.2.  The Way From Above Downwards 
 Love for Lonergan is the fullness of human authenticity, self-transcendence, and 
the unrestricted desire.  It is the result of an affective self-transcendence that goes beyond 
moral and intellectual self-transcendence.  As both the principle of movement and rest, it 
brings peace and friendship, new personal feelings and new communal cooperation.  It is 
both a fulfillment and a new beginning.  In addition to being a foundation for personal 
authenticity and for social collaboration, love has the intriguing ability to reverse the 
order of the operations in human conscious intentionality. 
Typically, knowledge precedes love, as formulated in the scholastic expression Nihil 
amatum nisi praecognitum (Nothing is loved if it is not first known).  For Lonergan, this 
is true “ordinarily.”194  Decision ordinarily presupposes judgment, judgment ordinarily 
                                                 
192 For Lonergan’s excellent account of the development of the theoretical category of nature, see the first 
chapter of his dissertation published as, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
193 Without grace, it is possible, but not probable for a person to love God.  In “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 
p. 25., Lonergan cites Thomas as saying, “‘Even without grace man naturally loves God   but, from the 
corruption of nature, rational will seeks self,’” citing Summa Theologica, 1-2, q. 109, a. 3 c. The editor 
notes that the quote is “ad sensum”). In Insight Lonergan affirms a natural love for God, as primary 
intelligence, primary truth, primary good (679-81).  But this is not the full love of God with one’s whole 
heart, soul, mind and strength that Lonergan speaks of in Method.  
194 Method, 122; cf., 278, 283, 340. 
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presupposes understanding, and understanding ordinarily presupposes experience.  
Despite this norm, 
there is a knowledge born of love.  Of it Pascal spoke when he remarked that the heart 
has reasons which reason does not know….  The meaning, then, of Pascal’s remark 
would be that, besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, 
and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of 
value and the judgments of value, of a person in love.195 
 
 To the ordinary way of knowing, Lonergan distinguishes two exceptions, a 
“minor” and a “major.”  Both reverse the ordinary priority of knowing to loving.  Both 
are forms of “a knowledge born of love.”  The major exception flows from God’s love 
flooding our hearts, and will be discussed later.  The minor exception begins when people 
fall in love with each other.  This love, like all loves, is “a new beginning, an exercise in 
vertical liberty in which one’s world undergoes a new organization.”196  Love is an 
exercise in vertical liberty because, while the world remains largely unchanged, the 
lover’s personal world or horizon expands.  Love reveals new values, and because values 
are related, one is forced to reevaluate all of one’s older values in light of the new ones.  
Thus, love reorganizes one’s world.  It occasions a new beginning. 
  Love’s revelation of new values and its transformation of old values reverses the 
typical order that moves from experiencing to understanding and feeling, through making 
judgments of truth and value, to commitment and decision.  Using a spatial metaphor, 
                                                 
195 Ibid., 115.  This passage in Method is taken from “Horizons,” where the Pascal quote is quoted in 
French, “le Coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point; on le sait en milles choses,” and located in 
Pensées, d’après l’édition de L. Brunschvicg (Londres:  M. Dent & Sons, n.d.; Paris:  Georges Crés en Cie, 
n.d.) no. 277, p. 120.   
196 Method, 122.  “Vertical liberty” was first discussed above in section 1.4.1.4. 
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Lonergan calls this ordinary process the way “from below upwards” and love’s reversal 
of this process, the way “from above downwards.”197 
In this second way, love operates primarily on the fourth, the highest, level of 
conscious intentionality.  There it creates new existential commitments. These 
commitments shape the decisions we make about how to live in society.  Moving down to 
Lonergan’s third level of consciousness, the commitments and decisions of love inform 
new judgments of value and new judgments of truth.  Such judgments informed by love 
are not necessarily subjective and biased.  They may be, if the love that informs them is 
biased.  But for Lonergan, genuine love flows into objective, authentic judgments.198 
Continuing our move “downwards,” love provides a new horizon for 
understanding.  A person dedicated to love and judging with love will be more likely to 
come to certain ideas or insights, and less likely to have others.  Finally, love transforms 
the way we experience the world.  When we fall in love, we not only have new 
commitments, new judgments, and new ideas, but also new ways of being sensitive and 
spontaneously intersubjective.199  At the very least, our prior decisions, judgments, and 
ideas influence the way we attend to our experience, the things to which we pay attention. 
1.5.3.  The World Mediated by Meaning and Belief 
 Love need not always be the fiery experience depicted in romance novels, the 
kind of love that consumes all of one’s attention.  Love, particularly as it ages, can slip 
                                                 
197 “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 180-81. 
198 More will be said below, on “belief,” in chapter two, under “bias,” and in chapter three, under 
“conversion.” 
199 If the love in question is the love of God, then “[t]he world is charged with the grandeur of God,” as 
Gerard Manley Hopkins wrote in his poem, God’s Grandeur. 
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into the background, unattended to, but no less operative and orienting.  Such, perhaps, is 
the general love one may have for one’s community.  The commitments of the 
community—the truths and the values it holds, its common-sense fund of understanding, 
and even the ways it structures one’s experiences through common architecture, design, 
music, and food—provide the background that conditions the possibilities for one’s 
personal growth in discovery and commitment.  As we have seen, experience, 
understanding, judgment, and decision take place within a horizon.  The human 
community forms much of this horizon.  But what is community?  How is it formed and 
of what is it constituted? 
 As usual, Lonergan’s answer is complex.  Simple physical proximity in a fixed 
geographic region is not enough to form human communities, nor are they founded on 
some deliberate “social contract.”  The individual does not join society out of a rational 
calculation of its usefulness.  Reason and deliberation do shape various communities; 
however, human society is not initially the product of experience, understanding, 
judgment, and decision, or even of love.  Lonergan asserts that society is founded on 
something more basic:  “Prior to the ‘we’ that results from the mutual love of an ‘I’ and a 
‘thou’, there is the earlier ‘we’ that precedes the distinction of subjects and survives its 
oblivion.”200 
This “prior we” is formed by the “spontaneous intersubjectivity,” reflected upon 
earlier. Lonergan believes that by nature human persons have some measure of “fellow-
feeling.” This is manifested, for example, by the fact that one spontaneously reaches out 
                                                 
200 Method, 57. 
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one’s arms to save another person from falling, just as one spontaneously raises one’s 
arms to protect oneself.201 
Spontaneous intersubjectivity and fellow-feeling are the basic foundation for 
human communities, but much more than this, human communities are constituted by 
“common meaning, common values, common purposes, common and complementary 
activities.”202  For Lonergan, common meaning unites these commonalities.  Where does 
common meaning come from?  Lonergan believes it forms much like personal meaning.  
Thus, common meaning may develop from common experience.  It becomes formal in 
common understanding, actual in common judgment of truth and value, and realized in 
common decision and activities.203 
While the common meaning of a community develops, “from below upwards,” by 
the addition of new insights of creative people who meet new problems and old problems 
in new ways,204 a person’s entry into the community’s common fund of meaning follows 
more of the way “from below downwards.”  From an early age, one is educated into a 
tradition.  In each tradition there are certain common commitments to values, certain 
truths held in common, and certain common ways of doing things.  Only after one has 
learned and followed these traditional meanings, values, and practices does one grow in 
critical understanding of them.205 
                                                 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid., 211. 
203 Ibid., 79; see also “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 243-47. 
204 This was discussed above in the section “Insight into Insight.” 
205 For an excellent discussion and extension of Lonergan’s thought on education in a tradition and personal 
discovery, see Frederick Crowe, S.J., Old Things and New:  A Strategy for Education (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1985). 
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The process of education in a tradition begins at least as soon as one learns a 
language.  Language is not simply a child’s achievement but a community’s 
accumulation.  It is the primary means for making common its common meaning.206  
Through language, a person’s horizon is radically altered.  One transcends “the world of 
immediacy,” characterized by mere sensitivity and intersubjective spontaneity, to enter a 
far richer mode of existence,  “the world mediated by meaning.” 
The infant’s world of immediacy is 
the world of what is felt, touched, grasped, sucked, seen, heard.  It is a world of 
immediate experience, of the given as given, of image and affect without any perceptible 
intrusion from insight or concept, reflection or judgment, deliberation or choice.  It is the 
world of pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, food and drink, rage and satisfaction and 
sleep.207 
 
However, as one’s command of language develops, one’s world expands exponentially.  
“For words denote not only what is present but also what is absent or past or future, not 
only what is factual but also the possible, the ideal, the normative.”  But perhaps more 
importantly, at least from the standpoint of community, is the fact that words express the 
memories and aspirations, the problems and the solutions, the successes and failures of 
other people in all walks of life.  Through language, we can learn, “from the common 
sense of the community, from the pages of literature, from the labors of scholars, from 
the investigations of scientists, from the experience of saints, from the meditations of 
philosophers and theologians.”208 
                                                 
206 Meaning has other carriers, “in human intersubjectivity, in art, in symbols, in language, and in the lives 
and deeds of persons” (Method, 57).  For sections covering each of these carriers, see pp. 57-73.  
207 Method, 76. 
208 Ibid., 77. 
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 In itself, “the world mediated by meaning” is enormous compared to the infant’s 
world of immediacy.  But entry into this larger world is no guarantee of participation in 
it.  The initial entry is through language, but one participates in it to the extent that one 
believes.  Belief tends to be associated almost exclusively with the realm of religion, but 
Lonergan reminds us of its integral role in any human activity.  For example, people 
around the world orient themselves geographically with maps.  But how many have 
verified for themselves empirically the positions of cities on a map?  When using a map 
we implicitly believe the mapmaker.  Furthermore, not only users but makers of maps 
rely on belief.  Larger maps tend to be compilations of smaller ones.  And the compiler 
does not verify all the work of the smaller mapmakers, who themselves rely on the work 
of surveyors. Every day, however, the accuracy of the maps and the value of belief is 
verified by the travel of cars, planes, and boats.209 
Scientists, too, whose knowing is often contrasted with that of religious believers, 
depend to a very large part on belief.  The advance of science depends on a division of 
labor that extends across both space and time.  No scientist checks all the findings of all 
other scientists currently working let alone all that went before him or her.  This would 
require repeating all of their experimental observations, formulating all of their 
hypotheses, verifying all of their conclusions.  While scientists verify each other’s work 
to some degree, without belief among scientists there would be no scientific progress. 
                                                 
209 Ibid., 42.  This is not to say that maps are perfect. 
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This highlights the general social and historical character of human knowledge, 
without which human progress itself would operate, if at all, on a much smaller and 
slower scale: 
There is a progress in knowledge from primitives to moderns only because successive 
generations began where their predecessors left off.  But successive generations could do 
so, only because they were ready to believe.  Without belief, relying on their own 
individual experience, their own insights, their own judgment, they would have ever been 
beginning afresh, and either the attainments of primitives would never be surpassed or, if 
they were, then the benefits would not be transmitted. 
Human knowledge, then, is not some individual possession, but rather a common 
fund, from which each may contribute in the measure that he performs his cognitional 
operations properly and reports their results accurately.210  
 
In fact, Lonergan writes, the “immanently generated knowledge” that comes from 
a person’s own experience, understanding, and judgment is only a “small fraction of what 
any civilized man considers himself to know.”211  Because of this communal, historical 
aspect to knowing, and in order to promote progress, we must be attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable, and responsible not only in our personal acts of discovery but also in the 
communication of our discoveries in writing, etc.  On the other hand, because we are 
aware of the possibility and the actuality of our own error,212 we must be aware of the 
possibility of others’ error.  Still, this does not eliminate the value of belief.  It simply 
means that belief must be critical and that progress is “advancing not merely from 
ignorance to truth but error to truth.”213  We must continually correct our own errors and 
those of those who preceded us.  Due to belief’s central role in human cooperation and 
progress, authenticity is of paramount importance. 
                                                 
210 Ibid., 44. 
211 Ibid., 41. 
212 Error is not the same as sin.  See Insight, 690, where Lonergan distinguishes sin from “inadvertent 
failure.” 
213 Method, 44. For more on the process of coming to believe, see Method, 41-47; and Insight, 725-40. 
 
 81
1.5.4.  The Human Good 
  We have said that for Lonergan, the human community is constituted primarily by 
meaning.  This is not idealism, for the real is not merely what can be rationally 
conceived, nor is it simply what can be sensed.  Rather, it is what can be known.214  
“Now the common meanings constitutive of community are not some stock of ideal 
forms subsistent in some Platonic heaven.  They are the hard-won fruit of man’s 
advancing knowledge of nature, of the gradual evolution of his social forms and of his 
cultural achievements.”215 
Lonergan’s term for the advancing human community in all its meaningful and 
material aspects is “the human good.”  All that we have discussed has been part of the 
human good.  The human good is a higher integration of general natural processes, of an 
authentic individual’s intellectual, moral, and affective self-transcendence, as well as of a 
community formed by common meaning. 
For Lonergan the human good, like anything good, is concrete.216  The good is 
not an abstract aspect of a thing.  The good is comprehensive.  It includes everything. 
common scholastic formula states that being and the good are convertible.
 A 
                                                
217   As we 
have seen, the good is a transcendental notion.  Along with Christian tradition, Lonergan 
believes that God alone is good by essence, while everything else is good by 
participation.218  
 
214 Method, 20, 38, 93; Insight, Chs. 9, 10. 
215 “Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,” A Second Collection, Papers by 
Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., 4. 
216 “What is good, always is concrete,” (Method, 27). 
217 Ens et bonum convertuntur, Topics in Education, 27. 
218 Topics in Education, 31. 
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Aristotle affirmed famously that the good is “what everything seeks.”219   
Lonergan insists that not just the object of human desire is good.  The desire itself is 
good, as is the capacity to desire, the concrete situation in which desire can be fulfilled, 
and the human operations and cooperation that bring fulfillment.220  This set of object, 
desire, concrete situation, operations, and fulfillment, provides the outline for what, in 
Topics in Education and Method, Lonergan calls “the invariant structure of the human 
good.”  Let us consider first Lonergan’s earlier and simpler development of the human 
good in Topics and then his later, more complex framework in Method. 
Like the good in general, the human good includes all of reality, starting with “the 
forest primeval.”221  The specifically human aspect of the human good is what is realized 
by human knowledge, choice, and activity.  It is a developing reality, progressing with 
each generation’s new insights, choices, and changed situations. Thus, “the human good 
is a history, a cumulative process.”222  It is something to which we all belong and to 
which we all contribute.  It shapes us and we shape it.  Concretely it is a compound of 
human achievement, human sin, and divine redemption.  On it depends our “eternal 
destiny.”223  
Lonergan analyzes the human good into levels.  First and most basic are 
“particular goods.” A particular good can be any particular thing, such as a pizza or pad 
thai.  It can be an event, a satisfaction, or an activity.  It is the satisfaction of a particular 
appetite. 
                                                 
219 Ibid., 28.; cf., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I,1,1094a 2. 
220 Topics in Education, 28. 
221 Ibid., 33, citing Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Evangeline. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid., 34. 
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A related set of particular goods organized in a particular way, Lonergan calls a 
“good of order.”  The good of order is “the setup,” a flow of particular goods (similar if 
not identical to how a scheme recurrence includes an interdependent set of things or 
events).  The good of order is not one more good among other particular goods but the 
proper organization of particular goods.  The economy is an example.  All the pieces for a 
robust economy may be in place, such as raw materials, factories, labor, and consumers, 
but if these parts are not related harmoniously there is no good of order.   
Economic depression exemplifies the lack of a good of order.  The good of order 
provides for a regular and recurrent production and distribution of particular goods. 
Without the order, particular goods may come, but not regularly or recurrently.  This is 
important because “Man is intelligent; he is not satisfied with breakfast today; he wants 
lunch and dinner too, and he wants them every day.”224   
The third and final level of the human good is “value.”  Particular goods and the 
good of order are evaluated and criticized as more or less worthwhile based on a society’s 
values.225 
Each culture will have different particular goods, different goods of order, and 
different values.  But every culture will have some particular goods, some good of order, 
and some values.  Thus, for Lonergan, these three levels constitute an “invariant 
structure” to the human good.226  Particular goods are relatively self-explanatory, but let 
us consider further the good of order and value. 
                                                 
224 Ibid., 39. 
225 Ibid., 39-40. 
226 Ibid., 33. 
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In this quote, Lonergan names four aspects of the good of order:  “a regular 
recurrence of particular goods, coordinated human operations, a set of conditions of the 
operations, and personal status.”227 
First, “a regular recurrence of particular goods,” is not to be achieved by 
“mechanist planning,” since in a mechanist model the plans must be perfect.  They must 
work out every detail or the whole system will go awry.  Instead of comparing the good 
of order to a machine, Lonergan likens it to the way water circulates on the surface of the 
earth.  Its circulation operates on probabilities more than certainties.  Consequently, some 
parts of the earth are very dry, and some are very wet.  Nevertheless, there is a statistical 
regularity to precipitation in certain geographic areas at given times.228 
Second, in affirming that the good of order is about “coordinated human 
operations,” Lonergan denies that human development is primarily produced by the 
unrelated achievements of isolated individuals.  Rather, he affirms that most human 
operation is cooperation.  “Coordinated human operations” occur because of an 
interdependence formed by spontaneous interdependence, love, and the communal bonds 
of common meaning, value, and purpose.  Persons separated by time and space may still 
influence one another mutually, though indirectly.  Such human cooperation is essential 
to the proper functioning of any human enterprise.229 
Third, for this cooperation to occur there is required “a set of conditions,” 
including  (1) “habits” and “skills” of the heart, mind, and body; (2) “institutions,” which 
                                                 
227 Ibid., 34. 
228 Ibid., 35. 
229 Ibid. 
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are like habits on social level—something in society which regularly handles certain sets 
of operations (schools, courts, etc.);230 and (3) “material equipment” such as books, 
desks, pens. 
“Personal status,” the fourth aspect of the human good, is produced by the pattern 
of cooperation in and among institutions.  Different people perform different functions 
and fill different roles.  We are who we are as persons in relation to others. 
The standard for evaluating, criticizing, and improving both particular goods and 
the good of order is Lonergan’s third level of the human good, “value.”  Just as a society 
can choose from a variety of products which ones it will produce, there are many possible 
ways of setting up a society, or goods of order.  Commenting on the Cold War, Lonergan 
writes, “Children fight about particular goods, but men fight about the good of order.”  
He selects three types or approaches to value:  (1) The “aesthetic” approach realizes the 
true and the good in the sensible.  When a good of order is good, its goodness is 
transparent in its products and in the happiness of its members.  (2) The “ethical” 
approach asks if its members becoming more “autonomous, responsible, free.”  (3) The 
religious approach to value judges all things as when we stand before God, with our 
neighbor, in the context of history.231  Any given society will have some measure of 
each. 
 is not 
provides for the fulfillment of these desires.  The particular goods and the whole system 
                                                
Lonergan’s basic point in Topics in Education, thus, is that the human good
simply the fulfillment of particular desires but the whole system that includes and 
 
230 Ibid., 35-36. 
231 Ibid., 37-38. 
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are not value-free.  They are the embodiments of a community’s judgments of value and 
decisions. 
To present the invariant structure of the human good in Method, Lonergan selects 
eighteen terms divided into three sets: “(1) individuals in their potentialities and 
actuations, (2) cooperating groups [also called society], (3) ends.”232  What follows is 
my attempt to relate these eighteen terms among themselves clearly, accurately, and 
briefly (At their first mention, the eighteen terms are in bold, and their above-men
categories are italicized.).  Method’s main additions to Topics in Education are “liberty,” 
“orientation,” and “conversion.” These I treat at greater length. 
tioned 
                                                
Each individual has potentialities.  Basic among these potentialities are needs and 
capacities to fulfill the needs.  The capacities are actuated on an individual level by 
operations that obtain the ends of particular goods.  To a great extent, since we live in 
cooperating groups, or society, the operations are cooperations.  The capacities for 
operating are plastic and perfectible so skills can be developed.  Development is largely 
in the context of social institutions, which also facilitate cooperation by assigning 
individuals different roles with respective tasks. 
The good of order is the sum of these things in a related whole. It is individuals 
in society developing their plastic and perfectible capacities to operate and cooperate into 
skills that give them roles and tasks in institutions that provide particular goods.  The 
good of order is not a design for a utopia nor a theoretical ideal nor a set of laws.233   
 
232 Method, 47.  Emphasis added. 
233 Ibid., 48-49. 
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The good of order as a whole and the individuals within it are characterized by a 
liberty that is not indetermination but a self-determinism, experienced by individuals in 
their choosing and acting.  Real liberty is the result of responsible decisions, exercised 
within personal relations that are determined by more or less shared needs, 
commitments, expectations, experiences, feelings, meanings, and values.  Terminal 
values are the values chosen by an “originating value” or an authentic chooser, whose 
choices create valuable goods, and who personally grows in liberty with each choice and 
realization of true value.  These originators of value, these self-transcendent people, can 
themselves be terminal values.234  
By their choice of terminal values, exercised in liberty, individuals and societies 
orient themselves and shape the direction of their development.  As individuals or social 
groups, people may also choose to change the direction of their development or their 
orientation.  Conversion is a positive change in orientation.  It frees one from 
inauthenticity for greater authenticity.  Conversion causes a radical shift in one’s fears 
and desires, satisfactions and values, beliefs and scales of preference.235 
I end this discussion of the human good by returning to Topics in Education, 
because it contains Lonergan’s strongest presentation of the human good as it develops.  
In the second chapter of Topics, Lonergan discusses the development of the human good 
on two levels: civilization and culture.  “Intellectual development corresponds to 
civilization, reflective development to culture.”  Lonergan analyses the development of 
                                                 
234 Ibid., 50-51 
235 Ibid., 51-52.  Conversion is treated at length in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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civilization along the lines of technology, economy, and polity.236  Civilization is driven 
by ideas, while culture is driven by values.  Culture stands above civilization as values 
stand above the good of order.  In other words, culture provides the standards for 
evaluating and critiquing a civilization.  It provides the “aims and values” by which one 
may judge the ideas embodied in a civilization.237 
The mutual development of civilization and culture follows a pattern of 
“Challenge-and-Response” that Lonergan learned from Toynbee.238  Basically this means 
that challenges arise in a human community.  The challenges invite responses by 
members of the community, and the responses create new challenges that again call for 
new responses, and so forth.  This is the same process as Insight’s self-correcting process 
of learning and Method’s transcendental method. 
Revealing the interdependence of the human good in a world order of emergent 
probability, Lonergan notes that the process of challenge and response may start small, 
with a single insight in response to a minor, localized problem, but swiftly it  
will involve repercussions all through the good of order.  New ideas will start popping up 
everywhere.  There will result augmented well-being, and it affects each of the aspects of 
the human good:  the flow of particular goods becomes more frequent, more intense, 
more varied; new equipment is produced; institutions are remodeled; new types of goods 
are provided; the society enjoys more democracy and more education; new habits are 
formed to deal with the new equipment in the new institutions; there is status for all, 
because everything is running smoothly; everybody is too busy to be bothered with 
knifing other people; there are happy personal relations, a development in taste, in 
aesthetic value and its appreciation, and in ethics, in the autonomy of the subject; finally, 
there is more time for people to attend to their own perfection in religion.239 
 
                                                 
236 Topics in Education, 55.  Cf., Insight, Ch. 7. 
237 Topics in Education, 50. 
238 Ibid., 51, with note to Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. 3: The Growth of Civilizations 
(London:  Oxford University Press, 1934); index, Challenge-and-Response.  See also Insight, 234. 
239 Ibid. 
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The agents of this change are “creative personalities.”  And while small changes 
can spread quickly, for sustained progress to occur, there needs to be a whole succession 
of these personalities “who are not simply sunk into the existing situation, immersed in 
its routines, and functioning like cogs in a wheel, with little grasp of possibilities, with a 
lack of daring.”240   
To be creative, such personalities must withdraw from society and become 
detached, at least mentally, in order to see how things could be different, to “become 
themselves.”  This withdrawal is not permanent but for the sake of a return, for 
transforming the world.  Lonergan notes that Karl Marx, perhaps the most influential 
person of the twentieth century, spent years alone writing in the British Museum.241 
These creative types must also be prepared to struggle.  Toynbee assesses four 
steps in a difficult process of social adaptation to creative ideas:  (1) enthusiasm, led by 
poets, (2) sedation, when systematizers take over, (3) disillusion, with conflicts caused by 
change, and (4) general acceptance, when “the prophets are honored by the sons of those 
who had stoned them.”  Ideas slowly spread by imitation.  Toynbee calls this mimesis, 
and it involves charmed followers who feel something is afoot but need a leader to 
provide direction, hierarchy, law, loyalty.242 
A major aspect of the difficulty faced by the creative class involves a change in 
culture. Along with changes in the technological, economic, and political structures of a 
civilization, and in addition to changes in the particular goods, the good of order, and the 
                                                 
240 Ibid. , 51-52.  For more on the need for change, particularly within the context of the church and 
classicism, see “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” especially, 247-49. 
241 Topics in Education, 52.  Toynbee writes of both “withdrawal for return” and a “creative minority.” 
242 Ibid.  Lonergan does not provide citations for this and the above ideas. 
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concrete ways of realizing value, there must be a concomitant change in the public’s 
apprehension, reflection upon, and expression of those changes in symbols, customs, 
laws, stories, and traditional wisdom.   
As a culture develops, so too do its tools for reflection.  In Topics in Education 
Lonergan discusses this as progress “from the compactness of the symbol to the 
differentiation of philosophic, scientific, theological, and historical consciousness.”243  
Thus, a very important part of progress occurs within human consciousness, as a 
“differentiation” of consciousness.  Lonergan’s account of four differentiations of 
consciousness constitutes our final section in this chapter on progress. 
1.5.4.  Realms of Meaning 
 
The “realms of meaning” are communal developments on a level of culture.  They 
arise when any group of people develops its own technical language, its own distinct 
methods for gaining and sharing knowledge, and perhaps even its own formal cultural, 
social, or professional organizations.244 
Lonergan typically counts four “basic” realms of meaning, leaving the possibility 
open for more.245   These realms are historical developments that emerged in different 
time periods (at least the first three realms).  Today, a particular culture or a particular 
person may be “fluent” in one or more of the realms of meaning.  When a person 
becomes fluent in more than one realm, her/his consciousness becomes “differentiated.”  
Lonergan calls the ground within consciousness for each fluency a “differentiation of 
                                                 
243 Ibid., 55. 
244 Method, 81-85, 257-262. 
245 Ibid., 272. Here Lonergan adds a realm of “art,” focused on beauty, and a realm of “scholarship,” which 
aims at the meaning of words and the intentions of deeds. 
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consciousness.”  He enumerates at least thirty-one possible combinations of differentiated 
consciousness, plus one undifferentiated consciousness (a consciousness restricted to the 
most basic realm).246 
The first and most basic realm of meaning is common sense.  One’s entry into 
common sense is one’s entry into the world mediated by meaning:  language.247  We 
have discussed common sense as a set of insights, meanings, and values, which consi
things in relation to ourselves or our group, and which aims at providing practical 
knowledge for everyday living. 
ders 
e 
                                                
We have also already considered the second realm, theory, and this in terms of the 
scientist’s quest for knowledge that moves from description to explanation, and from 
things as they are related to us and our senses, to things as they are related to each other.  
Common sense extends back to time immemorial.  But theory, at least in Western 
civilization, seems to have developed with what Lonergan, following Bruno Snell, calls 
“the Greek discovery of the Mind.”248  Theory develops when questions arise from real 
or apparent contradictions in a culture’s myths.249 Parmenides is key figure in th
development of theory, because he challenged sense evidence, and therefore established a 
 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid., 86-90. 
248 Ibid., 90, citing Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960), chs. 1, 
3, 5, 9. Lonergan writes that as stages of meaning they are “ideal constructs,” and that “in the main” he has 
“in mind the Western tradition” (Method , 85). 
249 Method, 89-91. For Lonergan this is true of the development of Christian theology.  In one’s reading of 
scripture, questions arise which scripture itself does not answer.  Lonergan traces the development of one 
such question, If there is one God and the Father is God, then what is the Son?  This is the subject of 
Lonergan’s work, The Way to Nicea (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976). 
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distinction between sense and intellect.  Furthermore, the thrust to theory is well 
exemplified in Socrates’ search for universal definitions.250 
Lonergan distinguishes between two stages within the realm of theory.  In the first 
stage, philosophers represent the paradigm for theory, so all academic thinkers, including 
scientists, seek logical control over meaning.251  In this stage, classical law reigns.  But in 
the second stage of theory, the natural sciences are given an independence from 
philosophy, and developments such as statistical law emerge.252  Both stages within 
theory give rise to the pursuit of wisdom and culture for its own sake in what Lonergan, 
following Marx, calls a society’s “superstructure,” namely its schools, libraries, research 
institutions, etc.  Commonly, some members of society may think such developments are 
useless, but they are for enrichment of mind, the ennobling of will, and many other 
unforeseen purposes.253 
The third realm of meaning, interiority, is developed from questions raised by 
conflicts between common sense and theory:  Is common sense simply “primitive 
ignorance” while science is the “dawn”?  How does one really come to know?254  In 
Western culture, the rise of interiority began in the Enlightenment, with the slow 
replacement of faculty psychology by intentionality analysis through the advance of such 
thinkers as Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche, Blondel, the pragmatists, Brentano and Husserl.255  Though he would 
                                                 
250 Ibid., 82, 92. 
251 Ibid., 85. 
252 As discussed above, in section 1.2.2. 
253 Topics, 75-76. 
254 Method, 83. 
255 Ibid., 96. 
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generally not agree with their answers, Lonergan would credit them with raising the right 
questions.  Lonergan believes that interiority is becoming dominant in culture today as 
the influence of the classicism of an early stage within theory diminishes.256  This is the 
realm of meaning Lonergan calls us to in Insight and Method.  While interiority arises 
from questions about how one comes to know its domain extends to questions about 
decision-making, loving, and the relationships among knowing, deciding, and loving.  
What is love?  How does one know one is in love?  Does love cloud or aid one’s 
objectivity?  “As always, enlightenment is a matter of the ancient precept, Know 
thyself.”257 
The fourth basic realm of meaning, transcendence, regards unrestricted 
intelligibility, absolute truth, the value beyond criticism, and unconditional love.  It is 
“the realm in which God is known and loved” reached in “religiously differentiated 
consciousness.”258  Not limited to some future stage, and not restricted to Christian 
mystics, Lonergan finds that Teresa of Avila and mystics from other religions cohabit this 
realm. 
While society has exhibited a progression from the simple, undifferentiated 
consciousness of common sense to a differentiated consciousness that includes all four 
realms of meaning, individuals within that society may remain content in an 
undifferentiated common sense both marveling at and mocking scientists, academics, 
poets, artists, and saints. 
                                                 
256 Ibid. 
257 “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 279.  This essay discusses the three historical “stages” as 
“plateaus,” 277-279. 
258 Ibid., 272. 
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Conclusion 
This ends the chapter’s presentation of Lonergan’s very complicated but very 
enriching thought on what drives human progress.  For Lonergan, progress is a more or 
less abstract notion.  He affirms that in concrete reality human beings do make real 
progress.  But theoretically, Lonergan studies progress in a particular way:  as it flows 
from human persons and human society to the extent that as we are strictly “natural,” in 
other words prescinding from both the negative effects of sin, which cause decline, and 
the positive effects of grace, from which flows redemption.  For Lonergan, this “nature” 
that drives progress is (1) historical, (2) part of a dynamic world order of emergent 
probability, (3) driven by intelligence  (4) self-transcendent in a larger experiential, 
intellectual, reasonable, and responsible authenticity, (5) comprised of common life in 
community bound by shared meaning, value, and love, and (6) productive, through 
cooperation, of a developing human good. 
Lonergan’s views on nature and progress are very complicated, still, they 
comprise just one of three factors or differentials operative in Lonergan’s analysis of the 
concrete human situation.  In the next chapter, we will consider Lonergan’s thought on 
the second differential, namely the decline caused by sin.
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Chapter 2.  Decline:  Nature as Fallen
 
 
 
 
One of the biggest mistakes of early proponents of progress, according to 
Lonergan, was their utopian view that progress in human affairs was automatic and 
unbroken.259  They failed to account for the role of sin and evil.  Early liberals were 
aware of sin, but they held the illusion that individual egoism was the sufficient engine 
for progress.260  Along with modernity’s many contributions to the natural and human 
sciences came an arrogance that viewed human intelligence, reasonableness and 
responsibility as sufficient for progress and human sin as what really makes one 
oneself.261 
 Progress, as one vector in the analysis of human history, is Lonergan’s 
transposition of the classical, static category of “nature” into a dynamic, historical 
context.  But in reality no person and no society is ever in a pure state of nature.  We are 
all affected by what Christian tradition calls “the Fall,”262 “original sin”263 and the 
                                                 
259 Insight, 264, 710-11; Topics in Education, 47. 
260 See note 7, above. 
261 Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 247. 
262 “Openness and Religious Experience,” 200. 
263 “Healing and Creating in History,” 101-02.  Lonergan does not discuss original sin by name in any great 
detail.  He would probably reject traditional metaphors for original sin such as the “stain” of original sin.  
Instead, he Lonergan  seems to address original sin when discussing the influence of a society in decline or 
a “sinful social process” on its members.  For example, in Method, 117, he writes, “Decline disrupts a 
culture with conflicting ideologies.  It inflicts on individuals the social, economic, and psychological 
pressures that for human frailty amount to determinism.  It multiplies and heaps up the abuses and 
absurdities that breed resentment, hatred, anger, violence.” 
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resultant “darkening of intellect and weakening of will.”264  The human person as 
concretely alive in this world is a composite, more or less affected by both the intrinsic 
goodness of nature and the inherent evil of sin.  The result is that we are, as Pascal 
observes, both “wretched and great.”265  In Lonergan’s terms, human history is always a 
mixed product of nature and sin, progress and decline. 
Decline is Lonergan’s term for sin’s cumulative effect on human history.  It is 
why our world does not function in a rosy, continuous succession of improvement upon 
improvement.  Because of decline, we remain intelligent and free, rational and loving, but 
in potential more than in truth.266  Decline flows from our real failure to observe the 
transcendental precepts, our failure to be authentic in individual operations and social 
cooperation.  As progress depends on our being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and 
responsible, decline is the result of “inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, 
irresponsibility,” and as progress was a series of insights improving the human situation, 
so decline causes successive “objectively absurd situations.”267 
Decline is the result of a perversion of the natural, unrestricted desire for beauty, 
meaning, truth, value, goodness, and love, i.e., our longing for God.  Sinful acts suppress 
this desire.  Over time they form multiple biases that shrink one’s natural orientation to 
                                                 
264 Ibid., 102; cf., Grace and Freedom, 16.  On the universality of sin and its effects, Lonergan cites Rom. 
1:18-3:20; 7:14-24; Eph. 2:3 (“Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,”8). 
265 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A.J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin.  This is a recurrent theme in the 
Pensées, but it is the focus of I, 7.  Similarly, though with an understanding of goodness that was confined 
strictly to grace, Luther wrote the phrase “simultaneously justified and sinner” (simul justus et pecatur) in 
the margin of his Bible.  The theme is expressed in his On Christian Liberty as “free lord” and “dutiful 
servant.” Martin Luther, On Christian Liberty, trans W. A. Lambert (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg 
Fortress), 2. 
266 Lonergan comments that because of sin, we are rational animals only in potency.  In reality, he believes, 
we are more symbolic animals than rational animals, since symbols affect both saints and sinners (Topics, 
79-80). 
267 Method, 54-55. 
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truth and goodness, to beauty and love.  In turn, these biases increase the probability of 
future sins, and thus produce a downward spiral of sin and bias, in a word, decline. 
In this chapter we examine decline in three parts:  (1) the more traditional cause 
of decline:  sin, (2) the mutual effect and cause of sin in human consciousness: bias, and 
(3) the result of sin and bias in history: decline. 
2.1.  Sin and Evil 
According to the older, scholastic theories expressed in terms of faculty 
psychology, original sin and personal sin cause a “darkening of intellect and weakening 
of will.”268  Sin and evil enter into the world through free human acts.  To the degree that 
we do good, we are God’s instruments, but when we do evil, we are the sole initiators of 
the act.  Following Thomas Aquinas, Lonergan affirms that God is the sole creator and 
the ultimate sustainer of all that exists and of all that is good.  Directly, God wills only 
what is good.  Among the goods that God wills are the free wills of human persons.  In 
willing the good of free will, God allows or permits the evil of sin, but in no way does 
God will it.269 
In Insight, Lonergan distinguishes “basic sin” from “moral evil” and “physical 
evil.”  Basic sin is a failure of the intellect and the will, respectively, to identify rationally 
and to choose morally the good.  Lonergan emphasizes the negative aspect basic sin by 
                                                 
268 See note 264, above. 
269 “Moral Theology and the Human Sciences,” Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 304.  Lonergan cites Thomas’s Summa Theologica, 1, q. 19, 
a. 9 c., and ad 3m.  See also Insight, 688-90.  The relationship between God and evil will be covered more 
thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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calling it not simply a failure of the will but a failure to will.  Similarly, sin is not only a 
failure of the intellect and reason; it is unintelligible and irrational in itself.270 
If there were a reason it would not be sin.  There may be excuses; there may be 
extenuating circumstances, but there cannot be a reason, for basic sin consists, not in 
yielding to reasons and reasonableness, but in failing to yield to them; it consists not in 
inadvertent failure but in advertence to and in acknowledgment of obligation that 
nonetheless is not followed by reasonable response.271 
 
Basic sin includes an unreasonable “contraction of consciousness” as well as 
some derivative unreasonable, wrong action.  “Moral evil” is Lonergan’s term for such 
wrong actions.  Moral evil is any result or “consequence” of basic sin.  Such 
consequences include damage done to the sinner and to the social situation. Basic sin and 
the moral evil they cause increase the probability that future sins and evils will occur.  
They do this by heightening the “tension and temptation in oneself or in one’s social 
milieu.”272   As scripture asserts, it is through sin that suffering and death enter the 
world.273 
Moral evil is to be distinguished from “natural evil,” which includes such 
occurrences as natural disasters and birth defects.  Natural or “physical” evils are in no 
way caused by sin, but rather constitute “all the shortcomings of a world order that 
consists, insofar as we understand it, in a generalized emergent probability.”274  The 
universe is developing from lower to higher material and biological and spiritual forms.  
This development is not a matter of fixed determinism but of risk.  From a limited 
                                                 
270 Insight, 689-90. 
271 Ibid., 690. 
272 Ibid., 689. 
273 “Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness,” 8.  Lonergan cites Gen 2:15; 3:19; 
Rom. 5:12; 6:22-23. 
274 Insight, 689. 
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perspective, hurricanes, illnesses, and the like are evil.  But from the point of view of the 
entire world order, they can be seen as tending to the good.  In fact, even moral evil (the 
consequence of sin), which is indirectly willed by God in the creation of a just world 
order, can be viewed in this way.  “For the imperfection of the lower is the potentiality 
for the higher; the underdeveloped is for the developed; and even moral evils through the 
dialectical tension they generate head either to their own elimination or to a 
reinforcement of the moral good.”275 
In Topics in Education, Lonergan identifies sin as the cause of decline.  He 
examines sin and its effects as “crime,” in “social process,” and as “aberration.” 
Considered as crime, sin can be studied statistically and may be dealt with mainly 
by laws, police, courts, and prisons.  The law is a fundamental instrument for 
apprehending good and evil.  “As St. Paul says in Romans 3.20, ‘Through the law there is 
knowledge of sin.’ And again in Romans 5.13 he writes, ‘Before the law there was sin in 
the world, but the sin was not counted as sin since there was no law.’”  As a kind of 
crime, sin is done by people who do not understand the social network and/or who do not 
wish to be a part of it, people whom society has failed to bring up in its ways or those 
who refuse to live by society’s ways.  Viewing sin as a crime makes sin clear, however, 
the great disadvantage of this approach is its minimal standard for the good.  The good 
has no real positive value.  It becomes merely not breaking the law or perhaps even not 
getting caught.276 
                                                 
275 Ibid., 691. 
276 Topics in Education, 59.  It would seem that another disadvantage to viewing sin as a crime is the 
individualization of sin.  A court of law must hold some individual or group of individuals responsible.  
Original sin, however, adds a social component that falls under social process and decline.  Lonergan does 
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Due to these shortcomings, it is best to supplement this view with an 
understanding of sin as a component in a social process.  Reminding us that the good of 
order does not in fact develop in the “glorious fashion” he outlined in his discussion of 
progress, Lonergan writes that the good of order: 
develops under a bias in favor of the powerful, the rich, or the most numerous class.  It 
changes the creative minority into a merely dominant minority.  It leads to a division of 
classes not merely by their function, but also by their well-being.  This division of classes 
gives rise in the underdogs to suspicion, envy, resentment, hatred, and in those that have 
the better end of the stick, to haughtiness, arrogance, disdain, criticism of ‘sloth,’ of ‘lack 
of initiative,’ of ‘short-sightedness,’ or in earlier times, of ‘lowly birth.’277 
 
So in the world process, sin introduces biases in favor of some types of people 
against other types.  To the extent that these biases are operative in society, it is not 
enough to have good ideas and to work hard.  One must have some measure of wealth, 
power, and popular opinion if one’s ideas are to be realized.  Management seeks ever 
more power because it desires control.  Bureaucratic hierarchies arise.  Eventually, the 
only ideas that have a chance of success are those that come from the people at the top.   
In a better world, good ideas could come from anywhere and still be effective.  
They could come from “the man on the spot who is intelligent, sees the possibilities, and 
goes ahead at his own risk.  But in the bureaucracy the intelligent man ceases to be the 
initiator….  Activity is slowed down to the pace of routine paperwork.  Style and form, 
that are inevitable when the man who has the idea is running things, yield to 
standardization and uniformity.”278  Small, independent businesses are taken over or 
                                                                                                                                                 
not state this weakness of considering sin as a crime, but it may have been at least part of the reason for his 
addition of sin as part of the social process. 
277 Ibid., 60.  Sin as social process seems to me to be the closest Lonergan gets to the traditional doctrine of 
“original sin.”  See note 263. 
278 Ibid., 60-61. 
 
 101
forced to close.  “You have to be in big business to be in business at all, and in big 
business you have nothing to say.”279  Work becomes drudgery.  People seek distraction 
in frivolity.  The universities become ivory towers, with no concern for the actual 
situation. 
Lonergan finds that many attempts to improve the social situation end up 
perpetuating or increasing the damage.  One such attempt is archaism, or a return to 
ancient virtues, even when the ancient virtues are no longer relevant.  Another is 
futurism, the expectation that utopia will come in some leap, probably through 
technology.  Alternatively, the state may create “‘times of troubles,’ wars to arouse social 
concern, to give people a stake in the nation, to give them the feeling that they belong 
together in one nation.”280  Any of these, for Lonergan, perpetuate sin as a “social 
process.” 
Finally, sin may be considered as aberration, as an evil opposed to the reflective 
development of the individual and the broader culture.  For Lonergan, an aberration is 
oriented to a negative outcome.  This is true for both the individual’s consciousness and 
the society’s cultural history.  “As aberrant [individual] consciousness heads to neurosis 
and psychosis, similarly aberrant [social] history heads to cataclysm.”281  Ideally, both 
persons and communities are oriented to the totality of the true and the good.  But the 
aberration of sin shrinks human concern, blocking off important ideas, questions, and 
                                                 
279 Ibid., 61. 
280 Ibid., 61-62. 
281 Ibid., 63.  
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aspects of experience.  It closes off “the higher aspirations of the human spirit and the 
human heart.”282 
In advanced civilizations, the higher aspects of culture (art, literature, philosophy, 
religion) function as arenas to work out the natural human unrestricted desire for beauty, 
truth, and goodness.  However, the “chain reactions”283 of sin transform high culture into 
“a high-level rationalization” for society’s sins.  In response to the evils of a culture in 
decline, virtuous observers may be tempted to wholesale condemnation, but Lonergan 
warns that this is not the best response:  “the Catholic may wish to retire to an ivory 
tower, to condemn the new good because of its association with new evils; but that is 
another form of the aberration.”284 
Not just culture, but the whole human good is affected.  As there are particular 
goods, a good of order, and the values by which particular goods and a good of order may 
be judged, so too there are particular evils, an organization of evil, and a negation of 
value.  Particular evils include personal privations, suffering, harm, and destruction.  
Organized evils include chronic schemes of recurrence, such as crime waves, 
depressions, and war.  These organized evils are evil schemes of recurrence.  Just as in a 
good of order, people involved in a cycle of evil can gain skills and habits to do what is 
evil.  They can cooperate in it, set up institutions for it.  “There can be the destruction of 
personal relations and status through hatred, envy, jealousy, lust, resentment, grievance.  
                                                 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid., 67. 
284 Ibid., 64-65. 
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People with grievances, nations with grievances, very easily can become warped in their 
entire outlook.”285  
On top of particular evils and their recurrent scheme, there is a “negation of 
value.”  Aesthetically, particular goods become dysfunctional and ugly.  The good of 
order becomes either too complex to be transparent or so loose it exists in name only.  
Ethically, the liberty that flourishes in a good of order becomes perverted into “a reign of 
sin, a despotism of darkness” that makes all men its slaves.286    The freedom of humanity 
that is “essential” to its nature becomes less and less an “effective” reality.287  If there is 
an order, it is mechanical.  Most individuals become “drifters,” conforming.  Some 
become  
the complementary type with the will to power, social engineers, the hidden persuaders, 
who dominate the drifting masses…  [who] are controlled without their knowing it – the 
propaganda ministry of the totalitarian state.  And there can be its equivalent in the 
advertising setup, big institutions for control of people’s choices without their knowing 
it.288 
 
Against religious value are the evils of “estrangement from God, secularism, the 
negation of the idea of sin, complete and full self-assertion.”  Social thinking becomes 
dominated by “vast illusions,” such as automatic progress, utopias, supermen, the illusion 
of the individual, and scientism.  People neither “fear God” nor “respect man.”289 
Finally, there is a “theological dimension” to sin and its consequent particular 
evils, evil schemes of recurrence and negation of value.  Sin is not merely an intentional 
failure to observe the natural desires of the human person and the natural patterns of the 
                                                 
285 Topics in Education, 43-44. 
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social order, sin is also a “revolt against God, an abuse of his goodness and love, a 
pragmatic calumny that hides from oneself and from others the absolute goodness and 
perfect love that through the universe and through men expresses itself to men.”290  Sin is 
a rejection of the wise, divinely-willed order of the universe as well as of humanity’s role 
of “cooperation with God in the realization of the order of the universe.”291  Tradition 
distinguishes between venial and mortal sin with mortal sin being a deadly blow, a total 
rupture of the sinner’s relationship with God, or as contemporary moral theologians 
might say, a “fundamental option” against God.292 
In Method, Lonergan does not focus on sin, but rather on the proper performance 
of conscious intentionality in right relationship with God and all things.  In this context, 
however, I believe it safe to say that sin is a failure of conscious intentionality to be 
authentically self-transcendent in one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and 
deciding.  It comes from and causes improper relationality.  Ultimately, “sinfulness… is 
the privation of total loving; it is a radical dimension of lovelessness”293 or perhaps even 
a “love of evil.”294  Because by nature we humans desire unrestricted love and the lasting 
peace that only such love can bring, sin leads us to engage in 
sustained superficiality, by evading ultimate questions, by absorption in all that the world 
offers to challenge our resourcefulness, to relax our bodies, to distract our minds.  But 
escape may not be permanent and then the absence of fulfillment reveals itself in unrest, 
the absence of joy in the pursuit of fun, the absence of peace in disgust—a depressive 
disgust with oneself or a manic, hostile, even violent disgust with mankind.295 
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Along with this disgust comes alienation, on which Lonergan writes briefly:  “Sin 
is alienation from man’s authentic being, which is self-transcendence, and sin justifies 
itself by ideology.”296  Alienation, in the context of transcendental method, is a disregard 
of the transcendental precepts—the opposite of authenticity.  Concretely, it results in 
decline.297 
In a public lecture, a year after Method’s publication, Lonergan summarizes the 
above aspects of sin, defining it simply, as “a turning against yourself, and against God, 
and against your neighbor.”298 
2.2.  Bias 
 Sin and evil are categories traditional to Catholic theology, even if Lonergan’s 
analysis of them is his own.  Bias is more original to Lonergan.  It is an inauthentic 
orientation caused by and causal of inauthentic actions, decisions, judgments, ideas, and 
experiences.  It is both the result of sin and a cause of further sin.299  As such, bias 
functions in a way similar to Aristotle’s bad habits, or vices.300  However, while Aristotle 
discusses vice as an extreme on either side of a “golden mean,” Lonergan analyses bias in 
terms of conscious intentionality, social dynamics, and history.  Sinful personal 
judgments of value, decisions, and actions damage the social and historical situation.  
Such actions and situations cause the hardening of bias, which is the shrinking of one’s 
                                                 
296 Ibid., 364.  More on alienation and ideology will follow in our discussion of decline, below. 
297 Ibid., 55. 
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horizon of concern, a harmful, habitual orientation of the heart and the mind.  This 
shrinking of horizon, this harmful habit of the heart and mind corrupts a person’s or a 
community’s decisions, judgments, understandings, and experiences.301 
Let us examine in greater detail the four biases that Lonergan identifies:  
dramatic, individual, group, and general. 
2.2.1.  Dramatic Bias 
Dramatic bias operates largely on a subconscious basis.  It negatively affects the 
psychic activity of the person, which controls the underlying physical, chemical, and 
biological schemes of recurrence, and which sets the conditions for the emergence of 
higher level functions of consciousness: experiencing, questioning, understanding, 
judging, and deciding. 
Even in the ideal authentic person, experience is patterned by “interest, 
anticipation, and activity.”302  For example, all of one’s conscious operations can be 
geared toward fulfilling biological needs, such as getting food to live, or escaping 
possible death.  A person could be attending to the beauty of the world and experiencing 
for the sake of experiencing, as do hikers or children at play.  Like Archimedes, all of 
one’s consciousness could be focused on getting an insight, on figuring out a problem.  In 
general, however, people are engaged in the general task of living.  This task takes up the 
biological, aesthetic, and intellectual concerns and brings them into a richer context of 
crafting the drama of one’s own life.  In this “dramatic pattern of experience,” food, art, 
                                                 
301 Method, 231.  Notice the movement “from above downwards,” similar to how genuine love and its 
horizons and habits shape a person or community’s decisions, judgments, understandings, and experiences.  
See section 1.5.2. 
302 Ibid., 210. 
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and insight get taken up into larger contexts of meaning.  “[C]lothes are not a simple-
minded matter of keeping warm.  They are the colored plumes of birds as well as the furs 
of animals.  They disguise as well as cover and adorn.”303 
In the dramatic pattern of experience by which we live our lives, higher mental 
functions “reach down” into the neural processes that set the preconscious conditions for 
conscious operations.  All conscious operations have counterparts in preconscious neural 
functions.  There is a preconscious operator that Freud calls a “censor,” which does the 
“selection and arrangement,” and thus the “rejection and exclusion” of both sensitive and 
affective experience.304  Normally, the censor functions in a positive, constructive 
manner by raising helpful schemes of images and feelings.  In the person who seeks 
genuine insight into the drama of living, the censor is neutral to whatever insight may 
arise from the question’s interaction with the scheme.   
                                                
However, “[j]ust as insight can be desired, so too it can be unwanted. Besides the 
love of light, there can be a love of darkness.”305  This, Lonergan calls a “flight from 
understanding,”306 caused by the natural human desire to have one’s choices to be in 
harmony with one’s knowledge of reality.  To avoid the uneasy conscience that arises 
from the dissonance between reality and sinful choice, one may tell oneself more or less 
conscious lies, i.e., one may rationalize.307  However, one may also have formed a 
fundamental, unconscious bias, the “dramatic bias.” 
 
303 Ibid.  For more on such patterns of experience, see Insight, 204-212; Method, 286.  To the biological, 
aesthetic, intellectual, and dramatic patters of Insight, Method adds the mystical or worshipful. 
304 Insight, 214. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Insight, 5, 220-223. 
307 Ibid., 215; cf., 264-65, 621-23.  See the above section on authenticity. 
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 If a person has a dramatic bias, the censor’s positive function becomes primarily 
repressive.  “Just as wanting an insight penetrates below the surface to bring forth 
schematic images that give rise to the insight, so not wanting an insight has the opposite 
effect of repressing from consciousness a scheme that would suggest the insight.”308  
Perverted by dramatic bias, the censor represses insight by inhibiting neural demand 
functions that allow needed images and feelings to arise.  Feelings may arise, but only 
when they have been detached from their proper image or insight.  They then arise 
attached to some incongruous object that may be more or less associated with the original 
object.  Blocking an insight causes a “blind spot” or “scotoma,” in one’s 
understanding.309 
The repression of just one insight can have far-reaching effects, as Lonergan 
explains: 
To exclude an insight is also to exclude the further questions that would arise from it, and 
the complementary insights that would carry it towards a rounded and balanced 
viewpoint.  To lack that fuller view results in behavior that generates misunderstanding 
both in ourselves and in others.  To suffer such incomprehension favors a withdrawal 
from the outer drama of human living into the inner drama of fantasy.310 
  
Dramatic bias fosters an introversion contrary to a human person’s natural 
extroversion on biological, aesthetic, intellectual, and social levels.  The person is no 
longer at home in the real world, and so s/he must generate “a differentiation of the 
persona that appears before others and the more intimate ego.”311  Individuals may seek 
release from division of the persona and the ego in certain dreams, in therapy, or in the 
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“mass therapy” and “catharsis” of theater, of totems and taboos.  In any case, a cure will 
require insight.312  Though associated with very serious neuroses and psychoses, 
Lonergan reminds us that dramatic bias is common to all people and elementary to all our 
sins.313 
2.2.2.  Individual Bias:  Egoism 
Egoism is generally acknowledged as a negative bias.  However, identifying 
exactly what it is, is difficult.  Egoism is not an animal hunting down its prey, just as 
altruism is not the animal parent fostering its young.  Both of these acts are instinctual 
rather than deliberate.  This distinction extends to some human behavior.  Egoism is not 
simply the spontaneous desire to satisfy one’s own appetites, and altruism is not simply 
the tendency of spontaneous intersubjectivity to help others to gain their satisfactions.314 
Furthermore, egoism is not the same as self-love, at least not genuine self-love.  
Aristotle brings this to light in his Nicomachean Ethics.  True friendship excludes self-
love in its popular sense, namely egoism.  However, to be a good friend to another one 
must have genuine love for oneself.  If one loves oneself rightly, one seeks the best things 
for oneself.  Since virtue and wisdom are the best things, a genuine self-love will seek 
wisdom and virtue, and these things are prerequisite for being a true friend to oneself and 
to others.  Thus, a true self-love can lead to true friendship.  Since love of self and love 
for others are intertwined, egoism and altruism are not ultimate categories. However, as 
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Lonergan writes, egoism is in some sense always wrong and altruism is “its proper 
corrective.”315 
To explain egoism, Lonergan returns to his distinction between human sensitivity 
and spontaneous intersubjectivity and common sense.  Human living is the result of a 
dialectical development of common sense and sensitivity and spontaneous 
intersubjectivity.  Egoism is caused by an overemphasis on spontaneity to the point where 
it interferes with the development of common sense and other forms of iintelligence.  
Egoism is a failure to ask if one’s actions are capable of being generalized and if they are 
compatible with the social, human good.  This overemphasis on spontaneity does not 
come with the destruction of common sense or of intelligence in general.  For an egoist 
may also be “the cool schemer, the shrewd calculator, the hardheaded self-seeker.”  Such 
an egoist is adept at instrumentalizing intelligence for his or her purposes.  Thus, egoism 
is to some degree intelligent, though it operates with an incomplete development of 
intelligence.316 
This incompleteness comes from a perversion of the detached and disinterested 
desire to know.  Egoism brushes aside the “further pertinent questions” that would cast 
doubt on its selfish acts.  “[I]t fails to pivot from the initial and preliminary motivation 
provided by desires and fears to the self-abnegation involved in allowing complete free 
play to intelligent inquiry.”317  Questions about fairness or the effects of one’s action on 
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the group are dismissed or are answered improperly, in a way that creates further difficult 
questions that again are brushed aside. 
Like dramatic bias, individual bias causes an aberration in one’s understanding.  It 
contradicts the wisdom of common-sense proverbs like,  “What is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander.”  It rejects the golden rule.  A common rationalization protests that 
each person and each situation is different.  Lonergan acknowledges these differences, 
and he concedes that common sense is incomplete without further insights into a 
situation’s unique circumstances.  But he insists that although persons and situations have 
their particularities, they are not completely different: 
[I]t does not follow that the golden rule is that there is no golden rule.  For the old rule 
did not advocate identical behavior in significantly different situations; on the contrary, it 
contended that the mere interchange of individual roles would not by itself constitute a 
significant difference in concrete situations.318 
 
The egoist “devotes his energies to sizing up the social order, ferreting out its 
weak points and its loopholes, and discovering devices that give access to its rewards 
while evading its demands for proportionate contributions.”319  Contrary to some early 
modern thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes, Lonergan maintains that egoism is not 
spontaneous.  Rather, it has to overcome systematically the fellow-feeling of spontaneous 
intersubjectivity and the spontaneous questions of the natural desire to know. 
Unlike dramatic bias, individual bias operates on a more conscious level, and the 
egoist is aware of her or his self-deception to some degree: 
The egoist’s uneasy conscience is his awareness of his sin against the light.  Operative 
within him there is the eros of the mind, the desire and drive to understand.  He knows its 
value, for he gives it free reign where his own interests are concerned; yet he also 
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repudiates its mastery, for he will not grant serious consideration to its further 
questions.320 
 
2.2.3.  Group Bias:  Group Egoism 
 
Group bias, like individual bias, involves an incomplete development of common 
sense.  It too includes a disregard for further questions about the world and one’s actions, 
forgetting the reciprocity implied by the golden rule.  “But while individual bias has to 
overcome normative intersubjective feeling, group bias finds itself supported by such 
feeling.  Again, while individual bias leads to attitudes that conflict with ordinary 
common sense, group bias operates in the very genesis of commonsense views.”321 
The community as a whole has a common sense, but each subgroup within a 
community has its own additional, particular common sense that comes from “the 
situations with which it immediately deals.”322  There are many healthy forms of 
communal bonds, but as an aberration of common sense, group bias creates  “a loyalty to 
one’s own group matched by a hostility to other groups.”323 
Lonergan devotes special attention to social classes.  He does not find their mere 
existence to be bad necessarily.  Ideally, these groups arise from and are distinguished by 
their roles in the many interrelated schemes of recurrence that underlie the production of 
a community’s technology, the economic distribution of its goods and services, and the 
political arenas of deliberation and decision.  So, for example, research scientists are 
distinguished from technicians, foremen from managers, and judges from lawyers.  If 
group bias arises, however, one group may manipulate the social order for its own good 
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to the detriment of others.  “Classes become distinguished, not merely by social function, 
but also by social success,”324 and that success is obtained at the expense of others.  The 
“body social” becomes divided into “those who have and those who have not.”325  Such a 
situation is not healthy for the common, human good. 
In Lonergan’s opinion, times of great change (caused by new material conditions 
and/or transformative ideas) set fertile conditions for the genesis and the hardening of 
group bias.  Sometimes, social classes are caused not by the seizure of power or wealth 
by one group, so much as the failure of a group or groups to adapt their lives to a change 
somewhere in the technological, economic, or political order.  The resulting inequalities 
can then be blamed on another group in “ressentiment”—the longstanding re-feeling of a 
values clash in which one or one’s group felt unequal to another and unable to attain 
equality.326 
As the subject has blind spots and the egoist seeks conclusions compatible with 
his or her egoism, so also is the group prone to developing blind spots and resisting 
questions and insights that threaten its social advantages or the usefulness of its social 
roles.327  As those who suffer from individual bias seek to soothe their uneasy 
consciences by the lies of rationalization, so do group egoists reinforce their irrational 
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and uncaring acts by the shared, systematic rationalization of ideology.328 
Despite their similarities, group egoism is likely to be more damaging than 
individual bias.  The individual egoist is resisted by the mass of society, but those who 
succumb to group bias have the reinforcement from others and from shared theories and 
doctrines.  The broad effects of group bias and the difficulty of its reversal make group 
bias the cause of a “shorter cycle of decline,” to be discussed after general bias. 
2.2.4.  General Bias: Shortsightedness 
Common sense, as discussed early in the first chapter, is a differentiation of 
human consciousness by which individuals in a society learn the community’s shared sets 
of meanings and values.  It is a common fund of accumulated wisdom.  On it people of 
all walks of life base their decisions and actions in all kinds of situations.  Common sense 
is a wonderful human development, but it is not its only development.  General bias 
“takes the narrow and complacent practicality of common sense and elevates it to the role 
of a complete and exclusive viewpoint.”329 
Common sense is a specialized form of knowing.  Its area of expertise is in the 
immediate, the concrete, and the particular—in the multitude of minor, everyday life 
problems.  There is much that lies outside its reach, however.  It is prone to forgetting its 
limitations as well as to rationalizing its limitations by saying that other forms of 
knowledge are useless or even untrue.  “Every specialist runs the risk of turning his 
specialty into a bias by failing to recognize and appreciate the significance of other 
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fields.”330 
Though not alone in this possibility, common sense has a strong tendency towards 
it.  In its great competence yet narrow focus on the indispensable tasks of living, it can 
easily mistake itself to be omni-competent.  It is indifferent to reaching abstract and 
universal laws, to attending to larger issues of the greater whole, and, most importantly, 
to considering long-term consequences of human action.  Common sense’s main task is 
to make swiftly a multitude of pressing decisions.  It may consider an action’s effects on 
more than one person and even on more than a particular group.  But in its focus on the 
immediate situation, common sense does not consider adequately the effects of a decision 
on the surrounding environmental conditions, on the next generation, or the ones 
following. 
This is a significant problem because humans can direct emergent probability to 
some degree.  We can grasp the conditions for and the probabilities of the emergence of 
various schemes of recurrence, and with this knowledge we can act to transform 
conditions and shift probabilities—increasing the likelihood that some schemes will arise 
and decreasing the likelihood that others will emerge.  In other words, human beings 
become in some measure the executors of human and global development.  To do this, 
we need to recognize how our present insights, decisions, and actions will influence our 
potential future insights, decisions, and actions.  Looking even further into the future, we 
can recognize how the efforts of one generation can affect the possibilities open to 
successive generations.  Common sense takes into account the next step or two, but what 
                                                 
330 Ibid., 251. 
 
 116
of the next ten?  It is common sense to educate our young, but can common sense teach 
them to consider the welfare of all humanity throughout history?331 
Lonergan believes that common sense is 
unequal to the task of thinking on the level of history.  It stands above the scotosis of the 
dramatic subject, above the egoism of the individual, above the bias of dominant and of 
depressed but militant groups that realize only the ideas they see to be to their immediate 
advantage.  But the general bias of common sense prevents it from being effective in 
realizing ideas, however appropriate and reasonable, that suppose a long view or that set 
up higher integrations or that involve the solution of intricate and disputed issues.332 
 
These are matters for science and theory, both natural and social, from physics to 
human history.  “The challenge of history is for man progressively to enlarge the realm of 
conscious grasp and deliberate choice.”333 
Compounding the limits of common sense is its rationalization of its limited 
competence. General bias adds “sins of refusal” to common sense’s “sins of omission.”  
In its one-sided emphasis on immediate practicality, it makes “insistent desires and 
contracting fears” of the immediate situation the only standard for ideas.334  It ridicules 
the far-ranging views of history and science as irrelevant and impractical.  This leads to a 
whole succession of problems we will discuss in the next section on decline. 
2.3.  Decline 
Lonergan asserts that it is easy to fall into the aberrations of bias but difficult to 
correct them: 
Egoists do not turn into altruists overnight.  Hostile groups do not easily forget their 
grievances, drop their resentments, overcome their fears and suspicions. Common sense 
commonly feels itself omnicompetent in practical affairs, commonly is blinded to long-
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term consequences of policies and courses of action, commonly is unaware of the 
admixture of common nonsense in its more cherished convictions and slogans.335 
 
The extent of aberration is variable.  “The greater it is, the more rapidly it will 
distort the process of cumulative change and bring birth a host of social and cultural 
problems.”336  Such is decline. 
2.3.1.  Shorter Cycle 
 Decline is a negative cumulative process.  Bias causes oversight; oversight causes 
“unintelligent policies and inept courses of action;” unintelligent policies and inept action 
lead to absurd situations.337  As this scheme of bias, oversight, policy, action, and 
changed situations recurs, biases deepen, oversights abound, and policies become more 
unintelligent.  Actions become more inept and situations more absurd. 
 Lonergan distinguishes between shorter and longer cycles of decline.  The shorter 
cycle is caused by group bias.  We have discussed the origins of aberrant social 
inequalities.  However, we have not discussed the cumulative effects and the accelerated 
formation of harmful and absurd elements in the social situation.  Lonergan’s exposition 
of the shorter cycle of decline picks up where his analysis of group bias and aberrant 
social classes left off:  When one group’s success comes at the expense of other groups’, 
the successful group must seek increasing amounts of power in order to stay in power.  
Ideas that benefit society as a whole are increasingly left behind as the powerful group 
only backs ideas that increase its hold on society.  Lonergan discusses the cumulative 
effects of group bias:  “those in favor find success the key to still further success; those 
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unable to make operative the ideas that are to their advantage fall behind in the process of 
social development.” The “haves” become more and more separated from the “have-
nots.”  The “haves” divert an increasing amount of social resources from institutions that 
benefit all to “devising and implementing offensive and defensive mechanisms.”338 
But there is hope.  This shorter cycle of decline caused by group bias creates the 
principles for its own reversal.  In its growing power and abuse of power, the successful 
group calls into being “an opposed group egoism.”339  Incomplete ideas forced on society 
by one group at first may go unrecognized as such, except by a few experts, but 
eventually their negative consequences damage peoples’ lives and their incompleteness is 
brought to light for all.  Groups made unsuccessful become motivated toward reform or 
revolution.  Dominant groups can be reactionary, progressive, or a mixture of both.  To 
the degree that they are reactionary, their suppression of other ideas calls forth 
revolutionaries and the situation heads towards violence.  Progressives, who aim at 
correcting their own oversights, are met by liberals, and the two groups may agree on an 
end while debating “the pace of change and the mode and measure of its execution.”340 
2.3.2.  Longer Cycle 
When general bias is added to group bias, the result is a further distorted dialectic 
of community.  Group bias alone can initiate a cycle of decline, but this cycle tends not to 
be short, because the practical plans discarded by the dominant group are “championed 
later by depressed groups.”341  But if the society’s problems are compounded by general 
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bias’s neglect of long-term solutions good for the whole of society, then all groups 
neglect the kind of ideas that would reverse decline.  There begins the longer cycle of 
decline. 
In normal positive development, questions lead to insights, problems lead to 
solutions, higher viewpoints are attained, and better situations are achieved.  But caught 
in the longer cycle of decline, society consistently disregards “timely and fruitful ideas.”  
This precludes their implementation, and furthermore, it prevents the conditions for the 
possibility of other truly practical ideas to arise in the future.  Consequently, the social 
situation deteriorates at an accelerating rate.  Bad ideas lead to bad situations, which 
result in worse ideas and to worsened situations.  Social schemes and functions become 
corrupted, some die, and some grow out of control.  The effects can be seen on 
technological, economic, and political levels.  Sluggishness leads to stagnation.  The best 
that one can hope for is a balance of powers. 
What is worse, the deteriorating situation seems to provide the uncritical, biased mind 
with factual evidence in which the bias is claimed to be verified.  So in ever increasing 
measure intelligence comes to be regarded as irrelevant to practical living.  Human 
activity settles down to a decadent routine and initiative becomes the privilege of 
violence.342 
 
In addition to deteriorating social relations, general bias has negative effects on 
cultural systems of evaluating and criticizing the society’s values.  Its disregard for 
intellectual pursuits and all that is not deemed “immediately practical” banishes art and 
literature into an ivory tower, makes philosophy a mere curiosity, and constricts religion 
to the private sphere: 
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Cognitional self-transcendence is neither an easy notion to grasp nor a readily accessible 
datum of consciousness to be verified.  Values have a certain esoteric imperiousness, but 
can they keep outweighing carnal pleasure, wealth, power?  Religion undoubtedly had its 
day, but is not that day over?  Is it not illusory comfort for weaker souls, an opium 
distributed by the rich to quiet the poor, a mythical projection of a man’s own excellence 
into the sky?343 
 
It is normal for common sense to be in tension with higher intellectual pursuits.  
Typically persons of common sense can find “a profoundly satisfying escape from the 
grim realities of daily living by turning to men of culture, to representatives of religion, to 
spokesmen of philosophy.”344 But general bias wipes out any validity to these other 
forms of knowing.  Without them, people lose humanizing sources of play and exalta
Culture, religion and philosophy may remain in name, but their goals and methods 
become those of common sense.  There can still be discovery and development, but the 
culture will be uncritical.  There will be limited concern for possibilities, no standard of 
truth, and no normative measurement of value.  Life becomes absurd. 
tion.  
                                                
It is bad enough for general bias to banish culture to an ivory tower; worse yet is 
the co-opting of science, culture, religion, and philosophy into justifying the absurdities 
of decline.  Through the perversion of these “higher” pursuits, spontaneous 
rationalizations are sustained, hardened, and handed on in ideology. “Imperceptibly the 
corruption spreads from the harsh sphere of material advantage and power to the mass 
media, the stylish journals, the literary movements, the educational process, the reigning 
philosophies.  A civilization in decline digs its own grave with a relentless 
consistency.”345 
 
343 Method, 243. 
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On all levels of the human good, from material conditions to higher culture and 
personal value, there is created the “social surd”—elements of a social situation that exist 
but are unintelligible.346  In the longer cycle of decline, the surd expands exponentially, 
“and so there is an increasing demand for further contractions of the claims of 
intelligence, for further dropping of old principles and norms, for closer conformity to an 
ever growing manmade incoherence immanent in manmade facts.”347 
At the root of decline and the resultant social surd is a frustration of the core of 
human nature, the “eros of the human spirit,” our self-transcendent desire for truth, 
goodness, and love.  “As self-transcendence promotes progress, so the refusal of self-
transcendence turns progress into cumulative decline.”348  The frustration of this eros to 
self-transcendence is a crucial, basic sin, because “the social surd resides least of all in 
outer things and most of all in the minds and wills of men.”349  
Sin and bias, as well as rationalizations and ideologies, alienate people from 
reality, from each other, and even from themselves.  The basic form of alienation is the 
disregard of the transcendental precepts:  Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be 
responsible.  As these precepts are disregarded, there increasingly is formed a “familiar 
opposition between the idealism of human aspiration and the sorry facts of human 
performance.”350 
In the longer cycle of decline, this opposition is reduced, not by an improvement 
in human performance, but by the lowering of human ideals.  Ideology perpetuates 
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alienation of persons from their self-transcendent cores.351  It transforms the entire 
culture, which should function as “social conscience,”352 into a social justification for the 
social surd.  For a community in the longer cycle of decline, confronted by increasingly 
absurd situations, culture becomes pervaded by an “ultimate nihilism.”353  So with “a 
succession of so-called bold spirits” we have “a series of rationalizations” and “ideology” 
until “sin ascends its regal throne (Romans 5:21) in the Augustinian civitas terrena.”354 
Eventually, the fruit of general bias and the longer cycle of decline is 
totalitarianism and war.  Lonergan discusses the ultimate consequences of mistaking 
common sense’s narrow practical standards for the ultimate standards of truth and value: 
[E]very type of intellectual independence, whether personal, cultural, scientific, 
philosophic or religious has no better basis than nonconscious myth….  Reality is the 
economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of the all-
inclusive state.  Its ends justify all means.  Its means include not merely every technique 
of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, 
every device for breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of 
civilized man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, of 
concentration camps, of transported or extirpated minorities, and of total war.355 
 
As wars increase in violence, the longer cycle heads to an end of total destruction.  
However, as emergent probability teaches, nothing is necessarily inevitable.  The longer 
cycle need not end in total destruction.  This cycle is long because it teaches a lesson of 
utmost difficulty, namely that the needs of human living are not adequately met by 
common sense, not even by a combination of technology, economics, and politics.  What 
humanity needs is “a higher viewpoint.”356  Part of this higher viewpoint is the 
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perspective possible in the higher realms of meaning such as in theory (including the 
theories of science and history), and interiority (which teaches self-appropriation and thus 
the discovery of the natural, self-transcendent thrust to truth, value, and love). 
However, a full and lasting solution, one that would shift probabilities to favor 
decline over progress, one that could solve the longer cycle of blocked insight, worsening 
situations, banished culture, hardened ideologies, totalitarianism, and total war, would 
require an absolutely transcendent viewpoint, a supernatural vector in human history.  
Such a solution, for Lonergan, becomes possible only through divine redemption. 
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Chapter 3.  Redemption: Nature Raised into Supernature 
 
 
 
 
 For Lonergan, everyday life is problematic.  Whether simple or difficult, life’s 
many challenges ultimately lead to ultimate questions.  These ultimate questions are 
questions about God, the universe, and God’s relation to the universe: 
The facts of good and evil, of progress and decline, raise questions about the character of 
our universe.  Such questions have been put in very many ways, and the answers given 
have been even more numerous.  But behind this multiplicity there is a basic unity that 
comes to light in the exercise of transcendental method.  We can inquire into the 
possibility of fruitful inquiry.  We can deliberate whether our deliberating is worth while.  
In each case, there arises the question of God.357 
 
We praise progress and denounce every manifestation of decline.  But is the universe on 
our side or we just gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools, 
individually struggling for authenticity and collectively endeavoring to snatch progress 
from the ever mounting welter of decline?…  Such is the question about God.358 
 
Indeed, since God is the first agent of every event and emergence and development, the 
question really is what God is or has been doing about the fact of evil.359 
 
Redemption is Lonergan’s answer to the question of what God is doing and has 
been doing in a world confronted by “the facts of good and evil, of progress and 
decline.”360  Our examination of redemption, will first clarify what is meant by the 
“absolutely supernatural” aspect of grace.  Then will follow the distinction of two 
general aspects of grace:  its “healing” of nature from a fallen state and its “elevation” 
of nature into the absolutely supernatural order.  From this distinction we proceed to the 
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concrete effects of grace in religious, moral, and intellectual conversion.  The chapter 
ends with a discussion of two communities formed by and formative of persons 
affected by grace and conversion: a natural “cosmopolis” and a graced Body of Christ.  
Our movement is governed by two principles:  (1) from older theories to newer, from 
static to dynamic, from classical to historical; and (2) from surrounding conditions to 
personal factors to social orders to historical implications.  These principles have 
guided the organization of each of our two previous chapters on progress and decline. 
3.1.  Grace 
3.1.1.  The Supernatural, Relatively and Absolutely 
 The theology of grace is both simple and complex.  Not just any gift from God is 
a gift of grace.  All that humanity has and is, it has been given by God.  Grace, however, 
is an extraordinary gift.  It is God’s gift to creation that goes beyond the natural goodness 
of creation.  Defined simply, grace is God’s gift of Godself to the world.  What does it 
mean for God to give God’s self to the world?  This is complex and ultimately 
mysterious.  God and God’s gift of Godself in grace are absolutely supernatural.  What 
does “absolutely supernatural” mean?  We may remember that for Lonergan, oxygen’s 
operation on chemical levels is natural.361  Its operation on higher levels, such as human 
respiratory schemes, is supernatural, but “relatively supernatural,” since chemical and 
biological schemes are both part of the natural order.  In contrast, the absolutely 
                                                 
361 Section 1.2.4., above. 
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supernatural transcends all of created nature, including our ability to understand it 
comprehensively.362 
Despite transcending created nature, divine grace remains harmonious with 
nature.  In concrete reality, the absolutely supernatural is not a separate addition to 
nature.  It is neither independent of, destructive of, nor counter-operational to nature.  
Rather, as natural biological rhythms presuppose, sublate, and go beyond natural 
chemical levels, so supernatural grace presupposes, sublates, and goes beyond all of 
created nature.  As the biological schemes are higher orders of what is systematic and 
nonsystematic on a chemical level, the supernatural order of redemption is a higher order 
of what is systematic and nonsystematic in human progress and decline.  In short, God’s 
supernatural gift of grace is consistent with a world order of emergent probability. 
Lonergan speaks eloquently about the harmony of supernatural grace with the 
natural order: 
[A] concrete plurality of essences has an upthrust from lower to higher levels…. [This is] 
conspicuous to one who looks at the universe with the eyes of modern science, who sees 
sub-atoms uniting into atoms, atoms into compounds, compounds into organisms, who 
finds the pattern of genes in reproductive cells shifting, ut in minori parte, to give organic 
evolution within limited ranges, who attributes the rise of cultures and civilizations to the 
interplay of human plurality, who observes that only when and where the higher rational 
culture emerged did God acknowledge the fullness of time permitting the Word to 
become flesh and the mystical body to begin its intussusception of human personalities 
and its leavening of human history.363 
 
The general harmony of supernature with nature notwithstanding, there is one 
crucial difference.  The supernatural grace that flows from the divine missions of the Son 
                                                 
362 We shall consider the mysterious nature of the supernatural and our limited ability to understand it in 
part 2, chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
363 “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 21.  In a footnote Lonergan notes an “affinity” between modern “statistical 
law” and Aristoteliean contingens ut in maiori parte and between modern “chance variation” and the 
contingens ut in minori parte.  
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and the Spirit is utterly, absolutely beyond what nature could achieve on its own.  Grace 
is not a scheme of recurrence that more or less probably emerges from natural processes.  
There is nothing a human person or human societies can do to merit the supernatural gift 
that is grace. 
This is just a general word on grace.  A full picture of a traditional Christian 
theology of grace would include many types used to distinguish various aspects and 
effects of grace.  For example, grace can be divided into actual and habitual, operative 
and cooperative, healing and elevating.364 
3.1.2.  Healing and Elevating Grace 
The distinction we are interested in here is between healing and elevating 
grace.365  The first type, in Latin, is gratia sanans, translated as the grace that saves, 
cleanses, cures, or heals.  It heals humanity of the effects of sin and restores nature to its 
natural state.  In older terms, gratia sanans frees us of the vicious habits that dispose us 
to sin.  It “plucks out the heart of stone that made the sinner a slave to sin; it implants a 
heart of flesh to initiate a new continuity in justice.”366  It is “the liberation of human 
liberty.”367 In terms of Lonergan’s dialectic of history, healing grace counteracts the 
forces of decline and enables their reversal.  Overcoming bias, it allows human persons to 
become more attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.   
                                                 
364 For a very detailed account of grace, see Lonergan’s Grace and Freedom. 
365 This distinction of Philip the Chancellor in the early 1200’s was part of a “‘Copernican revolution’ in 
theory” that distinguished between the two orders of nature and supernature, between “the familiar series of 
grace, faith, charity, and merit” and “nature, reason, and the natural love of God.” Grace and Freedom, 17. 
366 Ibid., 58.  
367 Ibid., 50. 
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The second type of grace is an elevating or sanctifying grace called gratia 
elevans.  Elevating grace causes things to emerge that are not possible to the natural 
world of emergent probability.  It enables human beings to operate on levels beyond their 
“own steam.”  Traditionally conceived, gratia elevans “infuses” us with (or gives us) the 
supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity,368 and it allows us to know God face to 
face, to know as we are known.369  For Lonergan, its primary effects are on cognitive, 
moral, and affective levels of humanity.  But its implications quickly move into the social 
realms of personal relations as well as the cultural realms of shared meaning and value.  
Eventually its effects extend to all of creation.  
3.2.  Religious, Moral, and Intellectual Conversion370 
 As we have mentioned in the section on the human good, Lonergan defines 
conversion in terms of horizontal and vertical liberty.  Horizontal liberty is the exercise of 
choice within a horizon.  Vertical liberty is a radical choice, a leap of self-transcendence, 
that expands, changes, or transforms one’s horizon.  Sometimes, the new horizon, 
“though notably deeper and broader and richer” than the previous horizon, may still be 
“consonant with the old and a development out of its potentialities.”  However, 
sometimes a new horizon is “an about-face; it comes out of the old by repudiating 
                                                 
368 Cf., Topics in Education, 242-43.  We will discuss faith, hope, and love further in the section on 
“religious conversion.” 
369 “Openness and Religious Experience,” 200-1 
370 Lonergan acknowledges a possible fourth conversion developed by one of his best students, Robert 
Doran, S.J.  In “Reality, Myth, Symbol,” Lonergan calls it an “advance” and describes it: “It occurs when 
we uncover within ourselves the working of our own psyches, the élan vital…” He refers the reader to Fr. 
Doran’s writing in such places as “Psychic Conversion,” The Thomist 41 (April 1977) 200-36; Subject and 
Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 
1977).  Fr. Doran tells me its effect is to offset dramatic bias since it is psychogenetic.  Recently he has 
found it to be helpful in his study of the French interdisciplinary thinker René Girard, because much of 
what Girard discusses is in this realm. 
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characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever greater 
depth and breadth and wealth.  Such an about-face and new beginning is what is meant 
by a conversion.”371 
Conversion is a positive change in the orientation of one’s liberty towards 
possible choices or terminal values.  It causes a radical shift in one’s fears and desires, 
satisfactions and values, beliefs and scales of preference.  It frees one from inauthenticity 
for greater authenticity.   
If conversion seems to function in a manner similar to grace, this is no accident.  
Conversion, particularly religious conversion, is the framework for Lonergan’s 
discussion of what traditional theology calls “sanctifying grace,” that is, “an entitative 
habit, absolutely supernatural, infused into the essence of the soul.”372  Conversion is part 
of Lonergan’s larger “transition from theoretical to methodical theology” which begins 
“not from a metaphysical psychology, but from intentionality analysis, and, indeed from 
transcendental method.”373  The contents of this analysis and the components of this 
method are organized as a threefold self-transcendence:  (1) as intellectual in attaining 
knowledge, (2) as moral in seeking what is truly good and in becoming a principle of 
benevolence and beneficence, and (3) as religious in falling in love with God and all 
things.  Religious conversion is a type of affective conversion.374   Whereas affective 
                                                 
371 Method, 237-38. 
372 Ibid., 120. 
373 Ibid., 289. 
374 Lonergan mentions affective conversion in the trio intellectual, moral, and affective conversion, in 
“Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” 179.  Affective conversion is unpacked as “love in the family, 
loyalty in the community, and faith in God,” and similarly as “commitment to love in the home, loyalty in 
the community, faith in the destiny of man.”  Both quotes seem to discuss an unrestricted love, one of 
which focuses on God, and the other on humanity.  Similarly, in chapter four of Method, “Religion,” 
 
 130
conversion could begin at any point, with falling in love with one’s family, one’s 
community, or with God, religious conversion is specified as falling in love with God 
and thereby with all things.  Religious conversion is the culmination of affective 
conversion.  It is “the deep-set joy and solid peace, the power and the vigor, of being in 
love with God.”375 
3.2.1.  Religious Conversion 
If one’s being-in-love is a result of being in love with God, then, according to 
“theoretical theology,” one is in a state of “sanctifying grace.”  Being-in-love with God, 
as a technical term of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, is not an abstract metaphysical 
concept.  It is a dynamic state that results from a type of concrete experience Lonergan 
calls religious conversion.   
What does Lonergan mean by “religious”?  Interestingly, he does not mean what 
commonly is meant by religion, at least in the contemporary United States.  He does not 
mean an organized body of people who share beliefs and practices relating them to a 
transcendent being or force.  Nor does he exclude members of such bodies, or their 
systems of belief and practice, from the religious.  The religious, for Lonergan, is more 
than any one such organization or even all such organizations.376  It pertains to “a reality 
that transcends the reality of this world,”377 a Being that is not virtually unconditioned 
but absolutely unconditioned, a Value by which all values are measured, a Love that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lonergan discusses two exceptions to the “normal” way by which knowing precedes loving.  The first 
flows from God’s love being poured into our hearts and the second arises when human persons fall in love 
with each other (Method, 122.  See section 1.5.2, above.).  
375 Method, 39.  We will focus on being in love with God toward the end of this chapter. 
376 Lonergan’s view on the relation of Christianity to other religions is interesting and fertile but beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
377 Method, 102. 
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knows no bounds.  In our unrestricted desires to know and to choose, an unrest
transcendent object is intended.  That Being, Value, Love, and transcendent object is 
God. 
ricted 
                                                
 Religious experience, the experience of God, is not the product of our knowing 
and choosing, nor is it properly an experience, for God is not a being among other beings.  
Religious “experience” is more of a religious consciousness that “occupies the fourth and 
highest level of man’s intentional consciousness.  It takes over the peak of the soul, the 
apex animae.”378   But while religious experience begins at the peak of the soul, religious 
conversion produces a being-in-love that affects the whole person on all levels of 
consciousness.  Religious conversion is the fulfillment of the natural human thrust toward 
self-transcendence: 
Being in love with God, as experienced, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion.  All 
love is self-surrender, but being in love with God is being in love without limits or 
qualifications or conditions or reservations.  Just as unrestricted questioning is our 
capacity for self-transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper 
fulfillment of that capacity.379 
 
 Rudolf Otto describes being in love with God as an encounter with mysterium 
facinans et tremendum [the mystery that both fascinates and terrifies]. Paul Tillich 
identifies it as “being grasped by ultimate concern.”  And for St. Ignatius Loyola it is 
called “consolation with no cause.”380  
 
378 Ibid., 107. 
379 Ibid., 106. Cf., 242: “Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal the eros of the 
human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self-transcendence.  But that capacity meets fulfillment, that 
desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a 
subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love.” 
380 Method, 106, referencing Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford, 1923) [and here noting 
that tremendum varies in meaning depending on one’s religious development]; D.M. Bron, ultimate 
Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); and Karl Rahner, The Dynamic Element 
in the Church, Quaestiones disputate 12 (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1964), 131. 
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 Lonergan holds that such religious experience is common to different religious 
traditions, even though it is interpreted and expressed differently by each.381  For 
Christians it is sanctifying grace,  “God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit 
given to us.”382  It lifts us up into the loving, trinitarian unity, and transforms us into 
“temples of Christ's Spirit, members of his body, adopted children of the Father.”383 
 The state of being in love is manifested in numerous ways, for it transforms one’s 
whole way of being in the world.  Many of these manifestations, expressions, or fruits 
have been discussed above under the general heading of love, and most of the particular 
ones will be considered under the following headings of charity, faith, and hope. 
 Here I would like to focus on the religious word, by which Lonergan means “any 
expression of religious meaning or of religious value.  Its carrier may be intersubjectivity, 
or art, or symbol, or language, or the remembered and portrayed lives or deeds or 
achievements of individuals or classes or groups.”384  Religious conversion is mediated to 
human beings by both religious experience and the religious word.  By the religious 
word, divine grace enters into the world mediated by meaning and regulated by value.  
For human communities, there is a mutually beneficial relationship between the religious 
word and the common language and culture.  On the one hand, the religious word endows 
a culture with its deepest meaning and its highest values.  On the other hand, it is only in 
the context of a culture’s meanings and values that human persons can come to 
                                                 
381 Cf., Method, 108-09. 
382 Ibid., 241.  This paraphrases Rom. 5:5, Lonergan’s most frequently cited passage of scripture. Andrew 
Tallon, “The Role of the Connaturalized Heart in Veritatis Splendor,”  Veritatis Splendor: American 
Responses,  ed. Michael Allsopp and John O’Keefe (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1995), 151.  
383 “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 249. 
384 Method, 112. 
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understand the religious word and to relate it both to the object of ultimate concern and to 
more proximate objects of ordinary concerns. 
 What exactly is the religious word?  Lonergan distinguishes between “the prior 
word that God speaks to us by flooding our hearts with his love”385 and the outer word 
that is expressed in time and space.  The outer word is not separate from love or an 
incidental byproduct of love (merely an expression of love).  Rather, the outer word is 
constitutive of love.  “When a man and a woman love each other but do not avow their 
love, they are not yet in love.  Their very silence means that their love has not reached the 
point of self-surrender and self-donation.”386  The expression of love is constitutive of 
love because the outer word realizes love, sustains it, and helps it to grow.  For religion, 
this is the role of “the word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom, the word 
of fellowship that unites those that share in the gift of God’s love, the word of the gospel 
that announces that God has loved us first and, in the fullness of time, has revealed that 
love in Christ crucified, dead and risen.”387 
 As expressed in time, space, and culture the outer word is historically 
conditioned.  Its meaning is understood by changing subjects in a context of other, non-
religious words whose meaning changes.  As the meanings of a culture’s words change, a 
religious tradition’s words adapt if the meanings of its doctrines are to remain understood 
as they are intended.  Furthermore, religious expression takes part in the development of 
the various realms of meaning: common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence.  
                                                 
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid., 113. 
387 Ibid. Emphasis added.  Cf., 283:  “[T]he gift of God’s love has its proper counterpart in the revelational 
events in which God discloses to a particular people or to all mankind the completeness of his love for 
them.” 
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Tensions may arise when words conceived in a common-sense context are transposed 
into a theoretical context, and vice versa, since the meaning of the same word is different 
in both contexts.  Even if the tension is resolvable by a movement into the higher realms 
of interiority and transcendence, religious words must continually undergo a type of 
translation for proper communication.388 
 In all cultures and in all of these realms of meaning, a primary function of the 
religious word is to work with love to help people grow in religious conversion.  
Concretely, religious conversion is not simply a moment; it is a lifelong, precarious 
process.  In itself, religious conversion is an end, the fulfillment of self-transcendence, 
but the subject in this life, even those religiously converted are always “on the way.”   
Though one may be a being-in-love, there are always further depths to love, and there 
remains the need to make one’s knowing and doing conform to one’s loving.   
For that love is the utmost of self-transcendence, and man’s self-transcendence is ever 
precarious. Of itself, self-transcendence involves tension between the self as transcending 
and the self as transcended.  So human authenticity is never some pure and serene and 
secure possession.  It is ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity and every successful 
withdrawal only brings to light the need for still further withdrawals….  Genuine religion 
is discovered and realized by redemption from the many traps of religious aberration.  So 
we are bid to watch and pray, to make our way in fear and trembling.  And it is the 
greatest saints that proclaim themselves the greatest sinners, though their sins seem slight 
indeed to holy folk that lack their discernment and love.389 
 
 Despite this lack of perfection in this life, there can be great progress.  Citing 
scripture, Lonergan reminds us of how one may know if one or if others are authentically 
                                                 
388 Ibid., 113-14.  See also, ch. 14, “Communication.” 
389 Ibid., 110; cf., 252. 
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living out religious conversion:  “‘[Y]ou will recognize them by their fruits’ (Mt.7, 
20).”390   
 Prominent among the fruits of religious conversion are (1) the charity that allows 
us to love our neighbors as ourselves, (2) the faith that enables us to “see with the eyes of 
love,” and (3) the hope by which we measure our successes and problems by an expected 
ultimate fulfillment.  Faith, hope, and charity are mentioned by Paul in 1 Cor. 13:13 as 
abiding Christian virtues in this life.  Thomas Aquinas used Aristotle’s philosophical 
account of virtue to interpret faith, hope, and charity.  In his Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle explains that virtues are habits—dispositions of the soul, that are good (as 
opposed to bad habits, or vices). Aristotle’s virtues are acquired by practice, or repeated 
action.  However, Thomas teaches that the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity are 
infused or given by God, and thus, they are called the “theological” virtues.  As Thomas’s 
interpretation of charity, faith, and hope sublates Aristotle’s virtue theory, so Lonergan’s 
methodological interpretation of these virtues sublates Thomas’s metaphysical account.  
All three virtues, like the three conversions, are not the products of human achievement 
but the free gifts of God’s unmerited grace.391 
3.2.1.1.  Charity 
 Charity is a religious love central to the reversal of decline and the restoration of 
progress.  It is an infused, supernatural love with both healing and elevating effects.  It is 
                                                 
390 Ibid., 119; cf., 269. Here, Lonergan extends this to moral and intellectual conversion. 
391 Thus, Lonergan scholar, John Haughey calls them a “receivement.”  See John Haughey, “The Primacy 
of Receivement,” Business as Calling, an E-Book at 
http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/mgmt/publications/businessasacalling.html. 
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“the charity of the suffering servant,” the “self-sacrificing love” of Christ.392  Charity is 
not a bias, but rather it heals a person of his/her biases, thus liberating her/his 
transcendental desire and transcendental operations.  Because charity  “promotes self-
transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificial love,” it has “a 
redemptive role in society, inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of decline and 
restore the cumulative process of progress.”393  “For only insomuch as men are willing to 
meet evil with good, to love their enemies, to pray for those that persecute and 
calumniate them, that the social surd is a potential good.”394 
 Charity operates on the whole person and the entire society, but its primary 
activity is on the fourth level of human conscious intentionality, the level of decision and 
commitment.  Charity creates a good will.  It enables a person to make authentic, 
responsible decisions.  Lonergan examines three decisions in particular: (1) to love God, 
the world order, and all people, (2) to repent one’s sin, and (3) to be joyful. 
 Charity is the cure for bias.  As bias shrinks the horizon of one’s concern, charity 
expands it.  To the extent that we love God, we love as God loves; our love is 
unrestricted; it flows to all things God loves, which includes all people, all things, indeed 
the whole order of the universe: 
[T]he actual order of the universe is a good and value chosen by God…  Moreover, it 
grounds the emergence, and includes the excellence of every other good within the 
universe, so that to will any other good is to will the order of the universe….  [A]nd so, to 
                                                 
392 Method, 117; cf. 55, 113, 242, 291, 342, 362.  Self-sacrifice is a difficult concept.  It will be discussed at 
greater length in the next chapter. 
393 Ibid., 55. 
394 Insight, 721.  This is a key part of the second chapter and will considered in greater detail there, 
including its problematic aspects. 
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will the order of the universe because of one’s love of God is to love all persons in the 
universe because of one’s love of God.395 
 
 This love leads to repentance for sin.  An expansion of concern brings to mind all 
one’s past mistakes, all one’s failures to love.  In the light of religious love, one grows to 
repent of one’s surrender to evil and bias, and of one’s contributions to decline.  The 
charitable soul: 
deplores and regrets the scotosis of its dramatic bias and its involvement in the 
individual, group, and general bias of common sense; it repents its flight from self-
knowledge, its rationalization of wrong, its surrender to evil; it detests its commitment to 
counterpositions [inauthentic beliefs], its contribution to man’s decline through the 
successive adjustments of theory to ever worse practice, its share in the genesis and the 
propagation of the myths that confer on appearance the strength and power and passion 
that are the due of reality.396 
 
 Repentance is not merely a feeling of guilt.  It is a more conscious, intelligent, 
reasonable, and responsible act that acknowledges our sin.  We repent not only our 
actions against our own self-transcendence, and not only our acts against other human 
persons, but also our sins against God, for sin conceals the goodness of God and the 
universe from oneself and from others. 
 Repentance involves sorrow, but sorrow is not the last word.  One looks back to 
past failure, but also forward to a bright future.  The person “is at one with the universe in 
being in love with God, and it shares its dynamic resilience and expectancy.”  He or she 
celebrates the creativity of a world governed by emergent probability.  Charity, thus, 
causes a deep joy in all things of creation.397 
                                                 
395 Ibid., 722. 
396 Ibid, cf. Method, 110, 117, 364. 
397 Insight, 722. 
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 In the love, repentance, and joy, of charity “one’s living is transformed into a 
personal relation to the one loved above all and in all.”398  Charity affects all of one’s life, 
and the effect is that all of one’s living becomes a living in dialogue with God. 
3.2.1.2. Faith 
 In addition to charity, being in love with God produces faith.  Faith is a form of 
the aforementioned knowledge born of love.  However, it is an otherworldly, absolutely 
supernatural type of knowledge.  Hence, Lonergan calls it “the knowledge born of 
religious love.”399   Faith, like the knowledge born of a natural love, is the heart’s reasons 
which reason does not know, so named by Pascal.400  As mentioned above, such 
knowledge, for Lonergan, reverses the normal, “from below upwards” vector of 
experience, understanding, judgment, and decision.  A relationship of unrestricted love 
with God calls forth commitments and decisions on the fourth level of consciousness.  
These religious commitments and decisions bear fruit on the third level as judgments of 
truth and value.  Such judgments constitute and are constituted by one’s faith.  They form 
the cognitional background that conditions which ideas might occur to a person of faith 
on the second level of her/his consciousness.  Finally, the judgments of value and truth 
received in faith shape the way a person experiences the world, on his/her first level of 
conscious intentionality.401 
 Faith has a similar effect in the communal life of the church.  Faith flows from the 
fundamental decisions and commitments of a community moved by charity.  The 
                                                 
398 Ibid. 
399 Method, 115, emphasis added. 
400 See section 1.5.1., above. 
401 Such is “the way from above downwards.”  See section 1.5.2., above. 
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community’s faith becomes expressed in the judgments of its doctrine.  Theologians then 
seek to better understand these doctrines through systematic theology and to connect 
them with the experience of the people through pastoral and practical theology.402 
  Faith is the “experienced fulfillment” of the natural human desire to know and to 
value.  But it is an experience that is clouded.  It is an overwhelming consciousness of 
“absolute intelligence and intelligibility, absolute truth and reality, absolute goodness and 
holiness.”403  God becomes known most profoundly, yet God remains a mystery.  The 
question of God recurs in a new form.  Primarily it is an existential question of accepting 
or rejecting God, and only secondarily is it an intellectual question of knowing better 
either the Beloved whom one has accepted or the One whom one seeks to escape. 
 Faith is an “apprehension of transcendent value.”  It is an “actuated orientation 
towards the mystery of love and awe.”404  This apprehension and orientation provide a re-
orientation of one’s entire world and thus a re-apprehension of all one’s vital, social, 
cultural, and personal values:405 
Without faith the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good man 
brings about.  But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while 
terminal value is the whole universe.  So the human good becomes absorbed in an all-
encompassing good.  Where before an account of the human good related men to one 
another and to nature, now human concern reaches beyond man’s world to God and to 
God’s world….  Human development is not only in skills and virtues but also in holiness.  
The power of God’s love brings forth a new energy and efficacy in all goodness, and the 
limit of human expectation ceases to be the grave.406 
 
                                                 
402 Method, 336.  See chs. 12, “Doctrines,” 13, “Systematics,” and 14, “Communications.” 
403 Ibid., 116. 
404 Ibid., 115. 
405 Ibid., 115. 
406 Ibid, 116. 
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 According to the model of faculty psychology, faith provides the “will’s hope 
with its object and assurance and the will’s charity with its motives.”407  According to 
Lonergan’s transcendental method, faith “places human efforts in a friendly universe; it 
reveals an ultimate significance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings 
with confidence.”408  Thus, faith has the unmistakable power of undoing decline, 
particularly the longer cycle of decline that is perpetuated by ideology: 
Decline disrupts a culture with conflicting ideologies.  It inflicts on individuals the social, 
economic, and psychological pressures that for human frailty amount to determinism.  It 
multiplies and heaps up the abuses and absurdities that breed resentment, hatred, anger, 
violence.  It is not propaganda and it is not argument but religious faith that will liberate 
human minds from its ideological prisons.409   
 
 To free human minds from the prisons of ideology, faith “reestablishes truth as a 
meaningful category.”  Lonergan reminds us of the critical link between truth and 
resistance to sin by calling to mind Pilate’s (in)action that was enabled by his separation 
of himself from the truth, as revealed by his question, “What is truth?”410 
 Furthermore, on cognitive levels, faith promotes a new order of meaning and 
values, one that flows from knowing that the universe is grounded in and moving toward 
unconditional love.  “Without faith, without the eyes of love, the world is too evil for 
God to be good, for a good God to exist.  But faith recognizes that God grants men their 
freedom, that he wills them to be persons and not just his automata, that he calls them to 
                                                 
407 Insight, 724. 
408 Method, 117 
409 Ibid. 
410 Topics in Education, 67, with reference to Jn. 18:38. 
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the higher authenticity that overcomes evil with good.”411  From such faith there flows 
great hope. 
3.2.1.3.  Hope 
 Hope flows from the commitments of love and faith’s judgments of fact and 
value.  Hope gives those caught in a spiral of decline the courage to resist personal and 
social tendencies to behave sinfully.  It frees people from drudgery, “liberates the pilgrim 
in us,” and “enables us to resist the pressures and the determinisms that are, as it were, 
the necessity of sinning further.”412  Hope gives ordinary people the “heroism” needed to 
resist negative situations that increase the probabilities of sin.  This is crucial in 
overcoming decline, for  “without that heroism there is no victory over the cumulative 
effects of sin as a component in social process.”413 
 According to faculty psychology, hope is a perfection of the will, a moral 
confidence that strengthens the intellect.  This is important for Lonergan, because the 
intellect functions properly inasmuch as the detached and disinterested desire to know is 
dominant in cognitional operations.  According to intentionality analysis, this desire is the 
spontaneous, prior foundation for intelligent, rational, and responsible self-consciousness.  
It is detached but not disembodied.  Consequently it must compete, on the one hand, in a 
cooperative way with the natural attachments of sensitivity and spontaneous 
intersubjectivity and, on the other hand, in an oppositional way with the disordered 
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attachments of bias.  In this dialectic, hope reinforces the unrestricted desire with a 
responsible commitment to transcendent truth and goodness.414 
Furthermore, because of the unrestricted nature of human desire, there is the 
temptation either to despair at ever fulfilling this desire or to grasp at some easy yet 
inadequate fulfillment, i.e., an idol.  Through hope, one knows that the objective of 
unrestricted desire exists and is promised, but that it lies beyond the reach of empirical 
science, common sense, their unification in metaphysics, and even the transcendent 
knowledge by which we know that God exists.  Hope is confident that despite the 
transcendent nature of our fulfillment, it is promised.  This confidence is a mean that 
excludes the extremes of “both despair and presumption.”  Lonergan summarizes:  “the 
conjugate form of willingness that aids and supports and reinforces the pure desire is a 
confident hope that God will bring man’s intellect to a knowledge, participation, 
possession of the unrestricted act of understanding.”415 
 Some further aspects and effects of faith, hope, and charity are covered under 
moral and intellectual conversion, for the effects of religious conversion flow “from 
above downwards” from the peak of the human person to moral and cognitive aspects of 
human living.  Intellectual conversion focuses on the truth grasped in cognitive self-
transcendence, moral conversion pertains to values affirmed and realized in moral or 
“real” self-transcendence, and religious conversion brings one to a “total being-in-love as 
the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence, whether in the pursuit of truth, or in the 
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realization of human values, or in the orientation man adopts to the universe, its ground, 
and its goal.”416 
3.2.2.  Moral Conversion 
 Moral conversion is typically the fruit of religious conversion, but it can occur in 
a person independently of religious conversion.  Like religious conversion, moral 
conversion operates mainly on the level of choice and decision, but its effects are less 
pervasive and less expansive than those of religious conversion.  The results particular to 
moral conversion include decisions that are more consistently responsible and that 
produce better consequences for oneself and the community, in not only the short term 
but also the long run. 
 A key to the development of moral conversion is the discovery that one’s choice 
for a particular good selects and influences not merely a single object, but a whole range 
and system of objects that go into the production, distribution, maintenance, and disposal 
of the object (i.e., a good of order).  Furthermore, one recognizes that along with 
choosing a particular object and a good of order, one is choosing oneself and who one is 
to become.  This critical point occurs  “when the subject finds out for himself that it is up 
to himself to decide what he is to make of himself.”417 
 A further aspect of moral conversion is the shift in the criteria of one’s decisions 
from satisfactions to values, from the apparent good to what truly is good, from a 
calculus of “pleasures and pains” to what truly is the right thing to do.  Ideally, this shift 
is a natural product of human development, of human maturing: 
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As children or minors we are persuaded, cajoled, ordered, compelled to do what is right.  
As our knowledge of human reality increases, as our responses to human values are 
strengthened and refined, our mentors more and more leave us to ourselves so that our 
freedom may exercise its ever advancing thrust toward authenticity.418 
 
Lonergan’s name for one who has not yet begun the process of moral conversion 
is the “drifter”:  “The drifter has not yet found himself; he has not yet discovered his own 
deed and so is content to do whatever everyone else is doing.”419  In other words the 
drifter will choose, think, say, and do whatever others are choosing, thinking, saying, and 
doing. 
 By the measure in which one abandons being a slave to the whims of others as 
well as one’s own selfish, short-term whims, one grows in vertical liberty and autonomy.  
Actions chosen (1) deliberately rather than by drifting, (2) out of knowledge of and 
concern for oneself, others, the whole of creation, and the long-term good, and (3) in 
preference to values over satisfactions are responsible, moral actions.  Each such act is a 
step in the right direction, but authentic autonomy, indeed moral conversion itself, is a 
life-long struggle requiring multiple repetitions of such acts.  To advance in moral 
conversion one must discover and resist one’s biases, one must grow in knowledge of 
one’s community and one’s world, one must keep scrutinizing one’s motives and scales 
of value, and one must remain open to the criticism and the wisdom of one’s 
community.420 
Thus, genuine liberty or autonomy should not be confused with an egotistical 
disregard for one’s neighbor.  It is quite the opposite.  Due to the shift from satisfactions 
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to values, from being concerned with what is good merely for oneself to what is good for 
the whole community, both in the short run and the long term, the authentic, morally 
converted, autonomous subject is “armed against bias,” egotistical and otherwise.421  In 
fact, moral conversion is the proximate means for people “to keep themselves free of 
individual, group and general bias.”422 
Finally, despite the significant measure we may grow in autonomy or in “open-
eyed, deliberate self-control,” Lonergan warns that due to human limitations, we never 
reach complete autonomy or self-control: 
We do not know ourselves very well; we cannot chart the future; we cannot control our 
environment completely or the influences that work on us; we cannot explore our 
unconscious and preconscious mechanisms.  Our course is the night; our control is only 
rough and approximate; we have to believe and trust, to risk and dare.423 
 
3.2.3.  Intellectual Conversion 
Intellectual conversion operates on the cognitive levels of understanding and 
judgment.  It is a transformation of convictions about what is real and how we come to 
know the real.  Typically we believe that the real is whatever we can experience, by 
which we mean whatever we can see, touch, taste, hear, or smell.  How do you know that 
happened?  I was there.  I saw it.  The real, according to this view, is what is “really out 
there,” or “the already-out-there-now-real.”424  
“Already” refers to the orientation and dynamic anticipation of biological consciousness; 
such consciousness does not create but finds its environment…. “Out” refers to the 
extroversion of a consciousness that is aware, not of its own ground, but of objects distinct 
from itself.  “There” and “now” indicate the spatial and temporal determinations of 
extroverted consciousness.  “Real,” finally, is a subdivision within the field of the “already 
                                                 
421 Ibid., 242. 
422 Ibid., 270. 
423 “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” 242; “Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious,” 315. 
424 Insight, 178, 181, 184, 449.   
 
 146
out there now”: part of that is mere appearance; but part is real; and its reality consists in 
its relevance to biological success or failure, pleasure or pain.425 
 
To Lonergan, the persistent belief in the already-out-there-now-real is a damaging 
myth with fundamental implications for philosophy and indeed for all of human living: 
The consequences of the myth are various.  The naive realist knows the world mediated 
by meaning but thinks he knows it by looking.  The empiricist restricts objective knowing 
to sense experience; for him, understanding and conceiving, judging and believing are 
merely subjective activities.  The idealist insists that human knowing always includes 
understanding as well as sense; but he retains the empiricist’s notion of reality, and so he 
thinks of the world mediated by meaning as not real but ideal.426 
 
A major problem with this myth is that if we think reality is simply what is 
sensed, we cannot account for the existence of such non-physical realities as love and 
friendship, God and sin, to say nothing of causality.  Nor can we understand the world as 
conceived according to modern science, because Einstein’s quantum mechanics 
removed from science the relevance of any image of particles, or waves, or continuous 
process.  No less than his predecessors, the contemporary scientist can observe and 
experiment, inquire and understand, form hypotheses and verify them. But unlike his 
predecessors, he has to think of knowledge, of knowledge, not as taking a look, but as 
experiencing, understanding and judging; … he has to think of the real, not as a part of 
the “already out there now,” but as the verifiable.427 
 
Intellectual conversion is from these false views about reality and human knowing 
to the position Lonergan calls “critical realism.”428  The critical realist knows that reality 
is a world of meaning and value, of things that both can and cannot be sensibly 
experienced.  S/he knows that knowing is by self-transcendence and is comprised of 
experiencing, understanding, and judging.  Reality is the set of intelligible relations 
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judged to actually exist.  One who is intellectually converted has judged this to be true.  
S/he has undertaken a long process of attending to his/her own processes of coming to 
know, of understanding the process, and of making the existential self-judgment that, s/he 
can and does know the truth by a compound of actions involving sensing, imagining, 
questioning, understanding, conceiving, verifying, and judging. 
By opening one’s mind to the existence of non-physical realities, intellectual 
conversion can open the door to faith and thus to redemption.  However, this typically 
works the other way around.  Faith usually comes first, for “among the values discerned 
by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and 
in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion.”429 
Moral conversion, too, is typically caused by religious conversion, for faith, “the 
eye of this [religious, unconditional] love reveals values in their splendor, while the 
strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion.430  In a 
concrete individual, the three conversions can be obtained separately, or in various 
combinations.  If all three are found in a person, the relation is of moral conversion 
sublating intellectual, and religious sublating intellectual and moral. 
Marked by “high seriousness and a mature wisdom,” as well as responsible 
dedication to the welfare of all humanity and indeed all creation, converted individuals 
are a “foundational reality.”  They are the standards of authentic humanity, the principles 
for the reversal of decline, for the healing and elevation of human progress.  Converted 
persons are the foundation for the authentic community, and, as community, they are 
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fundamental for the ongoing emergence of conversion.431  Again, even among the 
converted, authenticity remains a dialectical development, for “the task of repentance and 
conversion is life-long.”432  Fortunately, conversion is achieved not alone but in 
community. 
3.3.  A Redemptive Community 
3.3.1.  Cosmopolis 
 Typically in Insight, Lonergan credits progress to human intelligence as driven by 
the “detached and disinterested desire to know.”  Surprisingly, however, he sometimes in 
this same work credits liberty.  Rather than view this as an irreconcilable inconsistency, I 
would argue that liberty and intelligence are complementary, and both are necessary for 
progress.433  Good ideas can improve the situation, but there must liberty in the 
community for the ideas to arise, to be communicated, to be tested, to be implemented, to 
change the social situation, to be re-evaluated and corrected by new ideas.  This process 
is the “wheel of progress,” and it must spin freely.  If it is either halted or forced to spin, 
it can quickly turn into a “wheel of decline.” 434  New ideas arise unpredictably and only 
under conditions of liberty on personal and local levels.  Thus,  
one might as well declare openly that all new ideas were taboo, as require that they be 
examined, evaluated, and approved by some hierarchy of officials and bureaucrats; for 
members of this hierarchy possess authority and power in inverse ratio to their familiarity 
with the concrete situations in which the new ideas emerge…435 
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 If a community organized by bureaucratic hierarchy and control is not best at 
promoting progress and reversing decline, what type of community is?  Lonergan does 
not champion any particular type of political or economic organization (though he does 
call for a critical synthesis of the predominant liberal and Marxist models).436  Rather, he 
focuses on a redemptive community that would motivate people on a cultural level more 
than attempting to engineer new social structures of technology, economy, and polity. 
 As mentioned in the above section on sin, Lonergan believes that “the social surd 
resides least of all in outer things and most of all in the minds and wills of men.”437  
Thus, the problem of decline is first of all a challenge to transform human hearts and 
minds.  Because of his conviction about humanity’s natural desire for God, Lonergan 
argues that the best way to transform hearts and minds is not through ideology but by 
promoting liberty and thought.  A liberated and liberating culture provides a communal, 
collaborative context for a people to wonder, to reflect, to critique, and to deliberate in a 
way that at once satisfies their minds and speaks to their hearts.  Consequently, if we are 
to meet the challenge of the longer cycle of decline, then we must do it, not so much by 
social structures “with their teeth in them,” but through the persuasive meanings and 
values of culture.438 
 “Cosmopolis” is Lonergan’s term, within Insight’s philosophical context, for the 
social unit that works on the level of culture to reverse the cycles of decline.  Standing 
against the shorter cycle caused by group bias, cosmopolis “is neither class nor state.” It 
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is “too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored.”  
Cosmopolis also is not a police force.  It works through ideas and symbols.  Force is 
instrumental at best and then no more than “residual and incidental.”439  Cosmopolis is 
not a group against others, nor an institution of enrolled members, a superstate ruling 
states, an academy endorsing ideas, or a court enforcing a legal code.  Cosmopolis is not 
an organized body but the cultural embodiment of the unrestricted eros of the human 
spirit. 
Considered from a theoretical standpoint, cosmopolis is not part of the absolutely 
supernatural order of grace.  But in its concrete realization, cosmopolis will in all 
probability be made possible by the three conversions, for its members must be guarded 
against group bias in particular.  And this is made possible by the expansive concern of 
religious conversion and charity. 
The focus of its redemptive endeavor, however, is the counteraction of general 
bias and the longer cycle of decline that general bias can cause.  If we recall, general bias 
is a negative temptation to which common sense is susceptible.  Common sense is an 
indispensable specialization of consciousness that deals with everyday situations.  Its 
focus on practicality can become a narrow-mindedness that evaluates a thing’s or even a 
person’s value based on its perceived immediate usefulness.440   The members of 
cosmopolis inhabit all the realms of meaning available to a culture:  common sense, 
theory, interiority, and transcendence.441  They are not against common-sense 
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practicality; rather they teach that “practicality is for man and not man for 
practicality,”442 and that there is more to the value of a thing, a person, an artwork, an 
academic endeavor, etc., than its immediate usefulness. 
s, 
                                                
“Delight and suffering, laughter and tears, joy and sorrow, aspiration and 
frustration, achievement and failure, wit and humor, stand not within practicality but 
above it.”443  To appeal to these areas of human life, cosmopolis enlists multiple means 
of communication:  art and literature, theater and journalism, schools and universitie
public opinion and “personal depth.”444  In particular, “education is the great means for 
transforming the human situation.”445  Education is key because it can transform hearts 
and minds at a time when they are most open to change.  At the same time, human beings 
are not “pure intelligences,” so cosmopolis does not work merely through philosophy or 
other forms of scholarship.  However, to counteract the short-term thinking of common 
sense, it relies heavily on the broad and long-term viewpoints of philosophy, science, and 
history.446 
The work of cosmopolis to counteract decline is not easy.  It is not all “sweetness 
and light, where sweetness means sweet to me, and light means light to me.”  But its way 
is not entirely combative or countercultural.  “It is by moving with that [general] bias 
than against it, by differing from it slightly rather than opposing it thoroughly, that one 
has the best prospect of selling books and newspapers, entertainment and education.”447  
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The way of cosmopolis, after all, is to transform hearts and minds, and thus to persuade 
and to educate, rather than to attempt to force people to conform and thus perhaps to 
breed resistance and ressentiment.448 
3.3.2.  The Body of Christ 
 Cosmopolis is a philosophical term for a community that operates on the level of 
culture.  Its task is to combat decline and to liberate the natural creativity of the pure, 
unrestricted human desire for a transcendent fulfillment.  Only implicitly, by its de facto 
function of reversing decline, may cosmopolis be categorized as redemptive.  The body 
of Christ, however, is explicitly a redemptive community, since by definition it operates 
on the level of grace, both healing and elevating.  According to Christian faith, the body 
of Christ is not simply a redemptive community but the redemptive community.  For 
Lonergan it is “a concrete union of the divine Persons with one another and with man”449 
or “a new society in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in which there is communicated to us 
personally, through the person of the Son and through the person of the Spirit, a 
participation of divine perfection, a participation of the order of truth and love that binds 
the three persons of the Blessed Trinity.”450 
 Human beings are social by nature.  Our operations of knowing, valuing, 
choosing, loving, and acting, are, in the larger part, co-operations.  In progress, one 
person’s insights and innovations set the conditions for the emergence of many more 
insights and innovations by many other persons.  This true, in the reverse manner, for a 
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state of decline:  one person’s sins set negative conditions that increase the likelihood that 
others will sin.  Given the social nature of human progress and decline, it is fitting that 
redemption be achieved not simply through isolated conversions but in community.  
Thus, Lonergan affirms, “just as there is human solidarity in sin with a dialectical descent 
deforming knowledge and perverting will, so there is a divine solidarity in grace which is 
the mystical body of Christ.”451 
 Lonergan devoted an entire talk to the subject of the body of Christ.452  In it he 
states that because the body of Christ is a community with God, and because God is a 
mystery, the body too is a mystery and thus is not fully comprehensible to finite human 
minds.453  However, to explore the mystery of the body of Christ and to gain some 
fruitful understanding of it, he selects as “a guiding thread through the labyrinth of 
wealth, the single but basic and familiar theme of love.”454 
 In the mystical body of Christ, divine and human persons are bound by love.  First 
there is the love of the Eternal Father for the Eternal Son.  Both are God, so this love is of 
God for God.  Because this love is an infinite love for an infinite lovableness, this love is 
God too:  God the Holy Ghost or Holy Spirit.  Second, there is the love of God the Father 
for the Son as human.  The second person of the trinity possesses two natures, divine and 
human.  But since he is one person, and love is for a person, the Father has a single love, 
and God’s love for the Son as man is the same love as the Father’s love for the Son as 
divine:  it is an infinite love.  Furthermore, because the Son adopted a human nature, the 
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infinite love of the Father for the Son, the Holy Spirit, is extended to all of humanity.  
Thus, 
the stupendous corollary of the Incarnation [is that b]ecause God became man, the love of 
God for God became the love of God for man.  Because love is for a person, when God 
became man, when the Word was made Flesh, divine love broke the confines of divinity 
to love a created humanity in the way that God the Father loves God the Son.455 
 
This extension of divine love through Christ is expressed in the theological doctrine that 
Christ's sanctifying grace is infinite.  The divine love confers divine loveableness on the 
beloved creature. 
 The third love comprising the mystical body of Christ is the love Christ as human 
has for humanity.  Lonergan writes movingly of this love.  Here is just a taste: 
It is the love of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the love of a human will, motivated by a 
human mind, operating through human senses, resonating through human emotions and 
feelings and sentiments, implemented by a human body with its structure of bones and 
muscles, flesh, its mobile features, its terrible capacities for pleasure and pain, for joy and 
sorrow, for rapture and agony.  It is the love of the Good Shepherd, knowing his own, 
known by his own, and ready to lose his life for them [Jn 10:14-15]…456 
 
Jesus’ love is not calculating.  It gives without measure and without hope for 
personal gain.  “What is the use of living and dying for men who will not believe, or if 
they believe, do not love, or if they love only half-heartedly. Can love be love and not 
give all?”457  Christ lived to communicate God’s love to us.  For example, his baptism 
was not done so much for himself, in order to receive sanctifying grace, as in order that 
humanity might know the divine love extended to it.  Christ's baptism was “an outside 
manifestation of an inward effect.”458 
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 As discussed above, the Incarnation itself occasioned the extension of the Father’s 
infinite love for the Son to all of humanity.  To emphasize this effect, Lonergan devotes a 
distinct, fourth category to the Father’s love for humanity. Christ prays for it when asking 
that all his may be one, as the Father and he are one, that all may be one in the Father and 
the Son, and that we may know the Father has loved us as the Father has loved the 
Son.459  The Father’s love for humanity is the infinite love of the Holy Spirit.  It is the 
occasion for its recipient to be “born again,” to receive many graces and gifts, and to 
become an adopted daughter or son of God, a full heir to the reign of God.460 
                                                
 One of the gifts “diffused in our hearts by the Holy Ghost” is charity, the fifth and 
final love Lonergan examines in this context of the body of Christ.461  Already we have 
identified charity as the love of God with one’s whole heart, soul, mind, and strength that 
leads to love of oneself and love of one’s neighbor.  We have presented charity’s role in 
undoing decline by promoting repentance of one’s own sins and self-sacrificial love of 
neighbor that can undo decline.462  Here Lonergan adds that the love of the Father, Son, 
and Spirit is received and made one’s own in charity through the fellowship and 
sacraments of the church, such as baptism, reconciliation, and the Eucharist.463 
 Joined by this five-fold love, we are members of the body of Christ and begin “a 
new and higher life  [that] is not lived in isolation.”464  Human beings flourish to the 
extent that we are united with Christ.  “He is the vine and we are the branches.  As 
 
459 Ibid., 107, paraphrasing Jn. 17:11, 22-23. 
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branches wither and die, when separated from the vine, so are we without the life of 
grace, when separated from Christ.  As branches flower and fructify when united fully 
with the vine, so too, do we, when united fully with Christ.”465  There is, however, a limit 
to the analogy.  To some measure each human person has an existence, a freedom, and an 
accountability of her/his own. 
 The Body of Christ is the work primarily of God, particularly through the two 
missions of God to the world, the sending of the Spirit and the sending of the Son.  Their 
works operate respectively as the “inner word” and the “outer word.”  The Holy Spirit 
pours forth charity and other gifts in the “inner word of grace.”  The Son is the principle 
for the outer word, that is Jesus Christ’s words and deeds expressed in human terms by 
his life, death, and, resurrection, and passed down in the narratives of the gospels, the 
ongoing fellowship of the church, and the authority of tradition and doctrine.466 
 These missions are not merely the effects of God on the world, but 
a personal entrance of God himself into history, a communication of God to his people, 
the advent of God’s word into the world of religious expression.  Such was the religion of 
Israel.  Such has been Christianity.  Then not only the inner word that is God’s gift of his 
love but also the outer word of the religious tradition comes from God.467 
 
 Due to its reception of the inner and the outer words of God, there is a kind of 
authority and authenticity to the church.  However, Lonergan reminds us that Christians 
are “pilgrims,” still on the way.  As a concrete group of human persons, the church is not 
entirely free from sin.  
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Not only is there the progress of mankind but also there is development and progress 
within Christianity itself; and as there is development, so too there is decline; and as there 
is decline, there is also the problem of undoing it, of overcoming evil with the good not 
only in the world but also in the church.468  
 
In addition, there are elements of redemption found in secular society:  
Being in Christ Jesus is not tied down to place or time, culture or epoch.  It is catholic 
with the catholicity of the Spirit of the Lord.  Neither is it an abstraction that dwells 
apart from every place and time, every culture and epoch.  It is identical with personal 
living, and personal living is always here and now…469 
 
What matters is that members of the body of Christ receive and accept the 
sanctifying gifts of God’s love and God’s word given to all.  What matters is that each 
person grow in religious conversion, in otherworldly being-in-love, and that this love is 
shared in a community with shared meanings and values.  The body of Christ is about 
personal growth and growth in relationships, and these growths are not opposed, since 
“we grow in who we are through our relationships with others.”470  The doctrine of the 
mystical Body of Christ teaches us that we are blessed to grow in relationship, indeed in 
friendship, not only with each other but also and most importantly with God the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit.471  The doctrine of the mystical body of Christ teaches us that 
through these friendships a human person is blessed to cooperate in the redemption of 
her/his own soul as well as to collaborate in God’s redemption of all creation. 
Such growth, friendship, and collaboration are received and achieved not only 
through the gifts of God’s healing and elevating grace, not only in threefold conversion, 
and not only in communion with a redemptive community that includes the holy Trinity, 
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470 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1965, ed. R. Croken, 
F. Crowe, R. Doran (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1996), 174.  Cf. 180. 
471 Friendship with God will play a key role in the next chapter. 
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but, in particular, in imitation of Christ.  Like Christ we are to preach the kingdom or 
reign of God, we are to pray and to work for increased knowledge and love of the good 
and the true, and we are even at times called to overcome evil with good through self-
sacrificial love.472 
Lonergan believes that this overcoming of evil through self-sacrificial love is the 
core of both the love of God’s Spirit and the word of Jesus Christ.  It is the heart of 
participation in the life of the Trinity through the mystical body of Christ.  We must, like 
Christ, take up our own crosses.473  What this means, exactly, is much debated, and the 
debate is of tremendous significance, because the imitation of Christ, particularly Christ's 
work on the cross, is dangerous and complicated.  A proper imitation requires faithful 
understanding of Christ's work.  Such is the work of Lonergan’s systematic soteriology, 
but this we leave to the next part. 
                                                 
472 See Method, 291, where Lonergan cites Rom 12:21 on overcoming evil with good. 
473 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 181, with an uncited quote of Lk. 9:23, Mk. 8:34, or Mt. 16:24. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
We have considered nature, sin, and grace in terms of progress, decline, and redemption.  
Within each chapter and each section the movement was from the basic to the complex, 
from basic metaphysical generalities to individual persons to human communities to 
communities in history.  Progress, decline, and redemption account for the differences in 
human history.  All three are operative simultaneously, but it is helpful to consider them 
individually.  There is the natural thrust towards truth and goodness achieved in authentic 
self-transcendence and creative of a human good, i.e., human society progressing over 
time.  However, there is also the evil thrust of sin and bias that causes the downward 
cycles and worsening situations of decline.  Finally, there is the corrective vector of the 
absolutely supernatural, of grace converting persons, healing and elevating nature into 
participation in the divine love and life of the Trinity. 
God created humanity with freedom, with the ability to choose or to deny value, 
goodness, love.  But with this freedom arises the problem of sin and evil.  To solve the 
problem, God is working in history in a way that does not destroy human freedom or the 
integrity of the world order.  Rather, God is working in a way that is consonant with that 
order.  God is working through a higher integration that shifts probabilities, from a 
tendency to do evil to a tendency to do good.  This solution does not destroy human 
freedom, but works with it.  The solution is a collaboration of divine love with human 
hearts, minds, and sensitivities.  The solution works to transform those very human 
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hearts, minds, and sensitivities.  But more than this, the solution effects a transformation 
of the evils of sin into a greater good.  This is the focus of our next part.
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PART 2.  LONERGAN’S SOTERIOLOGY:  UNDERSTANDING THE MYSTERY 
 
 
 
 The immediate purpose of the last part of this dissertation was to set the context 
for this part.  We considered Lonergan’s anthropology before his soteriology, because to 
understand a solution one must possess some understanding of the problem.1  Having 
considered the problem of the world and in particular of humanity as infected by sin but 
also as graced by God, let us turn now to the divine solution to evil, focusing on Christ’s 
passion and death on the cross.  This is fitting, for, “It is by the death of Christ that we are 
saved.  And our salvation through the death of Christ is reaffirmed continuously 
throughout the New Testament.”2  
 This part examines the role of Jesus Christ’s suffering and death in the 
redemption of the world.3  It takes as granted the fact that Christ’s passion saves, and 
                                                 
1 This is related to Lonergan’s view (adapted from R.G Collingwood) that all statements are answers to 
questions, all questions arise in contexts, and to understand/appreciate a statement, one must 
understand/appreciate the question it answers and context in which the question arose.    See Method in 
Theology, (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1994), 164;  “Philosophy and the Religious 
Phenomenon,” Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980, ed. R. Croken, F. Crowe, R. Doran 
(Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2004), 404.;  and “Metaphysics as Horizon,” Collection, (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1996), 202-221; and The Way to Nicea (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1976), Translators Introduction and Ch. 1. 
2 Bernard Lonergan,  “The Redemption,” Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964, ed. R. 
Croken, F. Crowe, R. Doran (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1996), 8.  In affirming salvation 
through Christ’s death, Lonergan is not denying the roles of the Father, of the Incarnation, of Christ’s 
words and deeds, of the resurrection, of the Holy Spirit, or of the church.  
3 For Lonergan, “redemption is the restoration of a fallen order….  God intended a restoration of the 
universe’s good of order.”  Human sin caused the fall.  Thus, Lonergan focuses on the redemption of 
human sinfulness and its negative consequences.  Quoted text from p. 588 of Lonergan’s De Verbo 
Incarnato, Third edition (Rome:  Pontifical Gregorian University, 1964).  I rely on Charles Hefling’s 
excellent translation, henceforth to be referred to as “DVI (trans., Hefling).”  Unpublished at the time of this 
dissertation, Hefling’s translation of theses 15-17 will be published as Collected Works, Vol. 9.  For more 
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asks how it saves.  The fact of salvation through Christ’s passion is established as a 
doctrine of the church in the early Christian creeds.4  We seek to answer the question:  
How does Christ’s passion—his suffering and death—save us from our sins?  How does 
it function? 
This method follows Lonergan’s method, for he too began with church teaching 
on the fact of redemption and then sought to understand how it works. 5  In presenting 
Lonergan’s  soteriology, this part begins with his general views on whether it is possible 
to understand redemption and if so, what type of understanding can be gained.  The 
remainder of the part examines Lonergan’s conclusions, or his actual understanding of 
redemption.  Ultimately, the hope is not simply to understand Lonergan’s understanding, 
but through Lonergan to learn something true, edifying, and fruitful about the salvific 
effect of redemption and, in particular, of Christ’s cross:  what it achieves in us, how it 
achieves its end, and how we are to participate in the fulfillment of that end. 
The main texts examined are: (1) “The Redemption,”6 from a lecture given on 
September 25, 1958 at the Thomas More Institute in Montreal.  Lonergan delivered the 
lecture shortly after he finished teaching the theology of redemption for the third time at 
the Gregorian University as part of his Christology course, “De Verbo incarnato.”  
Lonergan had also just finished writing six chapters of a rough draft for a book on 
                                                                                                                                                 
information on the work as a whole, please see Frederick Crowe, Christ and History, Ch. 6. De Verbo 
Incarnato. 
4 Lonergan cites Henry Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus 
Fidei et Morum, edited by C. Bannwart, 2, 6, 54, 86; and the Denzinger edition edited by edited by A. 
Schönmetzer, 11, 30, 125, 150; henceforth referred to as DB and DS.  DVI, 553-59.  
5 As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation is directly an effort in indirect discourse, namely to 
interpret Lonergan, and indirectly an effort at direct discourse, or systematic understanding of church 
doctrine.   See note three in the introduction. 
6 See note 2, above. 
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redemption.7  (2) The final, 1964 version of a textbook Lonergan wrote for his 
Christology course at the Pontifical Gregorian University: The Incarnate Word (De 
Verbo incarnato), particularly theses fifteen through seventeen. 
These texts were written relatively early in Lonergan’s career.  As a consequence, 
they suffer from a lack of the mature Lonergan’s sense of historicity.8  This is most 
pronounced in De Verbo incarnato, because as a course textbook it needed to conform to 
the “manual” style of proving theses, then standard at the Gregorianum.  However, while 
Lonergan himself criticized with a great passion this style and the theological method that 
it resulted from,9 he maintained that some of the content of those writings remained “a 
permanently valid achievement.”10  I will supplement these two main texts with other 
writings of Lonergan to make up for this shortcoming. 
                                                 
7 Ibid., editors’ note, 1.  This rough draft was discovered at Lonergan’s death.  The dating is uncertain.  Cf. 
Frederick E. Crowe, Christ and History (Ottawa, Canada: Novalis, 2005), Ch. 9, particularly pages 99-100, 
124. 
8 In some ways, Lonergan’s interest in history is traceable to his early years of concern with the philosophy 
of history.  In 1955, Lonergan decided to abandon the ahistorical method of the “proof.”  But the full 
development and integration of Lonergan’s historical consciousness took many more years. Crowe, Christ 
and History, 20, 76. 
9 Cf. “Theology in Its New Context,” “The Future of Thomism,” and “The Future of Christianity” in A 
Second Collection, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996); as well as Crowe, Christ and History, Ch. 
7, “Critique of Scholasticism.” 
10 The phrase is Charles Hefling’s, but Lonergan said that while the situation was “hopelessly antiquated” 
some of his developments were “permanently valid” in  “An interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan,” A 
Second Collection, 211-213.  Quotes from 212.  Hefling’s phrase comes from his essay, “A Perhaps 
Permanently Valid Achievement:  Lonergan on Christ’s Satisfaction,” Method: Journal of Lonergan 
Studies (1992): 51. 
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Chapter 1.  Understanding Redemption? 
 The Type of Intelligibility Sought 
 
 
 
 
1.1.  Mystery 
 
 Redemption is a mystery, and one would think that by definition a mystery, at 
least in the theological sense, cannot be understood.  Lonergan defines mystery most 
generally as the “known unknown.”11  We know that something mysterious exists, but 
we do not understand what this something is or how it exists.  By our nature, human 
persons are oriented to mystery.  We want to pull back the curtain.  And though w
advances, much remains mysterious.  Each door opened reveals ten new doors.  “Though 
the field of mystery is contracted by the advance of knowledge, it cannot be eliminated 
from human living.  There always is the further question.”
e make 
                                                
12  Ideally, all of creation is 
knowable.  It is finite.  But even if a person could comprehend all of creation, her/his 
natural desire to know would not be satisfied.  Even without knowing all of creation, the 
human mind transcends creation in its questions about a creator.  Ultimately, there arises 
the known unknown of “transcendent reality.”13   
In “The Redemption,” Lonergan distinguishes, but does not separate, three senses 
of the word “mystery” that are applicable to the transcendent reality of redemption:  
theological, pious, and a hidden plan. 
The first, “the theologian’s sense” of mystery denotes “a truth that we cannot 
 
11 Insight:  A Study of Human Understanding (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 569. 
12 Ibid., 570. 
13 Ibid.  See also 663 and 674-80, as well as Method, 101-03.  
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adequately understand in this life.”14  The redemption is precisely this type of mystery, 
however, the apparent foolishness of seeking to understand redemption is diminished by 
the word “adequately.”  To settle the question of whether or not mysteries can be 
understood, let us backtrack from the truths “we cannot adequately understand in this 
life” and consider truth in general. 
Lonergan distinguishes two types of truth.  On the one hand are truths that can be 
known by “the natural light of reason.”  Among these, for example, is the fact that God 
exists.15  On the other hand are truths that completely surpass natural human capacities.  
If these truths are to be known by humanity, they must be revealed by God and accepted 
in faith.16  These are the truths that are mysteries in “the theological sense.”  One 
example is the essence of God as Trinitarian.   
                                                
While theological mysteries cannot be known by reason, there is the possibility 
that “[r]eason illuminated by faith, when it inquires diligently, piously, soberly” may 
reach “with God’s help some extremely fruitful understanding of the mysteries.”17  Such 
fruitful understanding is the understanding we seek in this part.  As “some” fruitful 
understanding, it is never a comprehensive or “adequate” understanding.  “For the divine 
mysteries by their very nature so exceed created intellect, that, even given in revelation 
 
14 “The Redemption,” 24. 
15 Some of the truths that are knowable through the natural light of reason, but are difficult to discover in 
this way, have been revealed by God.  These Lonergan calls “revealed truths” as distinct from “revealed 
mysteries.”  Method, 322-23.   
16 Method, 320-21.  Lonergan cites DS, 3004, 3008, 3009, 3015.  Some of the truths revealed by God and 
accepted in faith are not mysteries.  God in wisdom and love has revealed some truths to us that could, with 
difficulty, be known by reason.  But mysteries are those truths that must be revealed and accepted in faith, 
if they are to be known. 
17 Method, 320-21, 321. Lonergan paraphrases the documents of Vatican I.  He cites DS 3016. See also DVI 
(trans., Hefling), 503 and 509, which cite DS 3016 as well as DB 1796. 
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and accepted by faith, they remain as it were wrapped in the veil of faith.”18 
 The second sense of “mystery” pertains not directly to theology but to Christian 
piety.  For this sense, Lonergan primarily has in mind the mysteries of the life of Christ 
as meditated upon in the mysteries of the rosary.19  To say that they are the object of 
Christian piety is not to say that they are in any way simple, for “the mysteries of the life 
of our Lord that we contemplate, through sensibility and human feeling” treat reality in 
its complexity: the intelligibility of nature, the unintelligible elements of sin, and the 
transcendently intelligible elements of grace and God, as well as how these stand in 
relation to each other.20 
 Lonergan’s final sense of “mystery” is perhaps the most significant for 
understanding redemption.  This is mystery in the sense of the “secret counsel” (secretum 
consilium), “hidden wisdom,” or “hidden plan” of a king.21  This interpretation is 
scripturally founded.  When the New Testament writers speak of mystery, they are using 
a “Greek word [that] has been used to translate a Hebrew conception of Persian origin.”22  
In all three languages, “mystery” means something like the secret plan of a wise king.  
This, Lonergan believes, is the primary sense in which the New Testament authors use 
the word mystery.  “The mystery hidden through all the ages and now made plain is 
mystery in the sense of ‘secret counsel.’…  ‘Mystery’ means the secret counsel of a king, 
                                                 
18 Method, 320-21. 
19 “The Redemption,” 24. 
20 DVI (trans., Hefling), 557. 
21 Ibid., 456, 583; “The Redemption,” 24-25. 
22 “The Redemption,” 24-25.  Lonergan cites Ernst Vogt, “Mysteria in textibus Qumran,” Biblica 37 
(1956): 247-257; Karl Prümm, “Zur Phänomenologie des paulinischen Mysterion und dessen seelischer 
Aufname.  Eine Übersicht,” Biblica 37 (1956): 135-161 and “Mystère,” Dictionnaire de la Bible, 
Supplément, ed. L. Pirot, A. Robert, and H. Cazzelles (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1960): cols 1-226.  
Cf. DVI (trans., Hefling), 583. 
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and it is in that sense, fundamentally, that it is employed in the New Testament.”23 
In affirming this secret counsel or wise and hidden plan of God, Lonergan means 
both that God intends a particular order for creation and that God has a plan for its 
realization.  Thus, Lonergan distinguishes between redemption as an end and redemption 
as a means.24 As an end or a goal, God’s plan is an ordering of all of creation according 
to divine wisdom and goodness.  This is what the New Testament calls the “kingdom” or 
the “reign” of God.  The carrying out of this plan by Christ is redemption as a means.  
The plan has been initiated, and, consequently, the current state of the world is a mixture 
of order and disorder, a composite of progress, decline, and redemption. 
Not only initiated, God’s “hidden plan, ‘kept secret for long ages … is now 
disclosed … to all nations.’”25  In Christ, God’s hidden plan is revealed.  The secret 
counsel is now good news.  It is the “fulfillment of the promise made to Abraham” and 
the realization of God’s reign. It comes through an opposition of “justice and grace and 
life to law, sin, wrath, and death,” It is concretely “illustrated,” “applied,” and “realized” 
not simply in words and promises, but in deeds and events surrounding the God-man, 
Jesus Christ.  Thus, mystery in this sense is the divine plan to unite all things in Christ.26 
Our God, conceived as a wise king, has a plan to redeem the world and to 
reestablish his reign.  It is a plan to put a broken creation into order or right relationships.  
Its wisdom is so great that it will make ultimate sense of the sin and suffering of this 
world.  This plan is a mystery that transcends human reason, but it has been revealed 
through Christ to all humanity.  As Christians, we hold this in faith, and we can meditate 
upon it in the mysteries of Christ’s incarnation, life, death and resurrection.  Furthermore, 
with reason illuminated by faith, we may seek to gain some measure of fruitful but not 
                                                 
23 “The Redemption,” 24-25. 
24 Ibid., 446, 459-464. 
25 DVI (trans., Hefling), 583, quoting Rom 16:25-26. 
26 Ibid., 584, citing Eph. 1:9-10.  The text is, “He has made known to us the mystery of his will, according 
to his good pleasure that he set forth in Christ, as a plan for the fullness of time, to gather up all things in 
him, things in heaven and things on earth” (New Revised Standard Version). 
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comprehensive understanding of God’s mysterious plan. 
1.2. The Type of Intelligibility Sought 
 For Lonergan, “what is grasped when one understands is named an 
intelligibility.”27  What type of understanding can we have of God’s plan of redemption?  
What type of intelligibility does it have?  These are the questions this section seeks to 
answer.  They are important because misunderstandings of how redemption works are 
caused by underlying mistakes about its general intelligibility, as we shall see throughout 
this chapter.   
Lonergan discusses five aspects of redemption’s intelligibility.28 
1.2.1.  Fittingness, not Necessity 
At least since Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), there has been a tradition of 
arguing that Christ’s suffering and death was necessary for redemption.29  At a time when 
Christian faith in the Incarnation was being challenged as irrational by those he calls 
“infidels,” Anselm sought to explain why God became human.  Though his primary 
question was the Incarnation, Anselm grounded his answer on a position regarding 
redemption.  In the preface to Cur Deus Homo?, Anselm states his intention to “prove by 
absolute reasons, the impossibility that any person should be saved without him [Christ, 
                                                 
27 “The Redemption,” 8. 
28 Lonergan presents these five aspects in “The Redemption” in the same order that follows here. 
29 Ibid.  See DVI (trans., Hefling), 560-63.  In this section, our focus is distinguishing necessity from 
fittingness as type of intelligibility, but in a following section on satisfaction we will consider the negative 
consequences of holding Christ’s passion as necessary as well as the extent to which this position is 
attributable to Anselm. 
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the Incarnation].”30  Anselm argued that if humanity was to be saved, then it was 
necessary for God to become human.31 
The method of proving truths through absolute, necessary reasons was discussed 
above in our sections on classicism and determinism.32  It arose from a mistaken effort to 
generalize Aristotle’s ideal definition of science, and gradually it pervaded scholarly 
pursuits in fields from mathematics and physics to psychology and philosophy. 33  This 
obsession with necessity marked the work of many later scholastic Catholic theologians 
and the early Protestant reformers.  Lonergan notes that a negative consequence of this is 
that many theologians “flatly affirmed that God in his justice could not possibly forgive 
the sins of mankind, unless Christ became man and suffered and died.”34 
Against this Lonergan asserts: 
The Catholic tradition on the necessity of redemption by Christ is clear and uniform.  St. 
Augustine flatly stated that there were many other ways in which God could redeem man 
apart from the suffering and death of Christ.  The same view was repeated by Peter 
Lombard, whose Sentences were the basic text in theology for about three or four 
centuries.  It was repeated by St. Thomas and Scotus and subsequently by all 
theologians.35 
 
Lonergan’s argument against the use of necessity in soteriology hinges on the 
distinction between three types of necessity: absolute necessity, conditional or 
hypothetical necessity, and fittingness.  Only God is absolutely necessary.  All of creation 
is the result of God’s free decision.  As a whole and in all its parts, creation did not have 
                                                 
30 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo? in Basic Writings, trans. S.N. Deane (Chicago:  Open Court Publishing Co., 
1998) 191, emphasis added. 
31 In particular by an “adequate satisfaction.” DVI (trans., Hefling), 560. 
32 Part 1, section 1.2.  See in particular footnote 20.   
33 Method, 279-81. 
34 “The Redemption,” 8. 
35 Ibid., 8-9, emphasis added.  The editor’s footnote indicates that Lonergan probably relied on Jean 
Rivière’s Le Dogme de la Rédemption: Essai d’étude historique (Paris: Librarie Victor Lecoffre, 1905). 
 
 170
to be.36  Because of this, all relations within creation are governed, at most, by 
conditional or hypothetical necessity.  For example, if one wishes to live, then one must 
eat.  Hypothetical necessity, according to Lonergan, is the type of necessity that Anselm 
and others championed: if humanity was to be saved, then it was necessary for God to 
become human, to suffer, and to die. 
In contrast, Lonergan maintains that God’s redemption of humanity through the 
Incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of Christ is neither absolutely nor hypothetically 
necessary.  Rather, it was fitting.  Lonergan illustrates fittingness with an example from 
Thomas Aquinas.  Thomas distinguishes between two types of necessity when relating 
ends and means: 
One is the necessity of that without which an end is impossible, the necessity of food for 
maintaining life.  The other is the necessity of that without which an end would not be so 
well or so appropriately achieved, the necessity of a horse for making a journey.  [Thus] 
he affirms that the Incarnation was necessary for the restoration of the human race – 
necessary, not for there to be a restoration, but for a better and more appropriate 
restoration.37 
 
Applying Thomas’s categories of fittingness to Anslem’s question about the 
Incarnation, we might ask:  Why is the Incarnation fitting?  How does it make the 
restoration of the human race better and more appropriate?  And, since Lonergan would 
extend fittingness to Christ’s passion, we can ask:  Why is Christ’s passion fitting?  How 
does it make human redemption better and more appropriate?  These are the main 
questions for this entire part.  Let it suffice for now to affirm that redemption by Christ’s 
incarnation and passion are not necessary, but fitting.  They are not the only way God 
                                                 
36 DVI (trans., Hefling), 573.  See also Insight, 680-87. 
37 DVI (trans., Hefling), 565, emphasis added.  Fittingness was a relatively early interest for Lonergan and 
the topic of a short essay.  See Crowe, Christ and History, 65-68. 
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could have chosen to redeem humanity, but they constitute “a better and more appropriate 
restoration” (as above).  From a multitude of possible means to save the human race, 
Christ’s incarnation, life, death, and resurrection constitute the wisest way, the best way, 
the way chosen by God in infinite wisdom and goodness.38 
1.2.2.  A Dynamic Intelligibility 
Redemption’s intelligibility is not a matter of necessity, nor is it static or “a matter 
of deductive” thought.39  Rather, it is dynamic and a matter of dialectical thought. We 
may recall that Lonergan defined dialectic as “a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed 
principles of change.”40  In redemption, the primary linked but opposed principles are 
death and resurrection.  Throughout scripture, this theme of death and resurrection “takes 
many forms and is constantly returning.”41   
How do these dynamic, linked principles of death and resurrection unfold 
concretely?  Lonergan affirms that “the fundamental element” in the dialectical 
intelligibility of redemption is “a reversal of roles.”42  According to the books of Genesis 
and Wisdom as well as Paul’s letter to the Romans, death is the penalty for sin.43  But 
death does not remain simply the penalty, the wages, or the consequence of sin.  Through 
the cross, death becomes the means of salvation, of new life in the resurrection.  The 
intelligibility of redemption is an intelligibility of transformation. 
                                                 
38 More will be said on the connection between fittingness and divine wisdom. 
39 “The Redemption,” 9. 
40 Insight, 242; quoted previously in Ch. 1, ft. 1. 
41 “The Redemption,”  9. 
42 Ibid. 
43 “In the book of Genesis, we read that God said to Adam when forbidding him to eat of the fruit of the 
tree, ‘On whatever day thou eatest thereof, thou shall die’ (2.17).  Death is presented in the book of Genesis 
and in the book of Wisdom as the penalty for sin.  The same doctrine is repeated by St. Paul in Romans 
5.12: ‘By one man sin entered into the world and by sin death.’ And again in chapter 6, verse 23, ‘The 
wages of sin are death’” (Ibid.). 
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However, this transformation does not work in the simple, immediate manner that 
was expected at the time of Christ.  Redemption is “not deductive” in that it is not a 
simple matter of immediately applying general rules of justice to the world: “They were 
awaiting a Messiah that would transform, in the twinkling of an eye, the whole human 
situation.  The wicked would be punished, and the just would triumph, in this world.”44 
  Redemption works dialectically in that sin remains, and death as the penalty of sin 
remains.  But in Christ they become steps on the way to resurrection and redemption.  
“That means that conditions in the world continue despite the advent of the Messiah, but 
their very continuance becomes the means by which we proceed to eternal life.”45 
1.2.3.  Incarnate Intelligibility 
Redemption is not an abstraction or simply an idea.  Redemption is an event in 
this concrete world and in this actually occurring history.  “It exploits all the subtle 
relations that hold between body and mind, between flesh and spirit.  Christ crucified is a 
symbol of endless meaning, and it is not merely a symbol but also a real death.”46 
Christ’s act on the cross involves transforming sin and death into many goods, 
such as satisfaction and communication.  Without discussing these things thoroughly 
here, let us keep in mind that Christ’s work of redemption involves human persons in the 
whole of their being.  It involves mental, volitional, and physical operations; social and 
historical dimensions; beliefs and feelings; love in all its richness; interpersonal relations 
                                                 
44 “The Redemption,” 10.  Lonergan does not explicitly state what he means by redemption (not) being “a 
matter of deductive” thought.  Nor does he state the significance of the then-current messianic expectations 
at the time of Christ.  I believe the latter is the illustration of the former in that the various false messianic 
expectations demonstrate that the redemption is not something that can be deduced. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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in their complexities; and friendship.  Redemption as incarnate “resides in the love Christ 
manifested to us and the effects of that love on us.”47 
We cannot come to understand the redemption merely by an act of the intellect.  It 
comes to us in our whole being, in our physicality, in our sensing, inquiring, 
understanding, judging, and deciding.  It comes to us in community and in history.  It 
comes through the Word and the Spirit.  We receive it in the manner of “the way from 
below upwards” and in the manner “from above downwards.”48 
1.2.4.  A Complex Intelligibility 
 To illustrate the complexity of redemption, Lonergan borrows from higher 
mathematics, which makes use of many types of numbers—rational and irrational, real 
and imaginary.  These numbers must be clearly distinguished, but they can be used 
harmoniously. 
Just as math includes real and imaginary numbers, so redemption includes the 
intelligibility of nature, the unintelligibility of sin, and “the transcendent intelligibility of 
God meeting the unintelligibility of sin.”49   
We have covered Lonergan’s thought on the intelligibility of nature in the first 
chapter.  This is primarily the world operating according to emergent probability and 
humanity (in all its compoundness) as governed by but to some degree directing 
processes of emergent probability. 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 14. 
48 Relatively: experience, understanding, judgment, and decision and decision, judgment, understanding, 
experience – as covered in Ch. 1 of this dissertation, particularly sections 1.4 and 1.5. 
49 “The Redemption,” 12. 
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In agreement with traditional Catholic theology, Lonergan judges sin to be 
unintelligible.  There is no reason why people sin.  Sin is a failure to act according to the 
truth and goodness that humans seek by nature.  Choosing falsehood and evil does not 
make sense when scrutinized.  One may rationalize a sinful choice with pretense or 
excuse, but there are no real reasons for it. 
God is supremely intelligible in Godself, but to us, God’s intelligibility transcends 
all that we can comprehend, even aided by the supernatural light of faith. 
Soteriology must account for all of these, for progress, decline, and redemption.  
These elements must be distinguished, yet they must also be used together in the quest to 
understand how and why God chose to redeem the world in the manner God did indeed 
choose. 
1.2.5.  Multiple Intelligibility 
 Lonergan’s final general remark on the intelligibility of redemption cautions 
against seeking to fit redemption “into some single formula, some neat reason.”50  When 
seeking to understand redemption, it is best to consider it from multiple viewpoints.  The 
church has a long history with theologians coming up with many different ways of 
understanding Christ’s work.  Anselm’s thought on satisfaction is an example of “the 
tendency to try to reduce everything to a single formula.”51  Lonergan holds up Thomas 
as an example of considering multiple points of view:  merit, satisfaction, redemption, 
sacrifice, and efficient causality. 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 13. 
51 Ibid. 
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 Despite his caution against the temptation to fit all the aspects of redemption into 
a single formula, Lonergan does think it is good to hold as an ideal the search for a 
unified understanding. “Anyone who understands grasps many objects in a single 
view.”52  This is the work of the wisdom we seek, to order all things.53  It is possible that 
Lonergan thought he had achieved a unified view of redemption in his “Law of the 
Cross.”54  In his 1958 essay, “The Redemption,” Lonergan both cautioned against 
seeking a single view and invited this search.  At the end of this essay Lonergan writes 
that the way to “move towards a total view” is by “the fundamental category… the word 
mystery,” which he then explains means primarily God’s wise, hidden plan.55   A few 
years later, in The Incarnate Word, Lonergan devotes the final chapter to “Understanding 
the Mystery.” The chapter’s main theorem has been called “the Law of the Cross” and the 
sense of the chapter is that this law is a single view, an understanding of the mystery, 
which is defined as a “hidden plan.”  Furthermore, Lonergan calls the Law of the Cross, 
“the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption” and “the essence of redemption.”56 
Let us emphasize, however, that Lonergan consistently maintains that his 
understanding, even that contained in the Law of the Cross, was not perfect or 
comprehensive.  Redemption is a mystery that we cannot understand “adequately,” but 
only “fruitfully.”  In De Verbo incarnato, Lonergan refers to this understanding as 
                                                 
52 DVI (trans., Hefling), 565.  Lonergan directs us to his work Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. 
David Burrell (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 52.  We treat understanding in Ch. 1 
of this dissertation, particularly section 1.3.1. 
53 Lonergan states this frequently, such as in DVI (trans., Hefling), 566 and 579. 
54 Such is the claim in the editors’ note 26, “The Redemption,” 14. 
55 Ibid., 24. 
56 DVI (trans., Hefling), 576-77. 
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“imperfect and analogical.”57  The Law of the Cross may be first among many analogies, 
and perhaps the overarching one, but I believe the many analogies remain valid and all 
remain imperfect.  Our next section focuses on just what is this “imperfect and analogical 
understanding.” 
1.3.  An Analogical Understanding 
So far we have considered redemption as mystery and intelligibility.  We have 
indicated that while redemption is a mystery that cannot be understood comprehensively 
by the created human intellect, reason illuminated by faith can gain some measure of 
fruitful understanding, i.e. some insight into its intelligibility.  The intelligibility of 
redemption is also a mystery in the sense of God’s hidden plan, a free act of divine will.  
As such it is not necessary, but wise, good, and fitting.  In addition, its intelligibility is 
dynamic, incarnate, complex, and multiple. 
Now we ask how reason illuminated by faith is to gain fruitful understanding of 
the fitting, dynamic, etc. intelligibility of redemption.  Is there a particular tool that the 
theologian uses in this quest?  Lonergan’s answer to this question relies again on the 
statements of Vatican I.  Paraphrasing the fourth chapter of the Dogmatic Constitution 
concerning the Catholic Faith, Lonergan writes that such fruitful understanding of 
mystery “rests on the analogy of things known naturally and on the interconnection of the 
mysteries with one another and with man’s last end.”58 
Fundamental to this project is the first part, “the analogy of things known 
naturally.”  What is an analogy?  Basically it is a comparison of two things that share a 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 565. 
58 Method, 321, citing DS 3016 (DB 1796).  See also Method, 132. 
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likeness.  Typically analogy is used to understand a new or a difficult thing through its 
likeness to a something familiar or already understood.  Furthermore, while an analogy 
shares the use of likeness with metaphors, analogies in Lonergan’s usage means a 
controlled, proportionate likeness.  For example, as the soul is the principle for natural 
operations of questioning and understanding, so sanctifying grace is the principle for the 
supernatural operations of faith, hope, and charity.59  
Analogies are particularly useful in theology, because God and the divine 
mysteries are beyond created intellect.  Humans cannot understand and express the 
essences of these things comprehensively, exactly, or univocally.  The way of negation, 
or denial, is open to us in discussing the divine mysteries.  For example, we may state 
that God is not a body among bodies.  Negation is helpful for preventing errors, but 
humans desire positive understanding.  Traditionally, this is obtained in Christian 
theology through likeness.  For example, when scripture speaks of God as a rock (Ps. 
18:2, etc.), it does not mean that God is literally a rock, but that God is like a rock in 
being dependable.  Metaphors, similes, and analogies are used to demonstrate likeness.  
Analogy goes beyond the simple but wild60 comparison of metaphor and simile to a more 
extended and controlled comparison.61 
When seeking to understand the divine mysteries, an “analogy from things known 
naturally” is helpful.  As Lonergan writes, “Anyone who understands grasps many 
                                                 
59 See Michael Stebbins, The Divine Initiative:  Grace, World Order, and Human Freedom in the Early 
Writings of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 30. 
60 A person who hears that God is a rock or is like a rock may come to many different and perhaps harmful 
conclusions, such as that God does not care. 
61 Perhaps the best-known example is the psychological analogy of Augustine proposed in his The Trinity 
and developed in complicated ways by, among other theologians, Thomas Aquinas in the first part of his 
Summa (Questions 27-43) and Lonergan in the entirety of his Verbum. 
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objects in a single view.  For getting this grasp in difficult cases, an analogy drawn from 
simpler ones is a big help.”62 
Let us turn now to Lonergan’s imperfect, analogical understanding of the mystery 
of redemption, of God’s wise plan for salvation as it is carried out in the passion of 
Christ. 
                                                 
62 DVI (trans., Hefling), 565. 
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Chapter 2.  Redemption in the New Testament:  Basic Analogies 
 
 
 In the preceding chapter, we set out the type of understanding sought:  fruitful and 
analogical but not comprehensive understanding of God’s wise and fitting plan.  The 
primary text for the first chapter was Lonergan’s essay, “The Redemption.”  While we 
will continue to refer to it, we now focus our attention on the final three chapters or 
“theses” of The Incarnate Word.  The first is “Thesis 15: Redemption in the New 
Testament.”  It accumulates “the teaching of the New Testament” or, perhaps more 
correctly, what the church affirms in official doctrines as the “facts” of redemption.63   
Theses 16 and 17 constitute Lonergan’s efforts as a systematic theologian to understand 
these defined truths.64 
Scripture is a privileged and primary source in the life and thought of the church.  
However, scripture itself represents the attempts by different people living in particular 
contexts to understand the mysterious events of Christ’s incarnation, birth, life, death, and 
resurrection.  While inspired by the Spirit and granted the knowledge of faith, the authors 
of the New Testament were themselves seeking to make sense of Jesus of Nazareth, Jesus 
the Christ.65  Their understanding and their expressions of their understanding were to 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 445, 447.  Although Lonergan entitles the chapter “Redemption in the New Testament,” all 
statements of truth are drawn from both scripture and doctrine. 
64 See Method Chs. 12, “Doctrines,” and 13, “Systematics,” on systematic theology’s role of interpreting 
defined, doctrinal truth.  Particularly helpful is p. 325, where Lonergan distinguishes between 
understanding data, as done in the functional specialty “Interpretation,” and understanding facts or truths, 
the task of the specialty “Systematics.” 
65 See Lonergan’s 1975 lecture, “Christology Today: Methodological Reflections” published in A Third 
Collection (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985), 80-81.  Here Lonergan discusses the effects of 
modern historical scholarship on biblical studies.  With the shift in history conceived as “precritical belief 
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some degree analogical or metaphorical.  This chapter will present Lonergan’s discussion 
in thesis 15 of these scriptural analogies, which is why in the current chapter’s title I have 
added the subtopic, “Basic Analogies,” to Lonergan’s title for thesis 15, “Redemption in 
the New Testament.”   
Thesis 15 states: 
 
Redemption denotes not only an end but also a mediation: a price that has been paid, 
Christ the Mediator’s vicarious suffering and death for sinners and on account of sins, the 
sacrifice offered by our High Priest in his own blood, meritorious obedience, the power 
of the risen Lord, and the eternal Priest’s intercession.66 
 
 The thesis is primarily a list of basic analogies:  redemption, price paid, vicarious 
suffering and death, sacrifice, meritorious obedience, risen Lord’s power, and eternal 
Priest’s intercession.  They are all authoritatively defined ways of understanding how 
God has indeed chosen in wisdom and love to save the human race through his Son, Jesus 
Christ.  These ways are not competitive, but rather they “illuminate and complement” one 
another.67 
2.1.  Redemption:  As Word, End, and Mediation 
2.1.1.  The Word, Redemption 
 In “The Redemption,” Lonergan writes that the New Testament includes two 
traditions or contexts, or traditions, for considering what we mean by the word 
                                                                                                                                                 
in testimony” to “critical understanding of evidence,” scripture is treated as inspired in the sense of 
presenting “evidence of the faith of the early church.”  (Italics added.)  Faith, for Lonergan, is the 
supernatural virtue that is a knowing born of religious love, poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, as we 
saw in part 1, section 3.2.1.2.  See also Crowe, Christ and History, 76 and 150, where he discusses 
Lonergan’s long transition from the precritical to a more critical view. 
66 DVI (trans., Hefling), 446.  The original Latin:  “Redemptio non solum finem dicit sed etiam 
mediationem, solutum nempe pretium, vicarium Christi mediatoris passionem et mortem propter peccata et 
pro peccatoribus, sacrificium a Pontifice nostro in suo sanguine oblatum meritoriam obedientiam, 
resuscitati Domini virtutem, et aeterni Sacerdotis intercessionem”  (DVI, 446). 
67 DVI (trans., Hefling), 471. 
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“redemption.”68  The first comes from the Hebrew tradition presented in the Old 
Testament or the Hebrew Bible.  It discusses redemption in the Hebrew terms: “pâdâh 
and pidyôn, gâ’al and ge’ullah, kipper and kofer.”69  The second, the New Testament 
context comes from “a pagan marketplace and the ancient practice of buying and selling 
slaves and captives.”70  In the Hebrew or Old Testament context, redemption means 
deliverance from one’s enemies and one’s sinfulness for social tranquility and personal 
holiness.  In contrast, in the context of the pagan marketplace, redemption focuses on a 
financial transaction: the payment of a ransom or a price in exchange for goods.   
In “The Redemption” Lonergan considers both aspects together under the simple 
heading of “redemption” – one of “the traditional five aspects [of Christ’s work] 
enumerated by St. Thomas.”71  In thesis 15 of The Incarnate Word, Lonergan allots a 
separate section each to redemption in the sense of (1) deliverance from sin and enemies 
for holiness and tranquility, and (2) a commercial transaction.  Here we follow 
Lonergan’s presentation in The Incarnate Word, providing separate sections for Hebrew 
deliverance and for the pagan commercial transaction as, respectively, “Redemption” and 
“Paying a Price.” 
 In thesis 15, Lonergan writes that in the New Testament the English “redemption” 
is a translation of the Vulgate’s Latin, redemptio, which translates the original Greek 
words “lytron:  Mk 10:45, Mt 20:28. antilytron:  1 Tm 2:6. lytrôsis:  Lk 1:68, 2:38; Heb 
                                                 
68 “The Redemption,” 18.  Lonergan relies on a contemporary biblical scholar, Stanislaus Lyonnet and his 
works “De notione emptionis seu acquisitionis,” Verbum Domini 36 (1958): 257-69; De peccato et 
redemptione, vol. 2, De vocabulario redemptionis (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1960): 49-66. 
69 DVI (trans., Hefling), 456. Cf. “The Redemption,” 17. 
70 “The Redemption,” 18. 
71 Ibid., 14. 
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9:12. apolytrôsis:  Lk 21:28; Rom 3:24, 8:23; 1 Cor 1:30; Eph 1:7, 14, 4:30; Heb 9:15; 
(Heb 11:35). lytrousthai:  Lk 24:21; Ti 2:14. lytrôtês:  Acts 7:35.”72  The Septuagint 
version of the Hebrew scriptures uses lytron and its cognates to translate the 
aforementioned original Hebrew words pâdâh (used in the context of Israel’s Exodus 
from Egypt), gâ’al (used principally for deliverance from Babylon), and kipper 
(employed mainly for liberation from sin).73 
 “Deliverance” is Lonergan’s preferred English translation of these terms.  In 
support of this choice, Lonergan cites the canticle of Zachary in Luke 1:68-79: 
Blessed be the Lord, the God of Israel; he has visited his people, and wrought their 
redemption.  He has raised up a scepter of salvation for us among the prosperity of his 
servant David… He had sworn an oath to our father Abraham, that he would enable us to 
live without fear in his service, delivered from the hand of our enemies, passing all our 
days in holiness, and approved in his sight…. And thou, my child [John the Baptist], wilt 
be known for a prophet of the most High, going before the Lord, to clear his way for him; 
thou wilt make known to his people the salvation that is to release them from their sins.  
Such is the merciful kindness of our God, which has bidden him to come to us, like a 
dawning from on high, to give light to those who live in darkness, in the shadow of death, 
and to guide our feet into the way of peace.74 
 
 When the New Testament authors attempted to express their faith in what God 
was doing in Christ, they reached back to their Hebrew roots to the terms pâdâh, gâ’al, 
and kipper, expressed in Greek as lytron, in Latin as redemptio, and in English as 
“redemption.”  Thus, the primary meaning of the word “redemption,” as attributed to 
Christ’s work so many times in the New Testament, is of deliverance in a social sense 
from enemies and in a mostly personal sense from sin.  The end of deliverance is light, 
peace, and holiness. 
                                                 
72 DVI (trans., Hefling), 456. 
73 Ibid., 457; and “The Redemption,” 17. 
74 “The Redemption,” 17-18, emphasis added. 
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2.1.2.  Redemption as an End 
 After stating the thesis itself, Lonergan’s first move in thesis 15 is to distinguish 
between redemption as mediation and redemption as an end: 
Redemption as end is the state of the redeemed; the redeemed are those who, freed from 
past evils, enjoy the goods bestowed on them.  Redemption as mediation regards the 
process headed towards the end — a ‘medium’ is that which is directed towards an 
end — and denotes the intervention of a person so that the end may be arrived at.75 
 
 Lonergan states that redemption as an end “is commonly called ‘salvation.’”76  He 
cites Romans 8:24, “in hope we were saved,” to indicate that salvation, or redemption as 
an end, is divided into two stages, one that has happened and one that is in hope, or one 
earthly and one heavenly.  Humanity has been saved by Christ, and there are real, present 
benefits to Christ’s work.  Yet there remains a hope for the final, definitive salvation. 
Already in this life we have been freed from “the power of darkness,” “the fear of 
death,” and “sin and punishment.”  We have been “reconciled with God and the 
justified,” have received “the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and adoptive sonship,” and 
are able to “approach God with confidence.”77  These are “true goods” already bestowed 
in this earthly stage.  Furthermore, they include “forgiveness of sins, justification, the 
Holy Spirit poured into our hearts, charity, peace with God, our life hidden with Christ in 
God, and the like.”78 
Redemption as a final, definitive end is the mysterious, dynamic state traditionally 
conceived as being with God in heaven.  It is an “eternal redemption,” a state of peace 
                                                 
75 DVI (trans., Hefling), 446. 
76 DVI (trans., Hefling), 459. 
77 Ibid., 446. 
78 Ibid., 459.  More shall be said on this in section 4.3.5. of this chapter, but to sufficiently discuss the 
issues of how we are saved now would require fully developed presentations on grace, ecclesiology, the 
sacraments and sacramentology, Pneumatology, etc. – all of which lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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“when we shall no longer work out our salvation in fear and trembling.”79  Then we shall 
receive “resurrection of the body, the crown of glory, and eternal life with Christ.”80 
2.1.3.  Redemption as a Mediation of Reconciliation 
 Redemption is not simply an end, but also a process or movement.  And for 
Lonergan, this process is not simply a means, but a mediation.  Redemption has a “sense 
of a personal intervention,” for it concerns “the interpersonal relations between Christ 
and God the Father, between Christ and sinners, and between Christ and those who are 
justified.”81 
Lonergan affirms that Christ as human is the one mediator between God and 
humanity. Christ mediates redemption in his incarnation,82 his whole life (all his words 
and deeds, his entire person),83 his passion, and his resurrection.  Christ’s mediation is 
primarily of a new and better covenant between God and human persons.84  What an 
older, biblical language calls a new covenant, modern society might call reconciliation.85  
Christ’s personal mediation is a mediation of interpersonal reconciliation:  “The theme of 
reconciliation embraces the whole personal aspect of sin as offense against God and also 
of redemption as mediation.”86 
                                                 
79 DVI (trans., Hefling), 459-60, with reference to Heb 9:12, and Phil 2:12. 
80 Ibid., 446. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 447.  Lonergan mentions but does not discuss a patristic formula common to the Eastern and 
Western churches: “God became man that men might become Gods.”  
83 There is a way in which a person as a whole or at a decisive moment can stand as a symbol for something 
else, perhaps something greater.  This, Lonergan calls, “incarnate meaning.”  See “Time and Meaning,” 
Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964, 101-02 and Method, 73.   
84 DVI (trans., Hefling), 462, with references to Heb 8:6, 8-12; 9:15; 12:24.  I say “primarily” because 
redemption improves relations among human persons as well as between God and human persons, the topic 
of this chapter’s final section.  
85 DVI (trans., Hefling), 446, 451, 485.  Cf. “The Redemption,” 6; which quotes 2 Cor. 5:18 and 19. 
86 Ibid., 485. 
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In other words, sin, or negative human choice and action, creates a rupture in the 
relationships among human persons, with creation as a whole, and with God.  Lonergan 
understands Christ’s person, words, and deeds, and gifts—culminating with his suffering, 
death, and resurrection—to be an intervention in these ruptured relationships, an 
intervention that seeks not to increase separation but to heal and to deepen interpersonal 
bonds.  This is why the Christian tradition, and Lonergan standing squarely within it, uses 
the language of forgiveness, love, and reconciliation when discussing redemption.  It is 
why a redeemed humanity is described as the children of God who approach their father 
in confidence.   
This traditional language is fundamental to Lonergan’s theory of how redemption 
works.87  Redemption conceived as interpersonal reconciliation achieved by personal 
mediation provides the all-important context for understanding Lonergan’s more 
complicated analogies of satisfaction and the Law of the Cross—the topics of theses 16 
and 17 (to be discussed in chapters 3 and 4 of this part).  For now, we turn to other, more 
directly scriptural analogies for understanding Christ’s work of mediation as presented in 
thesis 15. 
 2.2.  Paying a Price 
 In general, Lonergan’s thought on redemption is an attempt to transcend or to 
move beyond an understanding of Christ’s work based on the analogy of a commercial 
                                                 
87 Lonergan’s distinction between common sense and theory, description and explanation, narrative and 
science (in the larger sense of Wissenschaft, not simply “natural science”) was presented in part 1, section 
1.5.5. 
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exchange.88   This transcendence is not a total repudiation or even a complete 
abandonment of a commercial understanding.  Lonergan is wary of potential errors that 
can arise when pushing such a commercial analogy; however, he retains this scriptural 
language while placing it in the richer interpersonal context of satisfaction, as we shall 
see in chapter three of this part. 
Commercial language is common to New Testament descriptions of redemption. 
Several passages use the Greek terms, “timê [price], agorazein [to buy], exagorazein [to 
buy up, buy from].”89  Even the word lytron and its cognates, translated as redemptio in 
the Vulgate and “redemption” in English, have commercial meanings.90  Lonergan cites 
Mk 10:45 and Mt 20:28 as stating that Christ came to serve and to be “a ransom” for 
many.  Such New Testament language of ransom or price paid comes from the pagan 
marketplace, particularly the market for slaves and captives.91 
Lonergan insists, however, that we should not impose literally a pagan 
interpretation on scripture.  This commercial language is metaphorical.  No money 
changes hands.  The commercial metaphor still has meaning, but this meaning is 
“minimal.”  It indicates simply that redemption comes “on condition… and this condition 
is ‘giving his life.’”92 
                                                 
88 This is because of the problems that arise from pushing the analogy too far, and because the commercial 
transaction does not do justice to the interpersonal nature of redemption.  More to follow in this section and 
section 3.2. 
89 DVI (trans., Hefling), 465.  Among the passages Lonergan cites or quotes are 1 Cor. 6:20, Gal. 3:13, 1 Pt. 
2:1, Rv. 5:9. 
90 Ibid., 463-64. 
91 See section 2.1.1. where lytron is translated simply as “redemption.”  Cf. DVI (trans., Hefling), 466. 
92 DVI (trans., Hefling), 466. 
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Why is this condition required?  Immediately the temptation might be to leap to 
the thought that God the Father demands the Son’s death in order to change His mind and 
forgive humanity’s sins.  This will be considered in the next chapter on satisfaction.  But 
it is important to stress that God’s love and forgiveness are not conditional.  Christ’s 
mediation to God is not to be understood as a requirement for changing God’s mind.93  
Redemption is the divine initiative.  Lonergan maintains consistently that “in the 
redemption God is making issue with wickedness and transforming sin and its effect into 
the forgiveness of sin and recovery.”94  
If Christ’s “giving of his life” is not the condition required for changing God’s 
mind, then of what is it the condition?  The simple answer is redemption.  This is what 
Lonergan clearly states here.  Yet this too is a minimal response.  Why is redemption 
achieved because Christ gives his life?  What does this do to redeem humanity?  How 
does it work? 
Perhaps there are no perfect answers within the framework of this commercial 
metaphor.  Lonergan writes that one can push the commercial metaphor in two ways.  
The first is to take the “for” (or anti in Greek) in Christ’s giving his life as ransom “for 
many” as meaning “in substitution for.”  The second is to ask “to whom the price was 
paid.”95  The first, substitution, Lonergan calls “true in a way,”96 but he critiques 
                                                 
93 Traditional Catholic theology has maintained that God does not change in general.  We are not to 
imagine God, then, as a black orb, but to understand God to the best of our abilities, as love in full.  A good 
book on the topic of God and change is Thomas G. Weinandy’s  Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2000).  The basic argument is that God is pure act and this act is love.  
God cannot become more loving because God is completely, overflowingly loving. 
94 “The Redemption,” 19.  Cf. for example, Ibid., 528 and 583, where Lonergan quotes 2 Cor. 5:19, “‘God 
was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them.’”  
95 DVI (trans., Hefling), 464, 466. 
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substitution in thesis 16.  Here Lonergan probably means that substitution is true 
inasmuch as Christ suffered “on behalf of” humans as we shall see in the next section on 
Christ’s vicarious suffering.  There is danger, however, in such talk.  Lonergan 
acknowledges this danger, and he focuses on it in thesis 16 on satisfaction.97   
As for the second way of extending the metaphor, that is, asking to whom the 
price was paid, Lonergan finds that attributing this to the devil can be helpful in its denial 
that the Father demanded Christ’s suffering and death to appease himself.  
Metaphorically understood, attributing it to the devil is a way of affirming “that it was… 
the evildoer’s hatred of the light that led to the death of Christ.”  As evildoers, Lonergan 
names “the chief priests and Pharisees,” “Judas and Pilate and Herod.”98  Despite the 
dangers of thinking of Christ as paying something to God, there is some legitimacy to this 
thought.  Lonergan writes that Christ’s passion is in a sense “paid” to God in the very 
broad sense of given freely.  This is how Lonergan would understand sacrifice. Sacrifice 
is not something God demands.  It is an offering to God, freely given.  In redemption this 
offering is of Christ’s self, his life, his suffering, and his death.99 
2.3.  Vicarious Suffering and Death 
As we have seen at the start of this chapter, thesis 15 of Lonergan’s The Incarnate 
Word affirms that redemption is by “Christ the Mediator’s vicarious suffering and death 
for sinners and on account of sins.”  Lonergan treats this as truth, as a doctrine of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
96 Ibid., 466. 
97 This will be a focus of section three of this chapter.  The distinction is between “vicarious suffering” or 
“vicarious satisfaction” and “vicarious satispassion” or “vicarious substitutionary penal atonement.”  
Punishment in the first is taken on willingly out of love and sorrow.  In the second, punishment is imposed 
as retribution.  
98 “The Redemption,” 18.  See also DVI (trans., Hefling), 466-67. 
99 DVI (trans., Hefling), 466-67.  More on this topic will follow in section 2.4. 
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church, to be believed in faith, but it “is not a doctrine clearly, distinctly, precisely, and 
coherently understood and explained.”100  For reasons that will be clearer in the third 
chapter of this part, this teaching is highly problematic due to a popular misunderstanding 
of the doctrine.  Thesis 15 simply presents the doctrine, while theses 16 and 17 seek to 
explain it.  However, Lonergan’s language in thesis 15 anticipates the solutions of the 
latter theses.  Let us consider Christ’s vicarious suffering and death for sinners in two 
parts: “for sinners” and “on account of sins.” 
Lonergan compiles multiple scriptural references attesting to the early church’s 
faith that Christ died for sinners or for us.101  These references indicate four things:  (1) 
that Christ’s passion is an act intended to benefit sinners, (2) that “sinners” includes all of 
humanity, each and every individual across time and space inasmuch as one is to some 
degree a sinner, (3) that Christ’s passion is “in accordance with the mystery of the 
cross,”102 and (4) that Christ suffered and died vicariously. 
The benefit intended in the first of these three is redemption as an end, the 
deliverance from sin and enemies for holiness and peace in eternal life with God.  The 
second, that Christ acted to benefit or to redeem all humanity, is commonly if not 
universally affirmed by Christians.103  In its support, Lonergan adduces several scriptural 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 448. 
101 (Ibid, 467):  “He died for all (2 Cor 5:15, Heb 2:9), for individuals (Rom 14:15, 1 Cor 8:11), for the 
ungodly (Rom 5:6), for us (Rom 5:8, 1 Thes 5:10), and for our sins (1 Cor 15:3, 1 Pt  3:18).  He gave his 
life as a ransom for many (Mk 10:45, Mt 20:28) and for all (1 Tm 2:6).  He gave himself for us (Ti 2:14) 
and for our sins (Gal 1:4).  He gave himself up for us (Eph 5:2), for the church (Eph 5:25), and for me (Gal 
2:20).  He was handed over for us all (Rom 8:32) and for our trespasses (Rom 4:25).”  
102 DVI (trans., Hefling), 447:  “He acts for sinners, that is, to bestow a benefit on sinners whose sins are 
forgiven; yet he also suffers for sinners in accordance with the mystery of the cross.” 
103 Against this is the non-Catholic belief in “double predestination”:  that God intends for some people to 
go to heaven and for others to go to hell. 
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passages104 in addition to the many footnoted above.  The third aspect, that Christ died in 
accordance with the mystery of the cross, is in itself mysterious.  Lonergan does not 
explain here what he means by “the mystery of the cross.”  However, the title of thesis 17 
is “Understanding the Mystery,” and Lonergan often referred to the thesis as the “Law of 
the Cross.”105  I believe that in this thesis Lonergan explains what he means when 
affirming that Christ suffered “for us” and “in accordance with the mystery of the cross.”  
This is the topic of this part’s fourth chapter, but let me state here that the mystery of the 
cross has to do with accepting the negative consequences of sin in order to transform 
them into a communication to sinners that works to redeem sinners. 
The fourth aspect is that Christ acted or suffered vicariously for sinners.  Early in 
thesis 15, Lonergan defines the term, “vicarious” as acting or suffering “on behalf of 
another, for another, instead of another.”106  Christ’s vicarious suffering and death is an 
important aspect of redemption for Lonergan.107  The fullness of Lonergan’s 
understanding of Christ’s effort as vicarious act is found in his analogy of vicarious 
satisfaction, presented in thesis 16 and examined in the third chapter of this part.  
In thesis 15, there is one further interesting aspect of Lonergan’s use of the word 
“vicarious” or vicarius in Latin.  While he affirms that Christ’s work was vicarious, 
                                                 
104 DVI (trans., Hefling), 468:  “‘Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world’ (Jn 1:29); 
‘to make expiation (hilaskesthai) for the sins of the people’ (Heb 2:17); ‘he is the expiation (hilasmos) for 
our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world’ (1 Jn 2:2).” 
105 DVI (trans., Hefling), 552, translator’s note.  Hefling refers us, “for example” to Lonergan’s 1966 essay, 
“The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical Mindedness,” A Second Collection, 7.  
106 DVI (trans., Hefling), 446.  The Latin is “vice alterius, pro alio, quodammodo loco alterius.” 
107 For his first three Christology courses at the Gregorianum (offered every other year between 1953 and 
1958), Lonergan relied on the manual by Charles Boyer.  During this time, he substituted Boyer’s 
presentation of Christ offering his own satisfaction (propria satisfactio) with a discussion of Christ offering 
vicarious satisfaction (satisfactio vicaria) (Crowe, Christ and History, 65). 
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Lonergan seems to deny that it is one of “substitution” (substitutio/nem).108  He does not, 
however, to my knowledge, clarify the difference between the terms substitutionary and 
vicarious.  Lonergan uses vicarious consistently to modify Christ’s work, but he uses 
substitution to modify non-Christian and mistaken interpretations of Christ’s work.109  In 
thesis 16, substitution is used in the context of punishment, where it seems to completely 
absolve humanity of any work.  Vicarious seems to be about satisfaction as apology, and 
Christ’s vicarious satisfaction seems not to replace but to cooperate with the sinner’s own 
act of satisfaction. 
At stake too is the intentionality behind the act of satisfaction, particularly the 
Father’s intentionality.  By no means does the Father demand satisfaction in the sense of 
some suffering (Christ’s or the sinner’s) as a condition of forgiveness.  Satisfaction is 
proportionate to divine justice, but it is neither a need nor a motive for the redemption.  
Having considered Christ’s suffering and death as working “for sinners,” we now 
turn to it as taking place “on account of sins.”  As Lonergan presents it, there are two 
parts to the doctrine that Christ died on account of sins.  Christ “acts so that sins may be 
taken away, cancelled, blotted out; yet he suffers in that sins have been, are, and will be 
committed.”110 
                                                 
108 Lonergan mentions substitution twice in thesis 15, both times in the context of ransom or price paid.  
First he affirms that substitution is an appropriate translation of the “for” (anti in Greek) in Lk 11:11, which 
he translates: “‘What Father … will instead of a fish give … a serpent? ‘” [DVI (trans., Hefling), 464]  The 
second time Lonergan mentions substitution it is to argue against applying substitution to Christ’s work of 
redemption because it is a pagan interpretation, not appropriately imposed on scripture [DVI (trans., 
Hefling), 466]. 
109 DVI (trans., Hefling), 466. 
110 Ibid., 447. 
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Earlier we affirmed that Christ died for sinners despite their sins; however, it is 
also true that Christ suffers and dies for humanity because of its sins.  This is not to say 
that Christ loves sins.  On the contrary, to say that Christ acts “on account of sins” means 
that Christ acts to remove or to take away sins.  Lonergan explains that this is what is 
meant by the New Testament use of “expiation” or “propitiation” (hilaskesthai,  
hilasmos, or hilastêron in Greek).111  
Lonergan does not explain fully how expiation or propitiation removes sin, but he 
clearly is against a common misunderstanding of expiation or propitiation as acting upon 
God.  He states that this misunderstanding may be attributed to a pagan usage in which 
expiation “appeases” or “placates” a pagan god or gods in order to prevent or to end 
being harmed by the god(s).  This usage is not consonant with the Bible, however.  In 
both the Old and the New Testaments, the priest or the sacrifice makes expiation for sins 
by taking sins away or removing them.  The important point is that, “the action is not on 
God but on sins.”112  God is the one who initiates the mediation of redemption by 
expiation: “God ‘first loved us and sent his Son to be the expiation (hilasmos) for our 
sins’ (1 Jn 4:10).”113  Again, we have Lonergan’s recurrent admonition that Christ’s work 
does not earn God’s favor.  Rather, God’s eternal love—given freely at all times in all 
conditions—is the ultimate, first cause of Christ’s work.114 
                                                 
111 DVI (trans., Hefling), 468:  “‘Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world’ (Jn 1:29); 
‘to make expiation (hilaskesthai) for the sins of the people’ (Heb 2:17); ‘he is the expiation (hilasmos) for 
our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world’ (1 Jn 2:2).” 
112 Ibid.  Cf. “The Redemption,” 15-16.  There, Lonergan considers expiation in the context of sacrifice. 
113 Ibid., 447.  Cf. 486, where Lonergan states that Christ satisfied for the sins of all of humanity.  
114 Ibid., 468.  In this section of the The Incarnate Word, Lonergan discusses the fact that Christ’s vicarious 
suffering and death are part of God’s plan.  He points out that “further questions” can arise regarding the 
Father’s role in the Son’s passion and the reason why the savior came, not in “power and glory” but “in 
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This leads us to a second, more basic but crucial, aspect of Christ’s suffering and 
dying “on account of sin.”  In addition to the fact that Christ suffers to do away with sin, 
sin is the proximate cause of Christ’s passion.  The sins of “Judas, the priests, the crowd, 
Pilate, the soldiers” and all of humanity led to Christ’s affliction.115  Christ also suffers 
from “sins [that] have been, are, and will be committed.”116 
2.4.  Sacrifice 
In an early essay, Lonergan defines sacrifice in general as “a proper symbol of a 
sacrificial attitude.”117  A symbol is an objective manifestation that is both sensible and 
social.  As a sensible manifestation it displays thoughts or feelings in a way perceptible to 
the physical senses.  As a social manifestation it communicates individual or shared 
thoughts and feelings, thus sacrifice manifests socially and perceptibly sacrificial 
thoughts and feelings.  Sacrificial feelings and thoughts are never owed to people but “to 
God alone as Creator, First Agent, Supreme Good, and Ultimate End.”118  Lonergan 
analyzes sacrificial thoughts and feelings in four categories: (1) “latreutic” or worshipful, 
(2) “propitiatory” or repentant of one’s sins, (3) “eucharistic” or thankful for past benefits 
received, and (4) “impetratory” or in petition for benefits to be received.119 
                                                                                                                                                 
suffering flesh.”  We reserve these questions and their answers until the fourth major section of this 
chapter, which covers Lonergan’s thesis 17. 
115 Ibid., 469. Cf. 452. 
116 Ibid., 447.  This is due to his divine knowledge and love. 
117 Bernard Lonergan, “The Notion of Sacrifice,” trans. Michael Shields, Method: Journal of Lonergan 
Studies 19 (2001): 3.  This article is based on a set of materials probably used for teaching a course on the 
Eucharist at the Collège de l’Immaculée-Conception in Montreal in 1943-44 and/or a seminar on the 
Eucharist there the following year, and/or a series of lectures on the Eucharist at the Thomas Moore 
Institute in the same year (“Translator’s Introduction,” 1) 
118 Ibid.  In particular, it is the worship aspect of sacrifice that makes it proper to give sacrifice to God 
alone.  
119 Ibid. 
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In “The Redemption,” Lonergan writes that for Catholics there can be  “no doubt 
whatever” that Christ’s work is a sacrifice.  However, he treats sacrifice with some 
concern, noting both the difficulty in trying to understand “the precise sense in which 
there is a sacrifice” and that “clearly the notion of sacrifice is not an intelligibility that 
exhausts the meaning of the redemption.”120 
As is his habit, Lonergan’s approach to sacrifice is faith seeking understanding.  
He first establishes scriptural passages that explicitly or implicitly call Christ’s passion a 
sacrifice.  Explicitly we have, for example, “‘Christ our Pasch has been sacrificed’ (1 
Cor. 5:7).  Again, ‘Christ offered himself up as a sacrifice of sweet odor’ (Eph. 5:2).”  
Implicitly we have “in 1 Corinthians, chapter 11, on the institution of the Eucharist: ‘This 
is my body which is given for you; this is my blood which is to be shed for you for the 
remission of sin.’”121   
In “The Redemption,” Lonergan discusses how the Greek hilakesthai can be 
translated as “sacrifice.”  In The Incarnate Word, as seen in the previous section, 
Lonergan preferred the words “expiation” and “propitiation” when translating 
hilakesthai.  Whether translated as sacrifice or expiation/propitiation, Lonergan 
distinguishes between two possible, divergent contexts for understanding hilakesthai: in 
the Septuagint as “something that removes sin” or in classical Greek, where it “means to 
                                                 
120 “The Redemption,” 15-16. 
121 Ibid., 15, referring to 1 Cor. 11:25.  Lonergan does not seem to have written much on the Eucharist in 
the context of redemption.  He mentions its institution in scripture and cites Mt 26:28, Mk 14:24, Lk. 22:20, 
and 1 Cor. 11:25 [DVI (trans., Hefling), 474].  He defers to Thomas’s treatment of it in the context of 
sacrifice in Summa Theologica III, q. 48, a.3 [DVI (trans., Hefling), 485]. 
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placate the gods, to avert their anger or vengeance.”122  As in his examination of 
vicarious suffering, but even more strongly here, Lonergan argues that hilakesthai in the 
New Testament is to be understood according to the Septuagint/Hebrew context, and 
consequently as operating on sin, rather than on “the feelings of a god.”123  Lonergan 
does not explain how sacrifice operates on sin.  Theses 16 and 17 may shed light on this, 
however.  In both theses, sin and its consequences do not become the causes of further sin 
and suffering.  Instead, they are transformed into goods, as we shall see. 
Finally, in this essay, Lonergan notes the connection of Christ’s death and 
resurrection to the liturgy, prayer, and piety.  This connection is helpful for understanding 
Christ’s work; however, Christ’s work is “not simply a ritual act, but his own suffering 
and death and glorious resurrection.”124 
In thesis 15 of The Incarnate Word, Lonergan examines carefully the Letter to the 
Hebrews, where “above all it is… that the death of Christ is presented as a sacrifice.”125  
First Lonergan analyzes sacrifice in general according to six components: (1) the effect 
which is the remission of sins, sanctification, and the ability to approach God in 
confidence; (2) the recipients: people on whose behalf sacrifice is made; (3) the agent, 
designated as “priest;” (4) the sufferer, or the passive sacrificial victim or offering; (5) the 
action, or the offering of a victim by a priest; (6) the foundation, a covenant or testament 
                                                 
122 “The Redemption,” 15.  Lonergan credits the then Cambridge professor  C. H. Dodd, “Hilakesthai, its 
Cognates, Derivatives, and Synonyms, in the Septuagint,” The Journal of Theological Studies 30 (1930-
31): 352-60.  See also DVI (trans., Hefling), 468 
123 “The Redemption,”  16.   
124 Ibid.  Curiously, Lonergan does not mention the Eucharist in this section or the entire essay. 
125 Ibid., 15. 
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by which a priest is selected from the people to act on their behalf.126  This analysis is 
based loosely on Heb 5:1-2. 
Lonergan then applies this general analysis to four sets of old and new—an old 
and a new covenant, mediator, priesthood, and sacrifice.  Both covenants were entered 
into by sacrifice, but while the old covenant was entered into by the blood of an animal, 
the second was by the blood of Christ.127  According to the book of Jeremiah, the new 
covenant would enable all people to know God and God’s law inwardly.  Furthermore, by 
this new covenant God and all people would belong to each other, and God would 
remember the sins of humanity no more.128  In comparing the mediators of the covenants, 
Moses was faithful with the faith of a servant of God, while Christ is faithful with the 
faith of the Son of God (who nonetheless was “like us in all respects apart from sin”).129   
Third, Hebrews compares the priesthoods of the mediators of the covenants.  The 
old Levitical priesthood contained many priests who were mortal, took no oaths, and 
sacrificed for their own sins in a sanctuary made by human hands.  Christ, on the other 
hand, is a unique and everlastingly priest, who inhabits a priesthood constituted by divine 
oath, and who remains perfectly unstained in his heavenly exaltation.130  Fourth, the 
sacrifices made by the priests who mediate the covenants are compared.  The older 
sacrifices, made under the law were shadows of Christ’s sacrifice.  They were temporary 
and cleansed only the flesh, not the consciences of sinners.  Furthermore, they could not 
take away sins.  The sacrifice of Christ is permanent, cleanses consciences, and removes 
                                                 
126 DVI (trans., Hefling), 471. 
127 Ibid., 471-72.  Lonergan refers to Ex 24:8, Heb 9:19-21 
128 Ibid., 472, quoting Heb 8:8-12; Jer 31:31-34. 
129 Ibid., citing Heb 1:2-3, 2:14-17, 3:2-6. 
130 Ibid, 472-73; citing or quoting Heb 5:3-6; 7:16-17, 20-21, 23-24, and 26-28; and 9:6-7 and 24-26. 
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people’s transgressions.131  Furthermore, Christ’s sacrifice is “‘once for all’” “‘offered 
for all time a single sacrifice for sins.’”132  Thus our sins are remembered no more.  
Finally, Christ’s sacrifice is unique because in it Christ is both the priest who actively
offers sacrifice and the offering passively being made.  Christ’s sacrifice is a free self-
offering, not an appease
 
ment.133 
                                                
2.5.  Meritorious Obedience 
Scripture and tradition affirm that Christ mediated redemption through his free, 
meritorious obedience to his father’s commands—an obedience even unto death.134  How 
is this obedience to be understood? What does it do if it is not an appeasement?  Does the 
Father force the Son to die?  Is there a good reason for the Father’s command or is it 
capricious?  Is Christ’s meritorious obedience to be understood like the tricks a dog 
performs for a biscuit?  
These are questions that Lonergan does not settle in this section, though he gives 
us some clues.  The first is his broadening of command and obedience to include all of 
Christ’s works, not simply his suffering and death.  Indeed, Christ’s very existence as 
incarnate is a command in the sense of an act proceeding from the Father.  God the Father 
sent the Son on a mission to save the human race.135  This mission is achieved in both the 
person of the Son and in his human acts.  Insofar as the mission regards Christ’ person, it 
 
131 Ibid., 473-74; citing or quoting Heb 9:9-10, 13-15, 28; 10-1-2, 4-7, 10, 14, and 17-18.  What it means to 
take away sins or to remove transgressions, I am not sure.  It cannot mean that God pretends they never 
happened, for this would make God dishonest.  My guess is that it heals the world of the negative 
consequences of sin.  More specifically, it promotes reconciliation among persons estranged by sin. 
132 Ibid., 473-74; quoting, respectively, Heb 10:10 and 10:12.  
133 See Ibid., 466-67. 
134 Ibid. 478.  Lonergan adduces: Jn 10:17; Mt 26:39-44, 53-54; Rom 5:19; Phil 2:8-9; DB 790, 799, 820, 
842, 843; DS 1513, 1529, 1560, 1582, 1583; and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q. 48, a. 1. 
135 Ibid., 475, citing Gal 4:4-5 and Rom 8:3-4.  The “even unto death” comes from Phil 2:8-9. 
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flows from the Son’s eternal procession from the Father and “an appropriate external 
term.”136  To the extent that the mission regards Christ’s human acts, it flows from a 
relationship with the Father that scripture refers to with the words “command” and 
“obedience.”137 
Following Thomas, Lonergan defines obedience as being “moved by another 
through reason and will,” and, conversely, “to command is to move another through 
reason and will.”138  This definition is of fundamental importance for understanding the 
relationship of the Father and the Son in the Son’s mission of redemption. 
On hearing that Christ suffered and died out of obedience, a contemporary 
Western reader (formed by individualism, human rights, and other ideas of the 
Enlightenment and modern liberalism) might to come to believe that the Father forced or 
coerced the Son to act against the Son’s will in a manner that violated the Son’s freedom.  
On the contrary, Christ’s suffering and death (as well as his life and resurrection) were 
acts of both perfect obedience and perfect freedom.  Freedom and obedience can coexist 
in one act.  “That this obedience on Christ’s part was free is proved by the explicit 
statement of Christ (Jn 10:17), by his repeated prayer and submission (Mt 26:39-44), and 
by the possibility of his avoiding his suffering (Mt 26:53-54).”139 
                                                 
136 Ibid.  Here Lonergan refers the reader to his works Divinarum Personarum, pp. 206ff, or De Deo Trino, 
II, pp. 226ff [chapter 6, assertion 17].  An English version of the latter has been published as The Triune 
God, trans. Michael Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).  See also Insight, 661-62. 
137 “Christ’s obedience in accepting his suffering and death is mentioned both in the gospels (Mk 14:36 and 
parallels) and by Paul (Phil 2:8, Rom 5:19)” (Ibid., 476). “Christ testified that he had commands from his 
Father: a command regarding what to say and what to speak (Jn 12:49), a command to lay down his life and 
to take it up again (Jn 10:17-18), and others besides (Jn 15:10)” [DVI (trans., Hefling), 475]. 
138 DVI (trans., Hefling), citing Thomas’s Summa Theologica II-II, q. 104, a. 1 and III, q. 47, a. 2 ad 1m; a. 
3 c. 
139 Ibid., 479. 
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 How can this be?  How can Christ be both obedient and free?  The possibility 
relies on the fact that command and obedience work through the intelligences and wills of 
the persons commanding and obeying.  The Father does not force or coerce the Son 
against what he knows and chooses.  The Father works with and through Christ’s 
knowledge and choice.  How?  Persuasion?  No, something more intimate.  The key is the 
perfect intimacy, the perfect unity, shared by the Father and the Son.  The key to this 
unity is the love they share.  Christ is and was free to do as he pleased.  Christ could have 
chosen a comfortable life of obscurity, but because he loved the Father, what he was 
pleased to do was what the Father willed for him to do, i.e. to fulfill the Father’s plan for 
human salvation.  Thus, Christ’s “food was to do the will of him who sent him and to 
accomplish his work (Jn 4:34).”140 
Consequently, when Lonergan mentions obedience, he often pairs it with love.141  
He may go so far as to identify obedience with love: “Thomas says it best when he relates 
the love and the obedience of Christ in a way that in some sense reduces them to one: ‘He 
[Christ] fulfilled the commandments of charity out of obedience, and was obedient out of 
his love for the Father who had given him the command.’”142  Obedience in this sense is 
a unity of heart and mind, a free choice and personal desire to do what one’s beloved
knows is good and desires to be done. 
 
                                                
Christ’s suffering and death alone are not redemptive; it is his suffering and death 
out of love and obedience that merits redemption, provides satisfaction, and is the 
 
140 Ibid., 475. 
141 Ibid., 455, 532, 537, 541, 543-44, and 556. 
142 Ibid., 479, citing Summa Theologica III, q. 47, a. 2 ad 3m. 
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principle of the Law of the Cross.  Satisfaction and the Law of the Cross are the topics of 
futures chapters, but let us turn briefly to the meritorious aspect of obedience.  Lonergan 
accepts as a matter of “defined faith” that Christ’s obedience is meritorious of our 
salvation.143  He sums up this teaching: 
For merit is a deed worthy of reward.  But Paul gives Christ’s obedience “unto 
death, even death on a cross,” as the basis of the exaltation that followed (Phil 2:8-9).  
The letter to Hebrews states that he is “crowned with glory and honor because of the 
suffering of death” (Heb 2:9).  The letter to the Romans teaches that “by one man’s 
obedience many will be made righteous” (Rom 5:19).  Hence Thomas (ST, III, q. 48, a. 1) 
and all theologians teach that Christ caused our salvation by way of merit.144 
 
Anticipating the possible objection that all of Christ’s activity is meritorious, not 
simply his acts of obedience, Lonergan affirms that all of Christ’s acts are acts of 
obedience and love, beginning with his coming as human, continuing in his all his 
teachings, and finding fulfillment in his suffering and his death.145 
Despite the fact that Christ’s love and obedience pervaded his whole life, 
scripture affirms that Christ “learned obedience” and was “made perfect” by his suffering 
(Heb 2:10, 5:8).  Lonergan’s interpretation of these passages is ingenious and perhaps 
original.   He writes that Christ’s passion is an act not only of the intellect and will, but of 
the whole person, including the body.  The body has its own desires.146  Consequently, it 
is one thing to know and to will an act and another to do it.  Christ had perfect unity of 
heart and mind with God, and at the same time he was like us in every respect but sin.  
He lived in the flesh and was tempted as we are.  In carrying out his free decision to obey 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 478., citing DB 790, 799, 820, 842, 843; DS 1513, 1529, 1560, 1582, 1583. 
144 Ibid., 478-79.  In addition, Lonergan notes here that merit is fitting, because “it is appropriate for an 
operation carried out at someone else’s command to be rewarded in a special way by the one who 
commanded it.”   
145 Ibid., 479 and 475-6.  One might also say that all of Christ’s acts are the Father’s acts, due to their unity 
of love. 
146 This was discussed under “sensitive spontaneity” in Ch. 1, section 1.3.3. 
 
 201
the Father, Christ overcame his temptation and “his being distressed, troubled, and 
sorrowful even unto death (Mk 14:33-34).”147  In doing so, he did not grow in his infused 
virtue, but exercised these virtues to perfection.  Thus, by conforming his whole being, 
body and soul, to his love, Christ “learned obedience” and by exercising his virtuous, 
loving obedience even unto death, Christ was “made perfect.”   
Furthermore, in a 1963 address at the Thomas Moore Institute in Montreal, 
Lonergan argued that Christ was made perfect not for himself, but for us.  As a divine 
person, it would have been more suitable for him to have been born rich and to be 
honored, but Christ chose 
the perfection of a person who lives a life of poverty and suffering, who dies in 
abandonment, unjustly and cruelly.  Christ chose and decided to perfect himself in the 
manner in which he did because of us.  We think of the way of the cross primarily as the 
cross of Christ.  But primarily the way of the cross is the way in which fallen nature 
acquires its perfection.  We attain resurrection through death because death is the wages of 
sin, and death entered into the world through sin.148 
 
 More on this will be said in chapter four on the “Law of the Cross,” but let us say 
now that Christ chose to perfect himself through suffering, through lovingly accepting the 
consequences because he knew that this was the way that sinful humanity would be able 
to stop individual and social spirals of sin and violence.  Christ chose this way to mediate 
or to communicate this fact to us incarnately, by deeds and example. 
2.6.  The Risen Lord and Eternal Priest 
 Christ’s work of mediating redemption to the world does not end with his death 
on the cross.  It continues in his resurrection and in his life eternal.  Lonergan goes so far 
                                                 
147 Ibid., 477. 
148 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964, 180-81, 
emphasis added. 
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as to say that to abstract Christ’s resurrection from redemption would be similar to 
abstracting “foot” from “animal.”149  The one can only be understood in relation to the 
other.  Christ could not have risen without first dying, and Christ’s death is for the 
purpose of the resurrection.  Lonergan cites Jn 10:27-18 on the fact that Christ “laid down 
his life so that he could take it up again.”150  To speak of Christ’s death is always to 
speak “about that concrete death which the Lord intended and chose and suffered—a 
death leading to resurrection so that death might be conquered and destroyed by 
death.”
f 
s risen.  
role in redemption is more apparent after 
onergan 
                                                
151 
More specifically, when interpreting the cross through all of the above ways o
thinking—of redemption for us on account of sin, as paying a price, as vicarious, as 
sacrifice, and as meritorious obedience—one must consider this death not simply as any 
death but as the death of one who will be raised.  Conversely, when considering the risen 
Christ, we cannot forget his death.  However, there are certain aspects of redemption that 
are more easily observed in the crucified Christ and others more salient in Christ a
For example, Lonergan writes, it is easier to attend to Christ’s passive role when 
meditating on his crucifixion, while his active 
he has risen.  What exactly is this risen role?  
 Lonergan presents four aspects of this role.  The first is sanctification.  L
summarizes that Christ “‘was put to death for our trespasses and raised for our 
justification’ (Rom 4:25); because of this justification, ‘your life is hid with Christ in 
 
149 DVI (trans., Hefling), 480.  
150 Ibid.   
151 Ibid. 
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God’ (Col 3:3); and without this resurrection and justification we should still be in our 
sins, for ‘if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins’ (1 
Cor 15
st 
ot 
r us 
rawn towards love for God the Father through his 
carna
e 
ity that the Father 
                             
:17).”152   
The second is as eternal Priest.  This is distinct from Christ’s role as High Prie
who offers himself as sacrifice for our sins.  As eternal Priest, Christ “has obtained a 
more excellent ministry (Heb 8:6), and is ‘seated at the right hand of the throne of the 
Majesty in heaven, a minister in the sanctuary and the true tabernacle which is set up n
by man but by the Lord’ (Heb 8:1-2).  There he appears in the presence of God fo
(Heb 9:24).”153  The term “eternal Priest” is an analogical way of discussing the 
interpersonal nature of how “we are d
in te Son in the Holy Spirit.”154 
 The third aspect of the risen Christ’s role, intercession, is initiated just before 
Christ’s death in his prayer to his Father.  Announcing that he will soon be leaving the 
world, Christ prays in petition that humanity may be sanctified in truth, protected from 
the evil one, but above all, that its members may be one with each other and one with th
Father and Christ.  This is a unity in love and glory, sharing in the un
and Son have enjoyed since before the foundation of the world.155 
 The fourth aspect of Christ’s role as risen Lord and eternal Priest, is his sending of 
the Holy Spirit.  Christ “breathed on the apostles so that they might receive the Spirit and 
                    
482. 
m Personarum, pp. 229-239, or De Deo Trino, II, pp. 249-259 
eference to Jn., Ch 17.  See also section 4.3.5.2., below. 
152 Ibid., 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 483.  Lonergan refers us to Divinaru
[Chapter 6, Question 32 and Assertion 18]. 
155 Ibid., with r
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have power to forgive sins (Jn 20:22-23).”156  By this Spirit we are made into children of 
God, able to call on God as Father (Gal. 4:5, Rom 8:15), and it was only after Christ had 
f 
 
 of the Cross—the topics of Lonergan’s theses 16 and 17 and of 
the next two chapters.  
                                                
departed to his glory that we received the Spirit (Jn 7:39, 16:7).157 
 This concludes our exposition of Lonergan’s thesis 15.  Lonergan wrote that this 
thesis treated “the teaching of the New Testament.”158 Our contention is the teaching o
the New Testament is a teaching through likeness in the manner of analogy.  Its basic
analogies reveal aspects of the mystery of redemption.  On these basic analogies, or 
metaphors, Lonergan builds with the more complicated and controlled analogies of 
satisfaction and the Law
 
156 Ibid., 484. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., 445. 
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Chapter 3.  Christ’s Work as Satisfaction:   
A Communication Primarily to God 
 
 
 
 
 Although he is very aware of the serious difficulties surrounding the notion of 
satisfaction, Lonergan believes that it is an issue that must be faced.  Toward the 
beginning of thesis 16 of The Incarnate Word, he presents briefly the history of official 
church teaching on the matter.  The teaching is clear but minimal.  The Council of Trent 
affirms that by Christ’s “most holy Passion on the wood of the cross” he “merited 
satisfaction for us” and “made satisfaction for us to God the Father.”159  From Leo XIII, 
Lonergan adds that satisfaction is by Christ’s blood and of the Father’s violated 
majesty.160  From Vatican I we have the addition that divine justice is what Christ 
satisfied.161  Furthermore, human persons are not simply passive, vicarious recipients of 
satisfaction.  We are to satisfy for our sins and thus to be made like Christ.162 
Due to these teachings, Lonergan takes satisfaction as a given yet to be 
understood.  But what exactly does it mean to say that by his blood and passion Christ 
satisfied divine justice and the Father’s majesty?163  Satisfaction is an analogy.  It is a 
way of understanding the mystery of redemption by likeness.  And as Lonergan 
understands it, it is a helpful, overarching way of grasping and relating the scriptural 
analogies presented above:  redemption, price paid, sacrifice, meritorious obedience, and 
                                                 
159 Ibid., 487, quoting from DB 904; DS 1690. 
160 Ibid., quoting from Acta Apostolicae Sedis 33 (1900-1901): 275 
161 Ibid., citing Collectio Lacensis Conciliorum Recentiorum, VII, 561a, 566c. 
162 Ibid., quoting from the council of Trent, DB 904; DS 1690. 
163 Lonergan notes that satisfaction is presumed but not defined by the council of Trent [DVI (trans., 
Hefling), 488]. 
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passion for us and for our sins.164   
Satisfaction is not only a higher intelligibility or a more encompassing analogy, it 
is an intelligibility of fittingness.  As we saw earlier,165 redemption is a mystery in the 
Persian/Hebrew sense of God’s “wise plan.”  According to Lonergan, satisfaction is not 
absolutely or hypothetically necessary, but it is supremely fitting, appropriate, or prudent.  
Thus, one way of phrasing the question for this chapter is:  How is Christ’s satisfaction 
wise and fitting?   
The search for understanding of Christ’s satisfaction is not purely academic.  If 
we are to follow Christ and to be made like him in satisfaction, it is important that we 
know what satisfaction is and how it is fitting.  There are consequences to our 
understanding. 
Satisfaction is a difficult and controversial term.  In this chapter we seek to shed 
some light on the issue, first by distinguishing between Anselm’s thought on satisfaction 
and a later perversion of Anselm’s thought called “satispassion.”  Once these have been 
clarified and contrasted, we can turn to Lonergan’s helpful theory of satisfaction as an 
analogy for understanding the redemption and, in particular, the role of Christ’s 
crucifixion. 
3.1.  The Context:  Satisfaction vs. Satispassion 
3.1.1.  Satispassion, a Misunderstanding 
The cross is popularly understood to be a punishment that Christ bore in the place 
of humanity, a kind of payment to God or the devil for our sins.  In gratitude and 
                                                 
164 DVI (trans., Hefling), 488, 491, 537-39. 
165 See sections 1.1. and 1.2.1. of this chapter. 
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sympathy, we bear our small crosses just as Christ bore the sins of all humanity.  But 
there are problems with this image.  It has been criticized, particularly by feminist and 
liberation theologians, for portraying God as a petty, even sadistic, tyrant.  If it is God 
who receives Christ’s punishment as payment, then divine love and forgiveness seem 
conditional.  If it is the devil, then God seems not to be omnipotent.166 This has 
implications for human relations. Those in power, thinking they are imitating God the 
Father, impose suffering cruelly.  Conversely, people who are unjustly oppressed may 
believe they are imitating the Son of God by tolerating and sometimes even seeking 
suffering. 
 Rita Nakashima Brock, a mixed-race, American Protestant feminist theologian, 
has documented well this problem.  Years of work as a counselor to women and children 
who have been victims of “racism, sexism, rape, homophobia, gang violence, poverty, 
drugs, child abuse, and incest,” have given Brock first-hand experience of injustice linked 
to a poor understanding of the cross.167  She writes: 
[The] loving father sends his son to be killed and the innocent, obedient son went without 
complaint.  This union of love and violence is the false trap for women and children 
created by battering relationships in which, for centuries, the church preached 
acquiescence to abuse and forgiveness of perpetrators without accountability.…  Jesus, 
depicted as an innocent lamb taken to slaughter for us, reinforces the idea that abuse is all 
right for a good reason.  Structures of oppression and violence become acceptable, if they 
serve a good purpose.  If divine child abuse, to save humanity is acceptable, and human 
parents are to obey the example set by the Father, then violence against children and 
women can be justified on the same grounds as has been the case in the Christian 
tradition.168 
 
                                                 
166 DVI, (trans., Hefling), 498. 
167 Rita Nakashima Brock, "Losing Your Innocence But Not Your Hope," Reconstructing the Christ 
Symbol, ed. by Maryanne Stevens (NY:  Paulist Press, 1993), 35. 
168 Rita Nakashima Brock, “The Greening of the Soul: A Feminist Theological Paradigm of the Web of 
Life,” Setting the Table, Women in Theological Conversation, ed. Rita Nakashima Brock, et. al. (St. Louis, 
MO:  Chalice Press, 1996), 146-47. 
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Injustices rationalized by a misguided imitation of the Father’s role in redemption 
and of the Son’s role are called, respectively, “Christian sadism” and “Christian 
masochism” by the German Protestant liberation theologian, Dorothea Sölle.  Suffering 
understood in a sado-masochistic context views all suffering as good, as “there to break 
our pride,” “to be a test, sent by God, that we are required to pass,” “a punishment that 
follows earlier sins” and/or “a refining from which we come out purified.”169  Either to 
avoid punishment in hell or to grow in holiness, Christians sometimes not only bear 
unnecessary suffering but seek it out.  “Submission as a source of pleasure—that is 
Christian masochism.”170 
As bad as this is, worse still is Christian, or “theological,” sadism.  It holds that 
God, as all-powerful, is the cause of all suffering, and God, as just, gives only the amount 
of suffering that is deserved.  It sums up atonement in the sentence “the first person of the 
Trinity casts out and annihilates the second.”171  A Christian imitation of God the Father 
that is based on this misunderstanding of the Father’s relationship to human suffering 
results in human sadism according to Sölle.  “The ultimate conclusion of theological 
sadism is worshiping the executioner.”172 
The atonement theory at the basis of Sölle’s criticism of “Christian sadism” and 
“Christian masochism” and of Brock’s criticism of “divine child abuse” is commonly 
called “substitutionary penal atonement” or “vicarious penal atonement.”  The theory 
reduces Christ’s work to a simple exchange, the payment of a debt, intended to appease 
                                                 
169 Dorothea Sölle, Suffering, trans. Everett Kalin (Philadelphia, PA:  Fortress Press, 1975), 19. 
170 Ibid., 22. 
171 Ibid., 27. 
172 Ibid., 28. 
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the Father’s wrath.  According to this way of thinking, human sin is disobeying God and 
a blow to divine honor.  It creates a debt that someone must pay.  God responds to sin 
primarily, if not exclusively, with wrath, and he demands human punishment to appease 
this wrath.  The punishment is death.  Only this can make God happy.  For some 
inscrutable or arbitrary reason, the Father commands that the Son take our place and be 
punished in our stead.  The Son obeys.  He atones for our sins by taking our punishment. 
The central problem with substitutionary penal atonement is its emphasis on 
punishment.173  It insists that Christ was punished to a degree sufficient to earn God’s 
forgiving love.  This theory Lonergan calls “satispassion,” thus highlighting helpfully the 
difference between it and satisfaction.174  The fullness of Lonergan’s distinction between 
the two is given in his definition of divine justice and its relation to punishment (to follow 
in section 3.2.1). 
3.1.2.  Anselm’s Satisfaction 
Despite the real distinction between satisfaction and substitutionary penal 
atonement, they are often confused.  Anselm of Canterbury is typically credited with or 
blamed for the theory of satisfaction, particularly because of his work Cur Deus Homo?  
However, Lonergan,175 Lonergan scholars,176 and other theologians,177 believe that 
                                                 
173 As we shall see in section four, Lonergan follows Thomas in integrating satisfaction with punishment, 
however, this depends on a particular definition of punishment as well as the stipulation that punishment 
plays a role subordinate to the “moral compensation” of apologizing for an offense. 
174 DVI (trans., Hefling), 494.  The translator’s note states that satis-factio is “doing enough” while satis-
passio is “having enough done to one.”  See also Roy, 525. 
175 Lonergan,  “The Redemption,” 8, 13, 19-20. 
176 For example: Hefling, “A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement,” 55, 60; Louis Roy, “The Death of 
Jesus:  Its Universal Impact,” New Blackfriars 83 (2002):  521, 525. 
177 For example: D. Bentley Hart, ‘A Gift Exceeding Every Debt:  An Eastern Orthodox Appreciation of 
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo,” Pro Ecclesia VII, 3:  333-39. 
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Anselm himself, while not free of difficulties, is not directly to blame for the idea of 
substitutionary penal atonement. 
Anselm does introduce a conception of atonement in which satisfaction plays the 
central role, although for Anselm satisfaction is the payment not of a debt of suffering but 
of a debt of obedience.  Obedience, for Anselm as well as for Lonergan, does not 
necessarily involve punishment.  In fact, Anselm holds strictly that satisfaction is the 
alternative to punishment.178 
Here is his theory in brief:  All that humanity has, it has been given by God.  
Humans owe God everything, particularly their lives lived in obedience.  Sin withholds 
this from God, creating an infinite debt, due to the infinite dignity of God.  This is a debt 
that humanity as sinful should pay but as finite and, already owing all it has to God, 
cannot.  God as infinite could pay but as innocent of sin should not.  What is needed is a 
savior who combines human obligation with divine ability, the human “should” with the 
divine “could.”  The savior must be a “God-Man.”  Christ as divine and thus infinite can 
pay, and as human, he should.  This Christ does.  He freely offers his life, which is of 
infinite worth, to God.  Christ does not suffer in punishment.  He offers God a 
satisfactory gift, his unowed life—unowed because he did not sin.  Christ’s gift satisfies 
humanity’s debt.179  Christ “does enough” rather than “suffers enough.”  Thus, Anselm’s 
theory may be called one of satisfaction, while vicarious penal atonement is better called 
satispassion.180 
                                                 
178 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?  Bk. I, Chs. xii-xix, Bk. II Ch. xvii-xviii.  
179 Ibid., Bk. I, Ch.viii; Bk. 2, Ch. xi. 
180 DVI (trans., Hefling), 498. 
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The difference between satisfaction and satispassion is the central difference 
between Anselm’s theory and substitutionary penal atonement theory.  But there are other 
differences:  Anselm’s theory is not penal since in his theory God does not punish at all 
let alone to a degree that satisfies divine wrath.  God is satisfied by Christ’s free and 
obedient offering of his life. Satisfaction is set up as an alternative to punishment.  For 
Anselm satisfaction is only partially substitutionary, in that Christ provides the 
satisfaction that humanity owes, but human persons are to take part in the redemption by 
personal contrition, confession of sins, and forgiving others.  His thought certainly 
regards atonement, and it is probably the first beginnings of a theory of atonement, for it 
aims not merely to proclaim the effects of atonement, but to explain how it works. 
While not all charges leveled against Anselm are true, the analogy of exchange 
remains problematic.  Satisfaction is necessary to pay a debt to God’s honor.  This 
necessity makes God’s love seem subordinate to, if not eclipsed by, God’s justice.  Its 
emphasis on a debt to God’s honor makes God seem petty.  Its demand for a satisfaction 
of this debt makes salvation appear to require a change in God, as if God’s forgiveness 
were contingent.181  The stress on God’s honor obscures the historical and human factors 
that put Jesus to death:  the misunderstanding, fear, and envy of religious and secular 
authorities, as well as the complicity of “the crowd.”  Anselm’s focus on the “necessity” 
of a God-Man makes God seem constrained to redeem humanity, and it makes humanity 
seem almost one-sidedly passive in the work of redemption.  Finally, Anselm’s strict 
                                                 
181 Though to be fair, Anselm does maintain that God is not dishonored in himself, but rather that he 
“appears” to be dishonored in relation to us.  Sin and satisfaction do not produce a change in God (See 
Anselm, Cur Deus Homo? Bk. I, Ch. xi). 
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choice of either punishment or satisfaction goes against scripture and tradition, which 
affirms that Christ in some ways was punished in that through death he paid the penalty 
of sin. 
Lonergan’s treatment of satisfaction attempts to resolve such issues as God’s 
justice seeming greater than God’s love, God’s love seeming contingent, salvation 
through suffering seeming necessary, and humanity’s role appearing merely passive.  It 
attempts to do so in a satisfying, systematic way while remaining faithful to traditional 
Christian doctrine.182 
3.2.  Lonergan’s Satisfaction:  A Communication of Detestation and Sorrow  
Despite its problems, Lonergan retains the notion of satisfaction, both because it 
accounts for such scriptural assertions as Christ died “on account of sins,”183 and because 
it is a way to preserve what Christ did for us as God.  One alternative to satisfaction is the 
“exemplarist” view, by which Christ’s death becomes simply another martyrdom, a tragic 
loss of life for some cause, a loss that inspires others to improve their behavior.184  By the 
exemplarist model, Christ need not have been divine; his death, while tragic and 
inspiring, would not differ in any meaningful way from, for example, the death of 
                                                 
182  There are many possible mistakes in addition to Anslem’s flat denial of punishment.  Brock and Sölle 
make excellent contributions in their critiques of vicarious penal atonement by exposing the social nature of 
sin and recovering a need for human agency, but they do not offer constructive, systematic replacements.  
And unfortunately, their deconstruction of mistaken elements in the tradition is accompanied by denial of 
some rather fundamental doctrines.  Brock finds Christ’s death a tragedy without salvific value,  “Jesus did 
not die to save us.  He died because the political, patriarchal powers of his day saw the danger of his life 
and his movement to their system of oppression.  We are saved by the resurrection community….  This 
resurrection community is ourselves.  We are called to be the wise and willful saving remnant that refuses 
to give up even when we are afraid.  No one else can stop the suffering in our world but our own courage 
and willingness to act in the midst of the awareness of our own fragility.  No one else can die for us” 
(Losing, 50).  Sölle holds simply that the presence of suffering in the world indicates that God is not 
omnipotent (Suffering, 25). 
183 DVI (trans., Hefling), 550. 
184 Hefling, “A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement,” 54-55. 
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Socrates.185  Such an exemplarist view would disregard numerous New Testament 
images of ransom, sacrifice, payment of a price, and expiation.186 
                                                
While acknowledging its problems, Lonergan makes the best of satisfaction in 
thesis 16 of The Incarnate Word, “Christ’s Satisfaction.”  His effort involves an 
oftentimes bewildering array of distinctions and relations.  I believe two are of the 
greatest significance.  They can be considered as organizing principles for his overall 
reflection on satisfaction.  Thus, we organize this presentation of Lonergan on 
satisfaction in two parts:  (1) the relation of satisfaction to divine justice and to different 
types of punishment, and (2) a contextualization of punishment, divine justice, and 
satisfaction within the interpersonal relationship called friendship.187 
Lonergan approaches Christ’s satisfaction by first building general tools in 
“Preliminary notes,” and then applying them to Christ’s work in the final one fifth of the 
thesis.  We follow this procedure here. 
3.2.1.  Satisfaction and Divine Justice 
 After presenting Anselm’s notion of satisfaction and rescuing it from the common 
misinterpretation as substitutionary penal atonement, Lonergan focuses on a further 
 
185 DVI (trans., Hefling), 452.  This is not to say that Jesus is not an example.  His work is not simply to be 
an example, but this is an important aspect of his work and his relation to us.  We shall examine Lonergan’s 
views on this in section 4.3.3.  I believe that one analogy for understanding the importance of example is 
through athletics.  Occasionally an athlete will break an old record that seemed unbreakable.  Often when 
this occurs many successive athletes will break this record.  It seems that the original record-breaker not 
only provides an image to emulate, but a freeing of the imagination, an expansion of horizon that promotes 
self-transcendence.  In this sense an example has a real effect that is subjective, but also objective.  It is 
empowering. 
186 Cf. Hefling, 54-55. 
187 In both moves, Lonergan follows Thomas Aquinas to a great degree.  To what degree is important, but it 
is not our focus here.  Our purpose is to gain some understanding of redemption by gaining some 
understanding of Lonergan’s understanding. For more on Lonergan’s original contribution, see Hefling’s 
“A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement” referenced above. 
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problem with Anselm’s satisfaction—the problem of integrating Anselm’s satisfaction 
with “the whole of tradition” which taught that Christ was punished or paid a penalty.188  
Whereas Anselm had attempted to maintain divine justice by his strict disjunction:  either 
punishment or satisfaction,  Lonergan seeks to integrate Anselm’s satisfaction with the 
traditional understanding of Christ having been punished.  Such an integration runs the 
risk of a possibly mistaken notion of divine justice, as shown by satispassion, which is a 
possible yet harmful attempt at integration.  By distinguishing different types of 
punishments and different contexts for punishments, Lonergan is able to integrate 
punishment with satisfaction while preserving divine justice.  We shall examine first two 
types of punishments and then two contexts for these punishments. 
3.2.1.1.  The Divine Will, World Order, and Punishment 
Did the Father punish the Son to satisfy for humanity’s sins?  Yes and no, 
depending on one’s definition of punishment.  Lonergan’s answer begins with the general 
order of the universe as related to God’s will:  (1) God directly wills what is good and 
only what is good, (2) God does not in any way will “basic sin” but permits it, and (3) 
God indirectly wills “moral evil.”189  
The good (bonum in the original Latin) is God and all of created being insofar as 
it participates in divine goodness.  Basic sin is malum culpae, also translated as “evil of 
fault” or “inner sin.”  This would be what contemporary language understands as a sinful 
                                                 
188 DVI (trans., Hefling), 520-21:  “According to scripture (Gen 2:17, 3:19; Wis 2:24; Rom 5:12, 6:23; 
compare 1 Cor 15:21-22, 15:26; Heb 2:14-15) death is the penalty of sin.  But Christ died.  Therefore 
Christ paid the penalty of sin.” 
189 Lonergan discusses this triad several places, including DVI (trans., Hefling), 514-515, 518, 544, and 
“The Redemption,” 12. DVI (trans., Hefling), 514.  In this Lonergan follows Thomas, and he cites 
Thomas’s Summa Theologica, I, q. 19, a. 9 c. and ad 3m. 
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choice.  Moral evil is also called “evil of penalty” or “evil of punishment.”190  But 
punishment here means something more general than common usage of someone is being 
forced to suffer an ill because of an offence.  Lonergan uses the Latin for moral evil, 
malum poenae.  Malum is “evil,” which Lonergan defines basically as a lack, privation, 
or failure of some good.191  Poena is “punishment,” “penalty,” or “consequence.”  Thus, 
malum poenae means simply the deprivation of some good as a consequence.  And since 
malum poenae follows basic sin or evil of fault, the “evil of punishment” is the 
deprivation of some good as a consequence of sin. 
 This ordering of the evil of punishment as consequent to basic sin is central to 
Lonergan’s understanding of divine justice.  In the existing world, created by divine 
wisdom and justice, sins have consequences.  They cause the sinner and others affected 
by the sin to suffer the deprivation of a good or goods.  This is how Lonergan makes 
sense of Paul’s statements about “the wrath of God” in Rom 1:18-3:19.192  God in infinite 
wisdom has seen it fit to create a world in which sins have negative consequences and 
good actions have positive consequences.193 
Such consequences of sin, built into the world order, are a kind of punishment 
“broadly speaking” (latius).194  This is the kind of punishment that Lonergan understands 
Christ to have suffered.  It is a consequence of sinful human action and willed by God, 
but only indirectly, as part of a world order in which human actions have both personal 
                                                 
190 Hefling, “A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement,” 56-57. 
191 DVI (trans., Hefling), 504. 
192 Ibid, 515. 
193 Why this is exactly, Lonergan does not state explicitly, at least not here.  My guess is that for freedom to 
be real, choices and actions must have real consequences. 
194 DVI (trans., Hefling), 505.   
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and social consequences.  Thus, the direct cause of Christ’s suffering is not the 
appeasement of the Father, but the sins of  “Judas, the priests, the crowd, Pilate, the 
soldiers” and all of humanity.195  What God directly willed for Christ in the passion was 
Christ’s unconditional and unfailing love, even in the face of sin and its evil 
consequences.196 
While Lonergan maintains that in the sense of suffering the consequences of sin, 
or  “broadly speaking,” Christ was punished, he is adamant that “strictly speaking” Christ 
was not punished by God, either directly or indirectly.  Let us clarify the distinction 
between broadly and strictly defined punishments.  Punishment “broadly speaking” is any 
lack or privation of any good due to evil.  The lack can be in external things, bodily 
goods, or goods of the soul.  Though all lacks are evil, they are not all equally evil:  “lack 
of bodily goods is worse, other things being equal, than lack of external goods, and lack 
of the soul’s goods is worse still.”197  On the other hand, punishment “pure and simple” 
or “strictly speaking” (strictus) is a lack of such goods that is forced, imposed, or 
inflicted.  Because such punishment goes against the will, freedom, or choice of the 
person punished, it always involves the deprivation of goods of the soul.198 
Christ’s punishment cannot be understood as punishment in this strict, “pure and 
simple” sense, for Christ freely and willingly took on the penalty of sins.  His suffering 
and death were not imposed on him by his Father; rather, he offered himself in 
                                                 
195 Ibid., 469. Cf. 452. 
196 This will be discussed in full in the fourth section where we examine thesis 17. 
197 DVI (trans., Hefling), 505. 
198 Ibid. 
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redemption for all.199  If we accept this, a further question may arise:  Why did Christ 
willingly accept the consequences of other people’s sins?  The highpoint of Lonergan’s 
answer is in thesis 17, but in 16 he takes the next step of distinguishing between 
punishment inflicted in the context of retribution and punishment taken on in satisfaction. 
3.2.1.2.  Two Contexts for Punishment:  Retribution and Satisfaction 
A part of divine justice is the ordering detailed above in which basic sin, inner sin, 
or evil of fault are followed by moral evil, evil of penalty, evil of punishment, or negative 
consequences.  This part of divine justice Lonergan calls simply “evil follows evil.”  The 
other components of divine justice are called “good follows good,” “good follows evil,” 
and “evil follows good.”200  All four sub-orderings are included in the one world order 
God has willed in infinite wisdom and justice. 
In “evil follows good” we have an instance of basic sin, i.e., a person choosing to 
use his/her freedom and other good, natural gifts for evil.  Both “good follows good” and 
“evil follows evil” are aspects of what Lonergan calls “vindictive” or “retributive” 
justice.201  In both pairs, like is rewarded with like.  The final ordering, “good follows 
evil,” is also an aspect of divine justice, a part Lonergan calls “redemptive.”202  When 
good follows evil, there is operative a “principle of transformation [that] seems to be the 
essence of redemption, which is nothing else than this: out of the evils he permits, God 
brings a more excellent good.”203  Lonergan focuses on this transformation in thesis 17, 
but satisfaction is one way of considering it.  To see how, let us distinguish between two 
                                                 
199 See, for example, section 2.5. above. 
200 DVI (trans., Hefling), 514-15. 
201 Ibid.  These terms go back at least as far as Aristotle. 
202 Ibid., 504. 
203 Ibid., 544. 
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general contexts for punishment.  We move now, not in the realm of divine justice, but in 
that of human justice, which shall then be used as an analogy for a deeper understanding 
of divine justice. 
The first context for punishment is the more familiar of the two.  This is 
retributive justice.  Most basically, it involves, as above, the rewarding of good with good 
and evil with evil.  Interestingly, Lonergan traces the beginning of the process involving 
retributive justice to the fact that human beings want everything, “the whole of being.”  
Concretely, “there are different wills that will different things with respect to the same 
goods.”204  Conflicts tend to arise, and in a conflict a number of persons involved may 
behave in an improper way, a way that justly offends others.  This improper action, 
Lonergan calls culpa, a “fault,” and its effect on the person(s) offended is the “offense” 
(offensa).  Fault affects the person at fault as well, creating  reatus, or “guilt”—a liability, 
debt, or desert (debitum) of penalty or punishment (poenae).205 
The punishment or penalty must be “imposed” or “inflicted” (inflicta)  by some  
“proper official.  The party at fault gives “payment” (solutio) of the penalty or 
punishment.  For punishment to be imposed justly, the person punished must be at fault, 
the punishment must be in line with the gravity of the fault, and it must be imposed in the 
right manner and circumstances (for example, not with delight in the pain inflicted).  
Otherwise the punishment is considered savage, cruel, and/or illicit.206 
                                                 
204 Ibid., 504-05. 
205 Ibid., 505-06. 
206 Ibid., 506-07.  Lonergan refers the reader to Thomas’s Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 108, a. 1; q. 159, a. 
2. 
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Such is the first context for just punishment, retributive justice.  Satisfaction is the 
second.  Lonergan notes that in Roman commercial law, when a person could not or 
would not fulfill a contract, the court would impose a penalty/punishment called 
satisfaction.207  This was a payment of something acceptable to a creditor.  Lonergan 
defines satisfaction differently, however. 
Most simply and broadly, satisfaction for Lonergan occurs when a person offers 
an offended party something that the offended party values as much as or more than the 
offended party was harmed by the offense.  He quotes Thomas: “Properly speaking, one 
makes satisfaction for offense by offering the one who is offended something that pleases 
him as much as, or more than, he hated the offense.”208  One might notice two differences 
between such satisfaction and satisfaction under Roman law (at least as portrayed by 
Lonergan).  Lonergan’s satisfaction is offered, not imposed.  Secondly, it is an offer of 
something as pleasing as or more pleasing than the offense is displeasing. 
The first difference is also the central distinction between satisfaction and 
retribution/retributive justice, as Lonergan understands them. The process of satisfaction 
begins likewise with fault, something deserved, and an offense.  But then someone seeks 
“pardon” (venia), also called the forgiveness or remission of the offense (offensae 
remissio).  Finally, the party offended may grant pardon.209 
The granting of pardon, forgiveness, or remission of offense is not necessary, 
though it may be appropriate or fitting (conveniens).  One key to this appropriateness is 
                                                 
207 DVI (trans., Hefling), 506-07. 
208 Ibid., 486, with quote from Summa Theologica,  III, q. 48, a. 2. 
209 Ibid., 507-508. 
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that the person seeking pardon willingly takes on the penalty owed for the offense.  This 
penalty is not punishment in the strict sense but it is a punishment “broadly speaking,”  
inasmuch as it involves some consequence that resulted from the fault.  Furthermore, 
pardon is appropriately granted when the party making satisfaction not only pays a 
penalty, but openly shows “sorrow over the offense and detestation of the fault” (dolor de 
offensa culpaeque detestatio).210 
Detestation of the fault is a very specific feeling with weighty content.  It “regards 
sin as evil and presupposes a judgment of value: it denotes a deliberate, willful 
hatred.”211  Lonergan defines sorrow heuristically.  It “stands to a present evil as delight 
stands to a present good.”212  Sorrow presupposes love of the party offended, detestation 
of the fault, and the fact that the fault is against the party offended.213  It is not simply a 
commercial transaction or a strict exchange but a matter of interpersonal relationships.  
seeks not merely a zero-sum balance, but reconcil
It 
iation.214 
                                                
Lonergan summarizes satisfaction and gives a short example:  
It is compensation, as it were, for offense, where compensation is thought of along the 
lines of interpersonal relationship, not commercial transaction.  If one person is offended, 
for example, another could say, “Good!  He got what he deserved,” and so the offense 
would not be taken away but made worse.  But the second person could instead be 
 
210 Ibid., 508-09.  The quoted text from 509. 
211 Ibid., 487.  See also Hefling , “A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement,” 70.  Viewed in the context 
of Method, detestation would operate on the fourth level, the level of deliberation.  Here feelings are have 
been weighed, judged to correspond to reality, to truth and value.  Furthermore, as deliberate, these feelings 
orient a person existentially, or really, and not merely notionally.  A helpful secondary source on this is 
Brian Cronin’s Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective (Nairobi, Kenya:  Consolata Institute of Philosophy, 
2006). 
212 Ibid., referring us Thomas’s treatment of sorrow in Summa Theologica,  I-II, qq. 35-39 
213 Lonergan does not state this explicitly.  He states, “Sorrow over offenses against God presupposes love 
towards God, detestation of sin, and the fact of sin’s being against God” [DVI (trans., Hefling), 487].  I do 
not think it is a large leap to generalize from offense against God and sin to offense against any offended 
party and fault. 
214 DVI (trans., Hefling), 490, 508, 539.  On 539, Lonergan refers us to Rom 5:10, 2 Cor. 5:19. 
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outraged at the offense, denounce its injustice, and in every way show that he takes sides 
not with the offender but with the offended.  There is a way in which the offense would 
be made less, there would be compensation for it, satisfaction would be made.215 
 
Clearly there is a difference between such satisfaction and retribution.  The 
difference is satisfaction’s focus on interiority and interpersonal relationships—
punishment willingly taken on, pardon sought and granted, detestation and sorrow felt 
and shared, reconciliation. 
Within this interpersonal conception of satisfaction, the question could arise:  If, 
after punishment is willingly taken on, detestation and sorrow are expressed, and the 
offense is pardoned, might it not be appropriate for the punishment to be forgiven as 
well?  Lonergan  answers in the affirmative: “It is appropriate for punishment to be 
remitted as a consequence of pardon, the remission of offense.  Anyone who really does 
forgive his brother’s offense with all his heart (Mt 18:35) and is reconciled with him does 
not think further of demanding punishment.”216 
This makes it seem as though satisfaction and punishment are incompatible.  
However, Lonergan maintains that they are compatible, because even if and when the 
person offended forgives the offender, the offender can be moved out of inner love, 
detestation, and sorrow to freely and willingly take on a punishment.217  Again, when this 
is the case, the punishment is not punishment in the strict sense (as in context of 
retributive justice, where punishment is simply imposed), but it is a kind of punishment, 
“broadly speaking.” 
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217 It would seem, too, that these negative feelings, if fervent, are a kind of punishment in themselves, 
though Lonergan does not say this. 
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Lonergan presents a scriptural passage illustrating the two contexts: 
Mt 5:23-26.  “So if you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that 
your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar, and first go 
to be reconciled with your brother, and then come and offer your gift.  Make friends 
quickly with your accuser, while on the road with him; lest your accuser hand you over to 
the judge, and the judge hand you over to the officer, and you be put in prison.  Truly, I 
say to you, you will not come out of there, until you have paid the last penny.” 
This passage is about seeking and granting pardon (“something against you,” “be 
reconciled,” “make friends”) as distinguished from inflicting punishment (the judge, the 
officer, prison, the last penny). Compare Mt 6:12, 6:14-15; Mt 18:21-35; Mk 11:25-26; 
Lk 7:47, 17:3-4.  These passages drive home very forcefully a Christian teaching known 
to all.218 
 
Having distinguished clearly the two contexts, Lonergan makes three further 
moves.  First, he states that other than satisfaction and retribution there are no other 
possibilities for restoring divine justice “in this present order of reality.”219  This is his 
definition of the “severity” of divine justice.220  Secondly, he writes that while these two 
contexts are conceptually distinct, they are not entirely exclusive of one another.  In fact, 
“in the concrete complexity of human affairs they are often mixed up and seldom entirely 
separate.”221  People are rarely either perfectly repentant or entirely unrepentant.  
Punishment is usually received in a manner both imposed and taken on, to varying 
degrees. 
Finally, Lonergan points to the last significant difference between satisfaction and 
retribution.  While punishment in retribution is justly imposed only to the party at fault, 
satisfaction may be offered justly by someone other than the guilty party.  This is true, 
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because in satisfaction the punishment is not imposed but freely taken on.  Satisfaction 
made by someone other than the party at fault is called “vicarious satisfaction.”   
Why would an innocent person freely undergo punishment for another’s offense?  
This is the topic for our next section. 
3.2.2. Satisfaction and Friendship 
3.2.2.1.  Vicarious Satisfaction and Friendship 
Before turning to vicarious satisfaction, let us first review satisfaction simply and 
its relation to punishment.  Throughout thesis 16, Lonergan is careful to say that 
punishment in a pure or ideal context of satisfaction is never incurred because imposed, 
but is freely taken on.222  Because of this fact, a person moved by knowledge of the 
offense and love for the offended party can express detestation of the fault and sorrow for 
the offense.  This expression can do much to heal the damage of the offense and promote 
reconciliation. 
Vicarious satisfaction maintains that this healing can be achieved by someone 
other than the person who committed the fault.  This assertion raises questions.  One 
question regards the reasons or motives for such a vicarious act.  Why would anyone 
willingly take on another’s just punishment?  A further, perhaps more fundamental, 
question regards not the motive of vicarious satisfaction but its outcome:  If the aim of 
satisfaction, as Lonergan conceives it, is not simply a payment of debt but interpersonal 
reconciliation, then even if a third party offers satisfaction and the offended forgives the 
offense, then might not the offender still remain unrepentant and thus unreconciled? 
                                                 
222  Although in concrete living, when remorse is imperfect, punishments can be to some degree both 
incurred and taken on, as above. 
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Lonergan admits this possibility.223  His answer to both of the above questions 
and the key to his version of vicarious satisfaction is the love of friendship.  To be clear, 
what is needed is a two-fold friendship on the part of the person offering vicarious 
satisfaction.  There needs to be friendship between not only the one making satisfaction 
and the party offended, but also a friendship between the one making satisfaction and the 
party at fault.224  In offering satisfaction, the mutual friend becomes a mediator of 
friendship.  The offended and the offender become friends.  How does this work? 
Lonergan defines vicarious satisfaction as “voluntarily taking on punishment so 
that pardon for another’s offenses, not one’s own, may appropriately be asked and 
granted.  The foundation of vicarious satisfaction is a union of wills by love.”225 
When two are joined in love—as is the case in friendship—one will freely pay the 
debts of another.  According to Aristotle, “‘What we can accomplish through the efforts 
of our friends we seem to do ourselves’ (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, iii, 13; 
1112b).”226  In this case, if two are joined in love, one friend’s suffering will be shared by 
the other.  Furthermore, according to Thomas, “‘one will regard punishment suffered for 
his sake by a friend as if he himself suffered: and thus he is not without punishment, 
provided he suffers along with his suffering friend, all the more so, the more he is himself 
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the cause of the suffering.’”227 
This is how vicarious satisfaction works.  It is how a third party’s satisfaction can 
bring an offender to repentance and into reconciled relationship with the one offended.  
The crucial point is that if my friend suffers, I suffer, and if (s)he suffered for me, 
because of me, then my suffering is made all the more painful.  This is the perhaps the 
most important aspect of Lonergan’s understanding of vicarious satisfaction.  In a way 
that significantly departs from popular imagination, Lonergan’s view of vicarious 
satisfaction does not focus on physical pain or financial payment, but on interior 
movements:  knowledge, love, detestation, and sorrow.  If my friend was moved by (1) 
love for me, (2) love for the one I have offended, (3) the knowledge that my fault was 
offensive, (4) detestation of my fault, and (5) sorrow for my offense, then I would be 
moved out of loving unity with my friend to the same inner movements, to the same 
judgments, feelings, and decisions.  I would—to the degree that I was truly loving—take 
a stand not with me and my fault, but with the offended party against my fault.  I would 
repent and reconcile. 
3.2.2.2.  The Supernatural Friendship of Charity 
 The vicarious satisfaction discussed above is possible, though not likely, in a 
purely natural context.  In the actually existing world, however, everything is a product of 
nature, sin and grace, to different degrees.  In this world, if such vicarious satisfaction 
were to take place, it would probably occur through a friendship based, to some degree, 
on the supernatural gift of charity.  In any case, Lonergan is clear that one particular type 
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of vicarious satisfaction is possible only through the grace of charity.  This is the 
satisfaction for someone who is not already one’s friend, perhaps even an enemy. 
A natural, mutual friendship would allow friends to satisfy for friends.  But in 
order for vicarious satisfaction to work (i.e., to end in reconciliation) among people who 
are not friends, the one making satisfaction would have to be moved by the supernatural 
love of charity.  This charity would then draw out love in the unfriendly offender.  Again 
the goal is reconciliation, a union of love. 
Lonergan presents this distinction briefly: “In the natural order, friendship 
between the offender and the maker of satisfaction not only grounds but also precedes the 
satisfaction made.  In the supernatural order, however, the love of charity in the one who 
makes satisfaction brings out a similar love in the offender.”228 
In sum, vicarious satisfaction in the context of charity is not grounded on a mutual 
friendship between the one satisfying and the one satisfied for.  Rather, it is based on a 
one-sided love, the love of charity for the one satisfied and in the one satisfying.  This 
initially one-sided charity can move a person to make satisfaction for an enemy and can 
move the one satisfied for to love the one who has made satisfaction.  Eventually, on 
consideration of this new friend’s actions, a charitable satisfaction can inspire the 
offender to repeat her/his new friend’s detestation and sorrow.  This will produce mutual 
friendship not merely between these two parties, but among all three involved:  the 
offender, the one making charitable vicarious satisfaction, and the one offended.  Again, 
only a vicarious satisfaction made out of the supernatural love of charity can start with an 
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offender who loves no one, neither the person offended nor the one making satisfaction 
for his/her faults. 
3.2.3.  Christ’s Satisfaction and Christian Satisfaction 
 Christ’s satisfaction is all of the above.  On the cross, Christ has made satisfaction 
for us and has received punishment for our sins.  He was punished in two broad senses:  
(1) he suffered the negative consequences of human sin, the consequences built into the 
world order, and (2) he willingly took on these consequences as an appropriate way of 
expressing many things:  his love for the Father, his knowledge that human faults are 
offensive to God, his detestation of these faults/sins, his sorrow for the offense, and his 
charitable love for all of humanity. 
This satisfaction integrated with punishment is not satispassion.  Christ’s 
suffering on the cross is not an act of retribution, but of satisfaction.  The Father did not 
inflict punishment on the Son in vicarious retribution for debt of human sin.  Rather, 
Christ willingly took on this suffering as an expression of his concord of his will with the 
Father’s will.  Christ’s suffering in itself was neither willed by nor pleasing to the Father.  
Rather, what the Father willed and was pleased by was Christ’s interior responses to sin, 
namely his love for God and humanity, his sorrow for the rupture in the relationship 
between God and humanity that sin causes, and his detestation of sin itself.  Christ’s 
acceptance of the consequences of our sin communicated this love, sorrow, and 
detestation to God on behalf of humanity.  In doing so, it satisfied the requirements of 
divine justice, however, we must remember that in satisfying for our sins, Christ does not 
earn divine love and forgiveness as a consequence.  Instead, divine love and forgiveness 
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are there from the outset.  Christ’s satisfaction is a divine initiative.  It flows from eternal, 
divine love and forgiveness.  It is an effort on our behalf, even while we are not friends 
with God.  It works to reconcile human beings to God, to draw out love from us sinners 
and to make us friends with Christ and with God. 
Because of this, the analogy of vicarious satisfaction breaks down to some extent.  
In a human community, vicarious satisfaction often produces a change in heart in the 
person to whom satisfaction is offered, namely forgiveness, and secondarily it may 
produce a change of heart in the person for whom satisfaction is given, namely 
repentance.  While Christ’s vicarious satisfaction is in some sense primarily a 
communication to God on behalf of humanity, still its most significant intended 
consequence is not to change the “heart” or “mind” of God, but to transform the hearts 
and minds of sinful human persons. 
This transformation is effected not through the normal means of vicarious 
satisfaction, i.e. when the one making satisfaction and the one satisfied for are already 
friends.  Rather, it is possible only through the divine friendship of charity.  As Aristotle 
wrote, through friendship two become as one.  Thomas follows Aristotle on friendship 
but adds a particularly Christian element:  the effect of the supernatural love of charity.  
Thus Thomas believes that “friendship makes two persons into one through sympathy, 
and chiefly by the love that is charity.”229 
“To this the council of Trent adds its authority:  ‘…in making satisfaction for our 
sins, we are made like to Christ Jesus, who satisfied for our sins…  We also have the 
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certain pledge that if we suffer with him we shall also be glorified with him.’”230  In 
coming to detest our sins and be sorry that they offend God, we come to a union of heart 
and mind with Christ and with God, the one who makes vicarious satisfaction and the one 
offended. 
If the “story” of Christ’s charitable, vicarious satisfaction were to end there, it 
would already be astonishing. However, there is one final aspect to it.  The interpersonal 
relationships involved in satisfaction are not simply vertical ones between God and the 
sinner, mediated through Christ.  Through Christ’s satisfaction for us and for our sins, we 
are drawn to suffer for our own sins, to detest them, to be sorrowful for their offense to 
God, and to return to God in a union of love.  But this is not all we are called to do.  Once 
we have repented our own sins and been reconciled to God in the supernatural friendship 
of charity, we are also called and moved by charity to participate in Christ’s work of 
vicarious satisfaction for the sins of others.  This brings into play a kind of horizontal 
aspect to satisfaction.  The circle of friends expands.  Repentance and reconciliation 
spread throughout the world and across history.231 
Lonergan cautions, however, that “the greatest care should be taken not to read 
this in Pelagian terms.”232  One’s satisfaction for one’s own sins and for the sins of others 
is made possible only by Christ’s satisfaction.  It is the mutual love of the Father and the 
Son that moves Christ.  It is Christ’s divine love for God and humanity that enables him 
to satisfy for our sins, and it is this divine love, extended to us while we are yet sinners, 
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that enables us to reconcile with God and our neighbor.  Satisfaction for the sins of others 
who are not our friends is possible, in theory and in practice, only through God’s 
supernatural gift of charity and God’s own friendship, “that friendship which consists in a 
communication of divine blessedness.”233 
Lonergan summarizes this dependence:  “Christian vicarious satisfaction is 
founded on a union of love such that the love itself belongs to Christ, on account of the 
fullness of grace that is properly his.  No one else has this love except through Christ’s 
merit and his satisfaction itself.”234  The satisfaction that Christians make is only 
analogical to Christ’s satisfaction.  In addition to being dependent on Christ’s work, 
Christian satisfaction is always a mixed product.  One satisfies for the sin of others, but 
also for one’s own sins.  And one’s detestation and sorrow are never perfect, therefore 
one’s suffering of punishment is never simply taken on freely.  It is to some degree 
imposed out of retributive justice.  Christ’s vicarious satisfaction, however, is purely 
vicarious and simply satisfaction, for Christ was free from sin, both original and 
personal.235 
Lonergan makes eight final arguments about Christ’s satisfaction.  First, Christ 
made “material satisfaction” for sins.  The material component of satisfaction involves 
the basic scriptural ways of discussing redemption, the ones Lonergan presented in thesis 
15.  Material satisfaction denotes “that by divine judgment Christ the man suffered and 
died for sinners and on account of sins; that he offered himself, a sacrifice to God, for the 
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total remission of sin and the reconciliation of all sinners with God; and that this end has 
been achieved by his blood.”236  The material component of Christ’s satisfaction is his 
suffering and death for us and for our sins.237  It is the payment of the price of 
redemption.238  It is Christ’s willingly taking on the consequences of our sin.239  It is an 
expiation for sin.240  These biblical words and phrases are the “bare fact” of redemption.  
Satisfaction is the intelligible context for understanding these bare facts.  It is the answer 
to the question, “on what basis is it true that there is an expiation [as well as price paid, 
etc.] for the sins of others in Christ’s suffering and dying?”241 
This formal aspect of satisfaction is Lonergan’s second point.  “Formally, you 
have a notion of satisfaction in so far as attention is given to the seriousness of sin as an 
offense against God…”242  Satisfaction is a “higher viewpoint,”243 a way of preserving, 
unifying, and relating the facts of Christ’s suffering, paying a price, etc.  Satisfaction 
raises these elements into the intelligible context not of commercial transaction but of 
interpersonal relationships.  Here, sin is thought of as offense rupturing relationship.  
Satisfaction is not simply suffering and punishment but suffering and punishment as 
freely taken on to express love, detestation of sin, and sorrow for offense.  Suffering and 
death are taken on for the purpose of establishing reconciliation.  This is the form of 
Christ’s vicarious suffering and death, his sacrifice, etc., where form is the higher 
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viewpoint, the larger context for understanding.244 
Lonergan’s third and fourth arguments are that satisfaction is “adequate” 
(condigne) and even “superabundant” (superabundanter). Romans 5:20 states that “grace 
has superabounded.”  Clement VI affirmed that one drop of Christ’s blood would have 
sufficed to redeem the whole race, and Thomas argues for the superabundance of 
satisfaction.245  These pertain to the rationale for Anselm’s requirement of the “God-
Human” and to the distinction made by Thomas in his definition of satisfaction as 
“offering the one who is offended something that pleases him as much as, or more than, 
he hated the offense.”246  The point of this is not that God is placated by Christ’s offering 
of love, detestation, and sorrow expressed in his passion.  The point is that no matter how 
serious the evil of sin is, the goodness of Christ’s satisfaction is as great and even far 
greater.  Lonergan agrees with Anselm that this is due fundamentally to Christ’s infinite 
dignity as a divine person.  “Just as sin is measured by the dignity of the person offended, 
so too satisfaction is measured by the dignity of the person who makes satisfaction for the 
offense.”247  Additionally, Lonergan agrees with Thomas that the abundance and 
superabundance of Christ’s satisfaction is caused by Christ’s perfect love, since “the 
more love increases, the less there is a need for punishment, either satisfactory or 
purgative.”248   
Lonergan’s fifth argument is that God directly willed Christ’s satisfaction.  The 
key to this is the fact that the event of Christ’s suffering and death is the result not merely 
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of the divine will but of multiple wills:  (1) God does not will (but permits) sin in general 
and the particular sins of Pilate, the high priests, and the rest.  Their willful choices led 
directly to Christ’s suffering.  (2) God indirectly wills the negative consequences of sin, 
which Christ suffered.  (3) God wills the good alone, this is Christ’s satisfaction, his 
acceptance of suffering as an expression of his love for God and humanity and of his 
detestation and sorrow over sin.249 
Sixth, in the whole work of redemption there is operative some kind of principle 
of transformation (quasi principium transformationis).  Things that are negative in 
themselves are transformed through satisfaction into goods in some sense.  The evil 
effects of sin become the material of satisfaction.  Death, the ultimate penalty of sin, 
becomes a principle of salvation, of restoration to new life in the resurrection.  The “curse 
of the law” becomes the “blessing of Abraham” (Gal 3:13-14).  And the “effects of sin” 
become “the effects of God’s righteousness” (2 Cor 5:21).250 
The principle of transformation seems to be the “essence of redemption.”  This 
principle is “out of the evils he permits, God brings a more excellent good.”251  Lonergan 
is referring to a quote by Augustine that he gave earlier, “God ‘judged it better to bring 
good out of evil than not to allow evil to exist’ (Enchiridion, 27; ML, 40: 245).”252 
God permits sin and indirectly wills the evils of punishment in order to bring forth 
good.  Satisfaction is one way of bringing out good from evil or transforming evil into 
good.  From the evil of penalty owed to divine retributive justice, God, in Christ’s work 
                                                 
249 DVI (trans., Hefling), 542-43. 
250 Ibid., 544. 
251 Ibid.  This good ultimately is reconciliation, but it is also, on p. 519, “the Body of Christ and the church, 
militant, suffering, and triumphant.” 
252 DVI (trans., Hefling), 515. 
 
 234
of satisfaction, draws forth the good of a redemption that is reconciliation.  Satisfaction 
operates not against divine justice, but according to a type of divine justice Lonergan 
calls “redemptive” (i.e. satisfaction).253 
Seventh, Lonergan advises that it is best to understand Christ’s satisfaction not 
through an analogy of the courts but through the sacrament of penance.254  In both 
satisfaction and penance punishment is not imposed, but rather is willingly taken on out 
of repentance.  In both, God’s love and forgiveness are not earned but are given freely.  
In both, what matters is the person’s inner movements of love, detestation, and sorrow.  
And in both, relationship—not payment—is primary.255 
This analogy of the sacrament of penance is appropriate, because the original use 
of the term “satisfaction” in ecclesial discourse was not in soteriology but in sacramental 
theology.  It arose in the third century in regard to personal sins and penance.256  The 
Council of Trent “puts the word ‘satisfaction’ in the context of contrition and confession; 
in other words, the three acts of the penitent in the sacrament of penance are contrition, 
confession, and satisfaction.”257  Contrition itself is of three parts: detestation of sin, 
sorrow for sin, and firm purpose of amendment.  The analogy is useful for understanding 
in general the relationships among God’s love, punishment, and repentance, as above.  
Still, it is not perfectly applied to Christ’s work, for Jesus was without sin and thus in no 
need of confession for past sin nor firm purpose of amendment. 
 Eighth, and finally, Lonergan argues that satisfaction is an expression 
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(expressionem).  In addition to the utmost detestation of sins and an utmost sorrow over 
offense, Christ’s satisfaction communicates a perfect knowledge and perfect love of God 
and humanity, for these are fundamental to Christ’s utmost detestation and sorrow.  The 
knowledge is what traditional theology calls the “beatific vision.”  By this Christ knows 
both God by his essence and the totality of sin.  The love is a perfect charity.  The 
resulting perfect detestation and sorrow proceeds from Christ the man on the basis of 
both his divine will and his human will.  It does not remain an internal act but is 
expressed outwardly and materially through a vicarious suffering and death.  No other 
human being had this perfect knowledge and love, and, thus, no other human being could 
have made the satisfying expression that Christ made.258 
 Furthermore, Christ’s passion expresses not only a human detestation of all sins 
and a human sorrow over all offenses, but it expresses God’s own hatred of sin.  
Lonergan turns to scripture: 
“God … sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin … 
condemned sin the flesh, in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in 
us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit” (Rom 8:3).  The fact 
that in the suffering and death of Christ God expressed his judgment on sin can, it seems, 
be understood the words “condemned sin in the flesh.”259 
 
 To conclude this chapter on the analogy of satisfaction, let us recall that 
satisfaction is not to be understood along the lines of “substitutionary penal atonement” 
or any type of “satispassion.”  The cross is not God the Father punishing his Son in order 
to please himself and settle a debt to his honor.  Understood according to Lonergan’s 
definition of satisfaction, the cross is Christ’s expression of both the evils of sin and the 
                                                 
258 DVI (trans., Hefling), 548-49. 
259 Ibid., 551.  Cf. 491. 
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goodness of God.  It is a personal, visible manifestation of these truths.  It is a 
communication within ruptured interpersonal relationships.  It brings forth in the sinner 
the same feelings, judgments, and expressions of detestation, sorrow, and love.  It flows 
from divine friendship, is given to humanity in charity, and seeks as its end 
reconciliation.  Thus, we have Lonergan’s sixteenth thesis of The Incarnate Word: 
Christ has made satisfaction for our sins, not only adequately but superabundantly as 
well.  This satisfaction, understood on a sacramental analogy, thus adds to his vicarious 
suffering and death an expression of utmost detestation for of all sins and utmost sorrow 
over every offense against God.260 
 
                                                 
260 Ibid., 486.  “Christus pro peccatis nostris non solum condigne sed etiam superabundanter satisfecit; quae 
quidem satisfactio secundum analogiam sacramentalem intelligitur; et ideo vicariae passioni et morti addit 
expressionem summae detestationis omnium peccatorum et summi doloris de omni offensa Dei” (DVI,  
486). 
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Chapter 4.  The Law of the Cross:   
A Communication Primarily to Humanity 
 
 
 
 
 Not all theological insights are equal.  As Lonergan notes, progress is “often 
enough… not merely from ignorance to truth but from error to truth.”261  Some of his 
work he considered to be true in a way that was “permanently valid” (as mentioned in 
this part’s introduction). Thesis 16 of The Incarnate Word, “Christ’s Satisfaction,” is 
probably one example262 and thesis 17, “Understanding the Mystery” is even more 
clearly so.263 
 That thesis 17 is one of Lonergan’s greatest developments is clear, but it is not 
clear exactly how great it is.  As presented above in section 1.2.5., Lonergan affirmed in 
“The Redemption,” that when seeking to understand the mystery of redemption, it is best 
to consider multiple analogies.  However, later in the same essay and immediately after 
considering the multiple analogies of Thomas Aquinas, Lonergan writes that mystery in 
the sense of “God’s hidden plan” is “the fundamental category” for moving towards a 
“total view” of redemption.264 
Another contender for this unified view is thesis 17’s presentation of the “Law of 
the Cross” as noted by the editors of Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-
                                                 
261 Method, 44. 
262 Hefling, “A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement,” 1. 
263 At a 1966 address to the Canon Law Society of America, Lonergan lauds his presentation of “the 
dynamic structure of human history” in Insight and “its strictly theological complement” in thesis 17 of The 
Incarnate Word. “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical Mindedness,” 7. 
264 “The Redemption,” 24. 
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1965.265  I am not sure what the editors’ grounds are for believing the Law of the Cross to 
be the single or overarching view of redemption.  They simply posit that Lonergan 
achieved a “unified understanding” in the Law of the Cross as was his tendency (more to 
follow).  However, I believe that several points would support their view:  (1) In “The 
Redemption,” Lonergan argues that the way to move towards a “total view” of 
redemption is in the category of mystery.  (2) The official title of thesis 17 is 
“Understanding the Mystery.”  (3) Mystery in both works is understood as a secretum 
consilium, “secret counsel” or  “hidden plan.”266  (4) In thesis 17, Lonergan explains that 
the hidden plan, now revealed, is best understood according to the lex crucis, the “Law of 
the Cross.”267  (5) Although “Understanding the Mystery” was the official title of thesis 
17, Lonergan often referred to it as the “Law of the Cross.”268 
In short, if mystery in the sense of God’s hidden plan is the total view, and the 
Law of the Cross explains the mystery, then it would seem that the Law of the Cross is 
the total view of redemption.  Furthermore, Lonergan calls the Law of the Cross “the 
essence of redemption” and “the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption.”269  Finally, in 
“The Redemption,” Lonergan’s discussion of mystery as the total view and hidden plan is 
followed immediately by an understanding of mystery in terms of the Law of the Cross 
(“the victory of suffering,” “accepting the consequences of sin,” “the transformation of 
the world,” “the transformation of evil into good,” “overcome evil with good”), though 
                                                 
265 Ibid., 14, note 26.  The editors are Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran. 
266 DVI, 583-84 and “The Redemption,” 24-25. 
267 DVI, 573, 583-84 
268 See note 105, above.  
269 “Lex crucis est essentia redemptionis… Sed redemptionis intelligibilitas intrinseca est lex crusis” DVI, 
577. 
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the Law of the Cross is not actually named.270 
How do we reconcile Lonergan’s caution to use multiple analogies with his 
explicit and implied claims for the Law of the Cross?  The editors of Collected Works do 
not view this as a conflict between two fixed positions but a growing unity of two aspects 
of thought.  They present three factors involved in this growing unity: (1) Lonergan’s 
heritage from Anselm who misguidedly sought unity in necessity and from Thomas who 
“was content to leave his understanding spread over five aspects,” (2) Lonergan’s 
“habitual orientation toward a unified understanding,” and (3) “the unity Lonergan 
actually achieved in his understanding of the redemption through the law of the cross.”271  
I am not completely convinced that the Law of the Cross is a unified, all-encompassing 
analogy for understanding redemption, but it is possible, and the law is certainly one of 
Lonergan’s two most privileged analogies for redemption (along with satisfaction).272 
Thesis 17, or the Law of the Cross, states: 
This is why the Son of God became man, suffered, died, and was raised again:  because 
divine wisdom has ordained and divine goodness has willed, not to do away with the 
evils of the human race through power, but to convert those evils into a supreme good 
according to the just and mysterious Law of the Cross.273 
 
 We shall consider the Law of the Cross in three parts, focusing first on how it is a 
law, then on the functioning of the law as instituted by Christ, and finally on the 
                                                 
270 “The Redemption,” 28. 
271 Ibid., 14; editors’ note 26. 
272 In some ways the two converge.  Satisfaction operates by transformation, and one good that could be 
converted from evils is satisfaction.  Charles Hefling notes that in a mysterious, unpublished work (often 
called De Bono et Malo after the title of its first chapter) Lonergan reversed the order of presentation “so 
that his discussion of satisfaction presupposes and expands on what he has already said about the lex 
crucis” (“A Perhaps Permanently Valid Achievement,” 52). 
273 DVI (trans., Hefling), 552.  “Dei Filius ideo homo factus, passus, mortuus, et resuscitatus est, quia 
divina sapientia ordinavit et divina bonitas voluit, non per potentiam mala generis humani auferre, sed 
secundum iustam atque mysteriosam crucis legem eadem mala in summum quoddam bonum convertere” 
(DVI, 552).  
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functioning of the law in Christians. 
4.1.  Why a Law of the Cross? 
4.1.1.  Four Causes and Redemption:  Introducing a Form 
For a while I struggled with the question of what exactly the Law of the Cross is.  
Given what Lonergan believes about analogy and mystery, I believe it to be an analogy 
for understanding the redemption, but what is it an analogy of?  Communication?  
Transformation?  Conversion?  Acceptance?  Unconditional Love?  Overcoming?  All of 
these realities play key roles in the Law of the Cross.  The title of thesis 17’s lone 
preliminary note is promising:  “The analogy for this question.”  Here Lonergan discusses 
understanding as grasping “many objects in a single view” and analogy as helpful for 
gaining such a grasp.  Surprisingly, the analogy he selects is the four causes of 
Aristotle.274  I believe that the point of this is not that the Law of the Cross should be 
called an analogy of the four causes, but that the four causes provide a way of 
understanding the Law of the Cross. 
The four causes answer important questions about redemption:  What for? (end); 
By whom? (agent); Of what? (matter); and In what way/pattern? (form).  This is indeed 
helpful for a single view of redemption.  But how are they related to the Law of the 
Cross?  Lonergan does not directly answer this question.  The causes seem to provide 
both a larger context for understanding the Law of the Cross and a way of discussing 
particular parts of the Law of the Cross.   
As context, the four causes provide a general definition of law:  a law expresses 
                                                 
274 DVI (trans., Hefling), 565. 
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how a certain form is established in a given matter by some agent for a particular end.  
The Law of the Cross expresses how the reign of God is established in sinful humanity by 
Christ for restored order in the world and more intimate relationship with God.  But if the 
Law of the Cross itself is to be understood as the single view, the essence, or the intrinsic 
intelligibility of redemption, it must include an understanding of redemption according to 
the four causes.  Indeed over the course of thesis 17, Lonergan incorporates end, agent, 
matter, and form into the Law of the Cross.  The Law of the Cross presents the four 
causes in their dynamic relations, in my opinion.  In any case, it is helpful to distinguish 
the end, agent, matter, and form. 
To ease in the reader into the complexity of redemption, Lonergan presents a 
simple example of building a house.  Here the end is the form produced in the material, 
i.e. the finished house.  The matter is the building materials, the stones, wood, etc.  The 
form is the proposed ordering of the parts into a whole.  The agent transforms the 
material according to the form into its end.  In this example, the agent is the person or the 
people who actually construct(s) the house.275 
In the example above, the four causes pertain to a kind of craftsmanship, the work 
of an artisan.  The same is true for Christ’s work of redemption.  “In the economy of 
salvation, the matter is the human race, infected with original sin, burdened with actual 
sins, entangled in the penalties of sin, alienated from God, and divided within itself both 
individually and socially.”276  Human persons are distinct from such matter as wood and 
stone not only by sin, alienation, and division, but fundamentally by their rationality, 
                                                 
275 Ibid., 566. 
276 Ibid. 
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their freedom, and their social nature (as presented in part 1, chapter 1). 
There is both an intrinsic and an extrinsic end to salvation.  God is the extrinsic 
end.  The intrinsic end is “the very order of the universe.”277  These ends are not 
separated, however, for God “communicates himself to creatures, both substantially (in 
the hypostatic union) and accidentally (in the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit and in 
giving himself to be seen by the blessed).”278  Furthermore, the order of the universe is an 
order of humanity in communion with the divine good, it is brought about through divine 
gifts of wisdom (faith now, vision later) and charity, and we reach the fullness of wisdom 
only in the final vision of God.  Thus, the end is obtained in two stages, as “pilgrims” 
who live by faith and as the “blessed” who comprehend according to the vision of 
God.279  In traditional Christian language, this is the communion of saints, the kingdom 
or reign of God.280 
                                                
This end is the “supreme good” in thesis 17.  It is the actualization of the form of 
redemption.  The form is: 
the whole Christ, Head and members.  For in the whole Christ there is grasped both the 
threefold communication of the divine good itself, and also that order which is an order 
of persons in the communication of the divine good and which is brought about through 
wisdom of apprehension and charity of will, either as pertains to the stage belonging to 
this life or as pertains to the stage of the life to come.281 
 
The agent who actualizes the form in the matter is Christ.  Christ is a unique 
agent, fully human and fully divine, like us in all things yet entirely without sin and in 
 
277 Ibid., Lonergan refers the reader to Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 103, a. 2 c and ad 3m. 
278 DVI (trans., Hefling), 566.  Cf. 554. 
279 Ibid. 
280  Lonergan does not use the term “communion of saints” in any of his writings, to my knowledge.  The 
“reign” of God is a gender-neutral term popularized after Lonergan’s time.  Lonergan does refer to the end 
of redemption as the “kingdom of God” in thesis 15, DVI 451 and 462; in “The Redemption,” 24-26; and in 
Method, 291; among other places. 
281 DVI (trans., Hefling), 567. 
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full communion with God.282  Lonergan notes that these facts are covered in theses 1-14 
of The Incarnate Word.  Here his concern is “how as a matter of fact” Christ introduced 
the form into the matter by his “suffering, dying, and rising,”283 and how this way of 
introducing the form is fittingly produced “in such a way as to be in keeping with the 
[human] apprehension of reason and the goodness of will.”284  He asserts that “this form 
is fittingly produced in them [human persons] only in accordance with the Law of the 
Cross.” 
Thus, the Law of the Cross is a way of explaining how Christ the savior brings 
sinful humanity to God, how Christ the artisan builds the kingdom of God from a 
humanity wounded both individually and socially by sin.  Humanity is the matter; God 
and an ordered universe are the end; the whole Christ is the form; Jesus Christ is the 
agent.  The Law of the Cross is the way Christ introduces the form into the matter to 
produce the end. 
4.1.2.  A Spiritual Law: Supernatural, Fitting, Effective, and Universal 
From the section above, we can see that conceived along the lines of Aristotle’s 
four causes, the Law of the Cross explains the process of a kind of craftsmanship—the 
way Christ the agent introduces the form of the whole Christ to the matter of humanity to 
produce, in two stages, an end called the reign of God.  Now we turn to why Lonergan 
uses the term “law” to name this process.  What does he mean by “law”? 
As usual, Lonergan collects several meanings or types of law in order to clarify 
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284 Ibid., 566. 
 
 244
what he means by the term.  By “law” he does not mean a necessary relationship or link 
(nexus) as is the case in logic and metaphysics.285  The relationship indicated here is, no 
surprise, of fittingness or positive intelligibility.  But Lonergan distinguishes between 
various types of fitting laws.  One type includes the “natural laws investigated by 
empirical sciences.”286  These laws are observable at all times given certain conditions 
governed by probability (prescinding from any questions of miracles).  
The Law of the Cross is not such a law.  It is neither an absolutely necessary law 
of logic nor a conditionally necessary law of nature. There is a universality to it, but not 
the universality of a law of nature.  It is a law of “the spiritual order”287 provided by the 
intellects and wills of persons.288  Lonergan is quick to point out that not all laws of the 
spiritual order are fitting or good, for some are mere commands of an arbitrary will.  To 
be effective they turn not to legitimate authority or persuasion but simply to power or 
force.  On the other hand, some precepts are fitting and good, but remain ineffective and 
are not observed.  The Law of the Cross is fitting/good and effective/universal, because it 
flows not from an arbitrary will but from divine authority and wisdom.  We shall follow 
Lonergan in considering the fittingness, effectiveness, and universality of the Law of the 
Cross.   
The Law of the Cross is not necessary, because it governs the redemption of 
creation, and, as we have seen, creation itself is not absolutely necessary.289  As an act of 
                                                 
285 Ibid., 574. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Lonergan does not mention his discussion in thesis 15 of Christ’s meritorious obedience and command, 
but it is reminiscent of that. 
289 See section 1.2.1, above. 
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God’s free will, creation and its redemption are not arbitrary acts, but they are eminently 
fitting, since they flow from infinite wisdom, goodness, and love.  As a further act of 
God’s wisdom, love, and goodness, redemption as governed by the Law of the Cross is 
fitting in a manner that surpasses the ordinary laws of nature.  This is to say that the Law 
of the Cross is a supernatural law—continuous with natural laws, but transcending them.  
In particular, “in the actual order of reality the human race is brought to its end 
supernaturally, and that in such a way as to be in keeping with the apprehension of reason 
and the goodness of will.”290 
But since the Law of the Cross functions supernaturally, it is recognized by the 
intellect and followed by the will only through the graces of the Holy Spirit.  On this 
point, Lonergan refers the reader to 1 Cor. 1:18-31 and 2:10-16.  The first passage 
maintains that while the cross is God’s wisdom and God’s power, it appears to the 
“wisdom” of the world as foolishness and weakness, as a stumbling block.  God chose 
what appears weak and foolish to shame those who seek to boast.291  The second passage 
argues that just as no human being knows the depths of a human being except through the 
human spirit, so no one can understand the depths of God and God’s works without the 
gift of the Spirit of God.  Later, Lonergan discusses how the Holy Spirit is “the Spirit of 
                                                 
290 See, for example, DVI (trans., Hefling), 566:  
291  Lonergan observes: “Thus in Nietzsche’s estimation Christian humility and gentleness were the religion 
of slaves who because of their abiding but unthematized envy of their masters’ power sought to make a 
virtue out of cowardly servitude.  In Marx’s estimation Christian longsuffering and patience derive, not 
from God’s wisdom, but from an ideology invented by the rich to make it easier for themselves to enjoy the 
good things of this life while the poor were fobbed off with empty hopes of a life to come.  The more 
widely these errors have spread and the more deeply their roots have penetrated, the more obvious and 
frequent it has been that those who call themselves Christians concern themselves all too little with the law 
of Christian living” [DVI (trans., Hefling),575]. 
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truth (Jn 14:17, 16:13) and of love (Rom 5:5).”292  It bears emphasizing that it is only 
through the gift of God’s Spirit of love and truth that Christians may recognize and 
follow the fittingness of the Law of the Cross.  This significance will become clearer in 
the following sections (4.3.2 and 4.3.3) on the Law of the Cross as precept and example. 
A supernatural law, the Law of the Cross is fitting in its ability to restore fallen 
nature or to reverse cycles of decline.  It is the fittingness of not perpetuating the cycle of 
evil with more evil but of responding with goodness. “That is what Paul urged: ‘Do not 
be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good” (Rom 12:21).”293  It is the fittingness 
of not doing away with evils through power but of overcoming evil with good to convert 
evils into good for the purpose of the supreme good, i.e. humanity in loving relationship 
with God and all things, or the reign of God. 
As a supernatural and fitting law, the Law of the Cross is effective and universal.  
However, it is not like the law of gravity in its unavoidability in the earth’s atmosphere.  
One cannot chose to float in the air without aid, but one can choose to return evil with 
evil rather than with good.  God permits sin and indirectly wills evil consequences in 
willing a good and ordered universe.294  Thus, there are consequences to choices.  This 
holds for the natural law of gravity as well as for the supernatural Law of the Cross.  The 
effectiveness of the Law of the Cross occurs through being taught and followed.  Christ 
communicates the Law of the Cross; he “teaches us through both precept and 
example.”295  The law is effective insofar as it is learned, believed, and freely consented 
                                                 
292 Ibid., 586.  Rom 5:5 was Lonergan’s most frequently cited passage 
293 Ibid., 575. 
294 Would freedom be real if choices did not have real consequences? 
295 Ibid., 556,  
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to.296  Its effectiveness, however, is not limited to acceptance by the believer’s heart and 
mind.  It moves us: 
For the Law of the Cross is not an injunction decided upon and issued by some legislator, 
which falls on the ear but leaves the heart unmoved.  The Law of the Cross has been 
enjoined by our Lord and by his apostles in holy scripture.  The Law of the Cross is taught 
not just in words but above all by examples, and those the greatest examples of all.  The 
Law of the Cross is seen in the Head, in such a way that satisfaction is made for all 
punishments, that sacrifice is offered for all sins, that the merit acquired for all the gifts of 
grace is infinite, and that a Mediator, the eternal priest, our Lord, Son of the Father, 
intercedes for all who are alienated from God, so that we might receive adoptive sonship.  
Ask and you will receive.297 
 
More shall be said about how the cross moves us in section 4.3.5.1.  
 Supernatural, fitting, and effective, the Law of the Cross is also universal—in the 
sense that it is the way that each and every human person as “free spirit” is led to its goal.  
In his words and deeds, Christ did not call only “a few select followers.” Instead he called 
the crowd, saying, “If anyone would follow me, let him deny himself and take up his 
cross and follow me” (Mk 8:34).298 
4.2.  Doing Away with Evil through Power vs. Converting Evil with Love and 
Wisdom 
4.2.1.  Clarification by Contrast 
We have considered how, according to Lonergan, the Law of the Cross explains a 
kind of craftsmanship, the way a form is introduced into matter to produce an end.  The 
Law of the Cross, thus, explicates a production, process, or change.  This change is from 
a state marked by sinful acts and the resultant alienation from God, disorder in the 
                                                 
296 Ibid., 557. 
297 Ibid., 576, emphasis added.  The “Head” here is Christ the head of the body of Christ, not the believer’s 
head/mind. 
298 Ibid. 
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universe, and division within and among persons.  It is a change for wisdom and charity, 
healed persons, restored relationships with God and each other, and renewed order in the 
universe.  Christ is a craftsman building the kingdom of God from a world torn by sinful 
humanity. 
We have also considered how, according to Lonergan, the Law of the Cross is a 
law.  It is not absolutely necessary, as are laws in classical logic and metaphysics.  It is 
not conditionally necessary, as are laws in empirical, natural science.  It is a spiritual law 
that is introduced by Christ as precept and example, a supernatural law grasped and 
followed by human beings only through the gift of the Spirit.299  It is effective in Christ’s 
own deed and in the way it moves us to accept it in full knowledge and freedom.  It is 
universal in that it is the way for all sinners to come to God and to help to bring other 
sinners to God. 
How does the law function?  As usual, Lonergan clarifies by contrast.  Doing 
away with evil “through power”300 is one possible means of salvation, but one that God 
in infinite wisdom did not choose.  It is associated with the “devil’s way” and “huma
pride.”  This rejected way is contrasted with the actual way that Christ worked in humble 
service and that salvation comes “through preaching of the gospel, through faith and 
n 
                                                 
299 This is another safeguard against substitutionary penal atonement.  We do not earn God’s favor and 
friendship through self-sacrifice.  Rather, God’s prior friendship and love can move us to follow Christ's 
work. 
300 Advocates of non-violence tend to emphasize the real power and activity of nonviolent responses.  Of 
course, anything achieved is achieved through some kind of power, and Lonergan uses a very general term 
potentia. The meaning is God did not solve the problem of evil simply by a unilateral exercise of 
irresistible will, but in a way that works with and through the wills of human persons.  A human attempt at 
“unilateral exercise of irresistible will” might use power in the sense which ethicists term “coercive 
power.” 
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repentance,” through “liberty” and “persuasion.”301  
Both methods are solutions to the problem of human evil.  Lonergan’s definition 
of evil in thesis 16 is the same as in thesis 17. “Evil” is a lack or privation (privatio) of 
the good.  In the realm of human freedom one can distinguish the evil of fault (or sin) 
from the evil of penalty/punishment (or any consequence of sin).  Each type of evil sets 
the stage for the other, “both in the individual, inasmuch as sins give birth to vices and 
vices lead to further sins, and in human society, when sins corrupt human situations and 
in corrupt situations the drag towards sin is extremely forceful.”302  In Lonergan’s 
alternative language, these are the cycles of decline, the cycles of violence and 
ideology.303 
God could have chosen to eliminate the downward spiral of sin and evil, of 
violence and ideology, with force or violence, either militarily or simply by wiping the 
slate clean and remaking humanity in a way in which sin was not possible.  “No doubt it 
was possible, in God’s absolute power, for fallen nature to be changed into a state of 
pure, integral nature ‘in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet’ [1 Cor 
15:52].”304  Citing Acts 1:6 and Lk. 24:21, Lonergan asserts that the messianic 
expectations of the Jewish people at the time were different in kind than what God 
chose.305  The book of Samuel narrates a growing frustration with kings who interrupted 
God’s direct rule.  From this frustration with human rulers, there arose an expectation of 
                                                 
301 Ibid., 555.  Lonergan quotes from Mt 11:29 and Mk 10:45. 
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303 See Ch. 1, section 2.3. 
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God’s anointed one who would restore God’s direct rule.306  This anointed one was often 
imagined as king who would vanquish Israel’s foes militarily. 
However, such an exercise of force or power would not have been a fitting way 
for Israel and for humanity as a whole to be redeemed, for it would have harmed the 
natural created order, violated the human freedom that God willed even as God permitted 
sin, and prevented the “supreme good” that God has willed from eternity:  free sons and 
daughters freely loving God and each other, “his friends, his children, and heirs of the 
kingdom of heaven.”307 
So instead, God chose the way Christ Jesus in fact worked, the way according to 
the Law of the Cross.  This method is to “convert” (convertere) the evils of human sin 
into a supreme good (summum bonum).308  This conversion of evil into good is the core 
of thesis 17.  It claims that redemption works “by submitting to evils and, by God’s grace 
and good will, transforming them into goods."309  How is it that evils may be transformed 
into goods?   
The intelligibility of the transformation involves three steps, each of which 
includes its own movement:  (1) the evil of fault or basic sin issues in the consequent evil 
of penalty or moral evil, (2) the evil of penalty/punishment is voluntarily transformed into 
good, and (3) God the Father blesses this transformation with another good.   
                                                 
306 “The Redemption,” 25. 
307 “The Mystical Body of Christ,” Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 20: Short Papers (Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 2008), 109.  See also DVI (trans., Hefling), 446, 530, 552, 586; Topics in 
Education, 68; Method, 117. 
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Regarding Christ, the steps are  (1) the sins of humanity lead to the sufferings of 
Jesus, (2) by obedient and loving acceptance of them, Christ transforms the sufferings 
into a moral good, which Lonergan calls “satisfaction for sins” and “sacrifice to God the 
Father,”310 as well as a teaching, expression, revelation, or communication of God’s 
glory, divine wisdom and charity, detestation and sorrow of sin, and a “new society,”311 
and (3) the Father raised his Son from the dead, so that “he might revive us from sin and 
raise our mortal bodies into eternal life.”312  This produces a situation in which all things, 
including sin, suffering, and death, can be beneficial, a situation in which, “‘all things 
work together for good to those who love God’ (Rom 8:28).”313 
The first step is the sinful situation, the matter of redemption.  The third step is the 
end of redemption, the blessing of the Father, the gift of a new situation in which pilgrims 
continue to work out their salvation with grace and the blessed enjoy eternal peace and 
life with God.  The second step is the hinge on which redemption turns.  It is a 
transformation of evil into good rather than a switch/exchange of the evils of sin, 
suffering, and death for some other things.  This is a partial answer to the question:  If we 
have been saved, then why is there still sin and evil?  On this matter, Lonergan is 
straightforward but deep: 
The redemption in Christ Jesus does not change the fundamental fact that sin continues to 
head for suffering and death.  However, the suffering and death that follow from sin 
attain a new significance in Christ Jesus.  They are no longer the sad, disastrous end to 
                                                 
310 Ibid.  On satisfaction, see section 3.2. above, and on sacrifice see section 2.4. 
311 This is the focus of our next section.  These terms can be found in various locations in the Lonergan 
corpus:  teaching: DVI, 556, 576; expression of detestation and sorrow: throughout thesis 16; revelation of 
divine wisdom, goodness, charity, and/or glory: DVI 557, 572, 583; communication or expression of love, 
detestation and sorrow: “The Redemption,” 5-6, 13, 22-23; new society: Topics in Education, 68. 
312 DVI (trans., Hefling), 556. 
313 Ibid., 557, 567, 574; “The Redemption,” 28. 
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the differential of sin, but also the means towards transfiguration and resurrection.  
Beyond death on the cross, there is the risen Savior.314 
 
On the cross, Christ freely accepted evils with the intention to convert them to 
goods.  “For Christ’s death took place so that he might rise again:  ‘I lay down my life 
that I may take it up again’ (Jn 10:17).”315  By redemption according to the Law of the 
Cross the sin, suffering, and death that remail are given a further purpose.  They become 
not the ultimate end, but the means to a better beginning.  In Christ’s work on the cross, 
suffering and death are transformed from mere consequences of sin to the means of new 
life.  And Christ died not simply for his own benefit.  He died for us and for our sins, in 
other words, because we have sinned and because he wills our redemption.316  In thesis 
17 Lonergan cites multiple passages to support this, among them Rom 4:25: “[H]e was 
‘handed over [to death] for our transgressions and raised for our justification.’”317 
Justification from sin and resurrection to new life are great goods, but they are not 
the only goods bestowed by Christ’s act.  The “fundamental theorem” of the Law of the 
Cross “is transforming evil into good, absorbing the evil of the world by putting up with 
it, not perpetuating it as rigid justice would demand.  And that putting up with it acts as a 
blotter, transforms the situation, and creates the situation in which good flourishes.”318  
This new situation is a social and an historical situation; it is the situation that reverses 
decline and promotes progress.  Lonergan explains how this works in both the individual 
and society: 
                                                 
314 Topics in Education, 66-67. 
315 Ibid., 569, emphasis added. 
316 As covered above under vicarious suffering and death and vicarious satisfaction (sections 2.3. and 3.2.), 
317 DVI (trans., Hefling), 569. 
318 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 182. 
 
 253
Sin as a chain reaction has two bases.  It has a basis first in the hearts of men, where sin 
leads to further sin insofar as hatred arises.  But Christ teaches us, “Love your enemies, 
do good to them that hate you.”  Secondly, there is a chain reaction of sin in the logic of 
the objective situation, and against that aspect Christianity teaches the acceptance of 
suffering. “The servant is not better than his master.” “Do not resist evil, but overcome 
evil with good.”  The acceptance of suffering puts an end, at least at one point to the 
chain reaction of sin that spreads throughout a society.  When everyone is dodging 
suffering, when no one accepts it, the burden is passed ever further on.319 
 
Thus, the Law of the Cross is not a way of doing away with evils through power 
or brute force.  This would go against human freedom, a gift that God wills for humanity.  
Instead, Christ, the anointed one of God, accepts the evil consequences of sin.  He 
lovingly serves us even while we are his enemies.  He breaks the personal chains of sin 
that weigh down on human hearts as well as the social chains of evil consequences that 
distort the objective situation.  Christ responds to evil, not with more evil, but with good.   
Breaking chains of sin and evil is invaluable, but it is not all that the cross 
achieves under the Law of the Cross.  The cross does not merely stop the cycle of 
decline, it reverses it.  How?  What are the goods created by accepting evils?  The 
resurrection is one good we have discussed thus far, but there are more, which we 
consider in section 4.3. 
4.2.2.  An Act of Divine Wisdom and Love 
In the third step of the Law of the Cross, Christ’s work is blessed by the Father.  
This is not to say, however, that the Father is uninvolved before this step.  Indeed the 
entirety of Christ’s activity pertains to God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  The Trinity 
as a whole is involved from the beginning.  Lonergan writes, “The Son did not love us 
                                                 
319 Topics in Education, 67-68.  Cf. “The Redemption,” 28. 
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while the Father held us in wrath; rather, both have loved us equally in the one Spirit.”320  
“It is not a matter of Christ earning God’s love for us; God’s love for us was the prime 
cause and mover of the redemption.”321 
The intentionality of Christ’s work is a divine intentionality.  It is the 
intentionality of an ultimate wisdom and love.  Accepting the consequences of sin, 
absorbing human evil, halting cycles of decline, and creating situations in which the good 
can flourish are all acts of divine wisdom and love.  To wisdom (sapientia) belongs the 
ordering of things, and the work of divine wisdom is the ordering of all things.  To love 
(typically caritas but Lonergan occasionally uses amor322) belongs willing the good for 
someone.  Divine love wills the good for all things.  When wisdom and love are 
combined, one loves rightly, one wills what truly is good for the beloved.  “For that 
reason, wisdom and charity are so conjoined that wisdom without charity lacks effect, 
and charity without wisdom falls short of the right order of justice.”323 
Christ knows and wills the true good for God, humanity, and all things.  Christ’s 
act of absorbing evil in order to overcome evil, to transform it into the supreme good, is 
possible only because he is divinely wise and charitable, only because he knows perfectly 
and loves perfectly both God and humanity.  Chosen out of this wisdom and charity, the 
cross reveals or communicates divine wisdom and charity. 
4.3.  A Communication Forming Community 
 All of Christ, his being and his works, are God’s wise revelation or 
                                                 
320 DVI (trans., Hefling), 582.  Lonergan cites Augustine, De Trinitate, XIII, 11, 15 and 1 Jn 4:10. 
321 “The Redemption,” 6. 
322 Such as on DVI (trans., Hefling), 580:  “Proinde, amare seu diligere est velle bonum alicui;…” 
323 DVI (trans., Hefling), 580. 
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communication of love.  Communication is so central to Lonergan’s soteriology that he 
writes, “The redemption is the outstanding expression of God to man…. And the 
Incarnation and the redemption are the supreme instance of God communicating to us in 
this life.…  Now that act that is found in the Incarnation and the death and resurrection of 
Christ is, above all, a personal communication.”324 
When speaking of Christ’s work as communication, Lonergan means that it 
expresses meaning and value, but also that it gives, imbues, or endows something.  This 
second aspect comes through most clearly when Lonergan speaks of redemption as the 
gift of new relationship, society, or life between humanity and God.  For example, 
“Redemption in Christ Jesus … comes through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, 
through a personal communication of the life of the ever Blessed Trinity to mankind.”325  
Of course, a community for Lonergan is constituted primarily by shared meanings and 
values.326  The mere expression of meaning and value does not make for a sharing of it.  
How the expression is given and becomes shared shall be addressed later in this chapter 
(section 4.3.5.1). 
Lonergan’s consideration of the cross as communication is spread over many 
works.  We shall consider it loosely according to the text of thesis 17,327 but our order is 
the following:   (1) the Incarnation as the communication’s foundation, (2) the Law of the 
Cross taught as a precept, primarily during Christ’s life, (3) the Law of the Cross taught 
                                                 
324 “The Redemption,” respectively, pp. 5, 6, 7. 
325 Topics in Education, 68. 
326 See part 1, section 1.5. 
327 In the context of the Law of the Cross, Lonergan considers communication in three parts: in the 
Incarnation (the Son’s “becoming like us and our situation”), in Christ’s life and teachings (“in the love in 
which he labored on our behalf”), and in his suffering and death, which we participate in and thus become 
“co-associated, conformed, and conjoined” to him [DVI (trans., Hefling), 580]. 
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by example, primarily in Christ’s death, and (4) the Law of the Cross as promise, 
revealed particularly in Christ’s resurrection, and (5) the gift by divine self-
communication of a new community. 
4.3.1. The Foundation:  The Incarnation 
 First, and most fundamentally, God united Godself to humanity in all aspects of 
our reality through the Incarnation and in all that “becoming flesh” involves.  Thus, the 
Son’s incarnation leads to being born, to partaking “in some sense” in our “sinful flesh,” 
it leads to temptation, betrayal, persecution, suffering, and death.328  The Incarnation is 
foundational to human redemption, because it enables God to communicate to humanity 
on human terms, and because it is a divine communication in itself: 
[T]he fact of the second person of the Blessed Trinity assuming human nature…  was an 
act of communication.  We express ourselves, we communicate through the flesh, through 
words and gestures, the unnoticed movements of the countenance, pauses, all the manners 
in which, as Newman says, ‘cor ad cor loquitur,’ the heart speaks unto the heart.329 
 
As fully human, Jesus Christ was able to speak to us in our own language, and 
thus to express divine love not as (one might imagine) a distant, disembodied voice from 
the sky, but as our human friend who wills us good as though we were “another self”330 
                                                 
328 DVI (trans., Hefling), 581, with reference to Rom 8:3. 
329 “The Redemption,”5-6. 
330 DVI (trans., Hefling), 580, citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9; 1169b 6, 116a 31.  Surprisingly, 
Lonergan leaves unsaid what one would think is an important element connecting the Incarnation, charity, 
and friendship, i.e. that friends share something in common.  Thomas, when presenting charity as a 
friendship with God, mentions this element borrowed from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Bk. 9), in his 
Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 62, a. 4.  Lonergan knew both works well, and, given his views on friendship 
and the Incarnation, it would seem to me that he would have had this in mind.  But this element is 
unexpressed, to my knowledge. 
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or half his soul.331  As fully divine, Jesus was able to communicate divine wisdom and 
charity, God’s “hidden plan ‘kept secret for long ages… now disclosed.’”332 
4.3.2.  The Law of the Cross as Precept:  Christ’s Life 
 
Second, during his whole incarnated life, Christ Jesus taught us the wisdom and 
love of God.  To relate Jesus’ life to the Law of the Cross as precept is not to say that his 
entire life was spent commanding that people die, and certainly not that they die 
according to some notion of satispassion.  On the contrary, love was Christ’s core 
teaching.  Paul highlights the intimacy, tenderness, and strength of Christ’s love for the 
church by comparing it with a husband’s love for his wife, and with the love we all have 
for our own flesh (Eph. 5:25-30). Christ’s more radical teaching is that, “‘No one has 
greater love than this, that a man should lay down his life for his friends’ (Jn 15:13).”333  
Christ’s message was a message of radical love, of love without conditions, a love not for 
suffering but for all people despite all suffering.  This is the love God the Father would 
bless.  The divine message of radical love comes not as a suggestion but with the force of 
a precept: 
It is the precept of loving one’s enemies (Mt 5:28-48), of daily accepting one’s cross 
(Mk 8:34; Mt 16:24; Lk 9:23), of the wisdom of laying down one’s life for Christ and the 
gospel so that one truly saves one’s life (Mk 8:35; Mt 16:25; Lk 9:24).  It appears in the 
parable of the seed that dies and bears fruit (Jn 12:24-25) and in the blessedness promised 
to those who suffer (Mt 5:11-12).334 
 
Lonergan enumerates four possible ways to observe this precept and join Christ in 
his work on the cross:  sacramental, moral, ascetical, and physical.  Sacramentally, 
                                                 
331 DVI (trans., Hefling), 580,citing Augustine, Confessions, IV, 6. 
332 DVI (trans., Hefling), 586, quoting Rom 16:25-26. 
333 DVI (trans., Hefling), 582. 
334 Ibid.,  
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baptism buries us with Christ to rise again to new life.  Morally, we are told to consider 
ourselves dead to sin and the law, “but alive to God in Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom 
6:11).”  Ascetically, we are to die according to the flesh, but if we “put to death the deeds 
of the body,” we are to live (Rom 8:13).  Physically, we are to die, and to rely on Christ, 
“‘who will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body, by the activity that makes 
him able to subdue all things in himself’’(Phil 3:20-1).”335 
In our imitation of Christ, we are to demonstrate the difference between proud, 
worldly people who wish to rule through power, and Jesus and his disciples who wished 
with humble charity to serve (Mk 10:42-45, Mt 20:25-28).336  In this work, Lonergan 
reminds us, suffering is required.  Paul cautions that “we may also be glorified with him,” 
“provided we suffer with him” (Rom 8:17.  Cp. Phil 3:9-11, 1 Pt. 4:13).  The Law of the 
Cross enjoins us to suffer with Christ, and in some ways it is the cause of this suffering, 
because its wisdom goes against the wisdom of the “world,” producing enemies from 
Jesus’ time to the present age.337   
Nevertheless, we are to take courage, since “the sufferings of this present time are 
not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed in us” (Rom 8:18.  Cp. 1 Pt. 
5:10, 2 Cor. 4:17). And “even in this life we can learn how ‘all things work together for 
good to those who love God’ (Rom 8:28).”338 
We do well to note again, however, particularly considering the potential abuses 
called “Christian sadism” and “Christian masochism,” (section 3.1.1.) that the Law of the 
                                                 
335 Ibid., 571. See also “The Mystical Body of Christ,” unpublished essay, 109-110; Topics in Education, 
67;  
336 DVI (trans., Hefling), 572. 
337 Ibid., 572-75, cf. 557.  
338 Ibid., 573-74. 
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Cross as a precept does not teach that the absorption of evil is absolutely necessary, or 
even that it is conditionally necessary as a natural law.  Suffering in itself does not please 
God.  Lonergan is aware of the real problems caused by poor understanding and 
application of Christian teaching on imitating Christ’s passion.  He concludes the thesis 
with a warning of two dangers.  One is in confusing the Father’s role with that of the 
Jews [humanity] and the devil—a problem of penal substitution.  The other is wanting to 
“follow Pilate and the Pharisees in forcing the cross on others”—problems Sölle and 
Brock point to so clearly.339 
That said, however, the Law of the Cross does teach that absorbing evil is the wise 
and charitable way that God in infinite wisdom and love has chosen for the world to be 
redeemed.  As Christ’s act, it is wise and charitable, and human observance of it must 
also flow from wisdom and charity.  This requisite love and charity, God grants us not 
only through Christ but by two trinitarian missions, the “visible mission of the Son” and 
the “invisible mission of the Spirit.”340 
4.3.3.  The Law of the Cross as Example:  Christ’s Death 
Jesus communicated his message of love not simply as precept but by example—
Christ enacted the Law of the Cross in the giving of his own life that culminates on Mt 
Calvary.  He taught us in words as well as in deeds, living his own precepts and setting an 
example for us to follow.  He not only preached and commanded that we love our 
                                                 
339 Ibid., 593.  Lonergan does not believe that a “symbolic” apprehension of the passion, one through 
feelings and images, is necessarily bad if balanced by “other elements of doctrine, devotion, and practical 
living.”  However, once further questions arise, such as Sölle’s and Brock’s, satispassion is an aberration to 
be attacked (DVI (trans., Hefling), 535). 
340 “Mission and the Spirit,” A Third Collection, 32.  See also above, section 4.1.2, as well as Ch. 1, section 
3 in which faith, hope, and love are discussed as infused virtues, a part of religious conversion which bears 
fruits in morally self-transcendent action. 
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neighbor as ourselves, that we love our enemies, and that we lay down our lives for our 
friends, but Christ acted upon his words. 
As stated above (section 2.5.), Christ’s divine status meant that he was owed all 
the riches and honors in the world, and more.  Instead he chose a life of poverty, service, 
and suffering.  In the end he chose a cruel and humiliating death, not directly, but in 
choosing unconditional love in the face of sin.  Jesus knew that the way to stop individual 
and social spirals of sin and violence was through the Law of the Cross, i.e., through a 
wise and loving acceptance of the consequences of sin.  Christ chose this death as the 
way to mediate incarnately, by deeds and example, this fact to us. 
By following Christ’s example, we join ourselves to him as he joined us to 
himself.  This is a matter of what Lonergan calls “mutual self-mediation”—becoming 
oneself in relation to the other, in this case, becoming oneself in relation to Christ.341  
Prayer is fundamental for such a growth in relationship: 
The life of prayer, the mediation of Christ in the life of prayer, is then, I should say, a 
mutual self-mediation.  One can think of attaining perfection through suffering, which is 
the human lot, in terms of abstract principles, of overcoming evil by good, of transforming 
evil into good, of the general theme of death and resurrection.  But instead of an abstract 
principle we have a mutual self-mediation.  We choose that way because, as I have said, 
we choose the cross of Christ:  “If any man would come after me, let him take up his cross 
daily and follow me.”342 
  
No less essential than prayer for following Christ’s example is the church and 
its social and historical mediation of Christ’s words and deeds.  For “the challenge of 
                                                 
341 This self-mediation and self-becoming is mutual, but it is not a relationship of equals.  Christ, however, 
does become himself in relation to us, having chosen a life of poverty, a death on the cross, etc.  See section 
2.5., above, and “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 180-181. 
342 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 181. Quote from Lk. 9:23. 
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the Word radiates to the ends of the earth only through human mediation,”343 “salvation 
comes to individuals through the preaching of the gospel,”344 and “as much as ever, one 
needs the word—the word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom, the word 
of fellowship that unites those that share the gift of God’s love, the word of the gospel 
that announces that God has loved us first and, in the fullness of time, has revealed that 
love in Christ crucified, dead, and risen.”345  Furthermore, “The example of Christ in 
his life, in his suffering and death, is set before us through all our religious teaching.”346 
Through the gospels, prayer, the Christian community, and God’s grace, we can 
learn and follow Christ’s example and grow in union with him.  However, no matter how 
far we advance, the Law of the Cross is not carried out in the same manner in us as in 
Christ.  Christ’s work is not that of a mere example, nor is his act entirely duplicable.  
Jesus is the cause of the Law of the Cross, and we are primarily the effect of it—though 
to some degree in observing the precept and following Christ’s example, we are 
participants in its causation.  Additionally, Christ is perfect before the transformation 
enacted by the law, while we are perfected through it.  Jesus took the evils of punishment 
freely, while we justly incur punishments, though we may take some on freely through 
the Spirit’s aid of grace.  Finally, the gifts produced by the law are Christ’s by virtue of 
his being a divine person, while they are disproportionate to us and become ours only by 
grace.347 
                                                 
343 “The Response of the Jesuit,” A Second Collection, 175.  This statement raises questions about salvation 
outside the church, questions that are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
344 DVI (trans., Hefling), 555. 
345 Method, 113. 
346 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 177. 
347 DVI (trans., Hefling), 577-78.  See also 557.  
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4.3.4.  The Law of the Cross as Promise:  Christ’s Resurrection 
 Without the resurrection, Christ’s suffering and death for us and for our sins 
would not be a narrative of glory but merely a story of sorrow.  The crucifix displayed by 
Christians would not be a symbol of God’s love and wisdom but a memorial to tragedy.  
Thankfully, however, God the Father blessed his Son’s meritorious choice to love 
without reserve.  And now Christians understand the resurrection to be the essential 
outcome of Christ crucified.  “Beyond death on the cross, there is the risen Savior.”348 
As the “principal instance” of the third step in the Law of the Cross,349 Christ’s 
resurrection gives his death its intended purpose:  “For Christ’s death took place so that 
he might rise again:  ‘I lay down my life that I may take it up again’ (Jn 10:17).”350  
Christ’s resurrection is the final word to Christ’s life and death, but it is not the final word 
of redemption.  For in this one man’s resurrection is the divine promise of new life to all 
people who share in Christ’s life and death.   
Thus, the resurrection of Jesus is a communication that inspires hope.  Through 
the resurrection Christ’s words and deeds become the good news.  Christ’s death and 
resurrection are the “concrete illustration, application, realization” of the good news of 
salvation, the initiation of the reign of God.351  In the reign of God, divine wisdom and 
love are in charge.  Even sin and death can lead to good.  Christ’s death and resurrection 
communicate this fact: 
What was Christ doing by dying and rising again? He was overcoming in himself, and 
also through his followers, all the evils in the world, and overcoming them to rise again, 
                                                 
348 Topics in Education, 67. 
349 DVI (trans., Hefling), 579. 
350 Ibid., 569, emphasis added. 
351 “The Redemption,” 26-27. 
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that by his resurrection we might know and realize and act upon those words of St. Paul 
in Romans, chapter 8, verse 28, “To those that love God, all things conspire unto the 
good.”352 
 
With the knowledge that in the resurrection sin and death are overcome, 
Christians are given the hope that enables them to follow Christ and to reverse cycles of 
decline: 
The death and resurrection of Christ express the victory of truth and goodness in spite of 
every kind of suffering…  The example of Christ and the grace of God that comes to us 
through Christ constitute a historical force that, in Christ’s own words amounts really to 
this:  Fear not, I have overcome the world….  It is this Christian hope that is the supreme 
force in history.  It is a fundamental and unchangeable ground that enables ordinary 
mortals to stand by the truth and stand by what is right, no matter what the 
consequences.353 
 
The resurrection is not only the promise but also the object of Christian hope.  
Christ’s resurrection is the promise, but our hope is for our own resurrection.  Lonergan 
understands Christian resurrection in multiple ways: “There is the symbolic death of 
baptism and the symbolic life of the Eucharist; there is the ascetic death of mortification, 
of dying to sin, and the ascetic resurrection of the exercise of virtue.”354  Ultimately, 
however, the resurrection we hope for is a bodily resurrection after physical death.  This 
resurrection is eschatological.  It comes, not in this world, but in the world to come.355 
4.3.5.  Divine Love and the New Society 
 Redemption according to Lonergan is a personal communication given in Christ’s 
incarnation, life, death, and resurrection. “It is an act of human communication performed 
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353 Topics in Education, 257 
354 Ibid., 67. 
355 “The Redemption,”17. Cf. DVI (trans., Hefling), 559, where Lonergan cites church doctrine on the 
resurrection of the body: DB 2, 6, 86; DS 11, 30, 150.  Lonergan does not discuss specifics about the 
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by a divine person.”356  It is a personal communication in two senses, both as incarnate 
meaning and as self-gift.  In both senses redemption as communication forms 
community. 
4.3.5.1.  Bringing Out Love by Incarnate Meaning 
Earlier,357 we quoted Lonergan as stating that when made out of charity, 
satisfaction for one’s enemy’s offenses (whether by Christ or a Christian participating in 
Christ’s work) can “bring out” love in one’s enemy and create a mutually loving 
relationship.  The same is true under the Law of the Cross.  Accepting the evil 
consequences of sin can be a wise way of communicating love and drawing forth love 
from one who does not love, i.e., a sinner or enemy.  But how does this bringing out or 
drawing forth work? 
This question is important because, as mentioned in section 3.2., there is the 
pitfall of exemplarism, by which Christ’s work is thought to have been simply a positive 
example.  Among the various ways Lonergan guards against exemplarism is his 
affirmation that Christ’s example, Christ’s communication, brings or draws out a loving 
response in the sinner.  The question is, how does this work?  Lonergan does not answer 
the question explicitly, but I believe that what he calls “incarnate meaning” provides an 
answer.  Meaning is an important part of human existence.  It connects with the natural 
human desire to know and to follow the true and the good.  It guides human activity and 
builds human community.  Incarnate meaning is a special type of meaning with a central 
role in human living.  
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 265
Lonergan asserts that Christ’s work of redemption is communicated both in word 
and deed, in other words, by both “linguistic meaning” and “incarnate meaning.”  The 
linguistic meaning of the gospels is “endlessly reinforced by the incarnate meaning to be 
contemplated in the life and ministry and, above all, in the suffering, death, and 
resurrection of Christ.”358  Incarnate meaning is the way “heart speaks to heart.”  “It can 
be at once intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic.  It is the meaning of a person, of 
his way of life, of his words, or his deeds.”359  This is the “incarnate intelligibility” 
(section 1.2.3.) that “exploits all the subtle relations that hold between body and mind, 
between flesh and spirit.”360  
For Lonergan, the whole person as body and mind is physical, sensing, 
spontaneously intersubjective, imaginative, inquisitive, intelligent, reasonable, feeling, 
and committed.  Christ crucified appeals to all aspects of the human person.  The 
meaning he mediates on the cross is, thus, an incarnate meaning that moves us physically, 
sensibly, in our deep desires and fears, our imaginations, our senses of wonder, our 
desires for understanding and truth, our capacities for feeling and commitment. 
An important part of the reason why the cross moves us is the natural human 
desire for truth, goodness, and love.  This desire is not simply a desire to know and to feel 
truth, goodness, and love.  It extends from the cognitive realm to the moral and social 
realms.  Lonergan affirms that part of human nature is the desire to be, to act and to live 
in accordance with truth, goodness, and love.  Finally, we have a desire to know, to feel, 
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to be, to act, and to live according to ultimate truth, unconditional goodness, and 
otherworldly love.  This is a desire for what Lonergan  calls self-transcendence as 
intellectual, moral, and religious.361  When sin has affected the person and the 
community, then self-transcendence becomes a matter of conversion.362  As a 
communication of incarnate meaning by a divine person, the cross meets human persons 
in their transcendent desire for intellectual, moral, and religious fulfillment. 
This is true not simply about abstract, general natures, but about concrete human 
persons.  In Christ’s incarnation, life, death, and resurrection there is a personal message 
for each person at each moment of his/her life.  When meditating on these mysteries, 
“each must take from it his [or her] own fruit… the thoughts that come to him, the 
affectations aroused in his heart, the acts of will that arise, that are presented as 
possibilities to his freedom.”363  We come to know Christ “not as apprehended by the 
apostles, by Paul and John, by the church, by Christ himself, by the Spirit; it is our own 
apprehension of him.  It is, as it were, putting on, acquiring our own view of him.  We put 
on Christ in our own way, in accord with our own capacities and individuality, in 
response to our own needs and failings.”364 
The cross as incarnate meaning meets each of us where s/he is.  In a personal way, 
it draws forth from the peak of our selves a self-transcendent love.  There is something in 
                                                 
361 See part 1, particularly section 1.4.2.  On this natural desire to be, act, and live according to truth, 
goodness, and value, Lonergan writes, “For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to 
self-transcendence, not only can we recognize answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but 
also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of moral 
self-transcendence ” (Method, 38, emphasis added). 
362 See part 1, particularly section 3.2.1. 
363 “The Redemption,” 7.  Lonergan acknowledges his dependence on Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual 
Exercises. 
364 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 180. 
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our very makeup, in our natural desires and personal characters, that Christ on the cross 
appeals to, connects with, and draws forth in an appropriate response.  From the cross, 
Christ communicates an interpersonal invitation to transcend ourselves in an 
interpersonal way.  Specifically, this communication is of the condemnation of human sin 
and the love of God despite sin.  This communication invites us to respond to Christ’s 
condemnation of sin with repentance and to Christ’s love with our own love.  This love, 
like all loves, bears consequences on the way “from above downwards” (part 1, chapter 
1, section 1.5.2.).  It shifts all of our commitments.  It bears fruit in judgments of truth 
and value, in new questions, and new insights.  It opens up new ways of experiencing the 
world.  We become new persons, renewed by the incarnate meaning, the divine wisdom 
and love that Christ incarnates for us on the cross. 
The cross is a communication, but it is not a mere communication.  It moves us 
with a meaning that is both transcendent and incarnate.  But it is an invitation, for it 
meets us where we are, as chained by sin yet yearning for righteousness.  It works not by 
necessity and power, doing away with human freedom, but in a way that fits with human 
desires and human freedom, as incarnate communication and moving invitation. 
4.3.5.2.  Self-Communication for Life in the Trinity 
` Christ Jesus, moved out of love for us, chose to be who he was for us.  So we too, 
moved by love for him, can choose to become conformed to Christ and to live a renewed 
life in him.  This conformity to Christ is not merely the product of our choice.  The 
incarnate meaning of his life, death, and resurrection moves us with the power of God’s 
love (see “religious conversion” in chapter. 1, section 3.2.1.).  Furthermore, the cross 
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does not merely mediate a profound and moving incarnate meaning.  Christ’s 
communication on the cross is a communication in the sense of “imbuing,”  
“implanting,” or “infusing.”  God gives God’s self to us in redemption.365  By this self-
gift human persons are healed of sin and become part of a new society, sharing the life of 
the Blessed Trinity and enjoying healed relationships with one another. 
 First, in the Incarnation, God has communicated not simply an intellectually-
graspable fact: that God loves us.  Rather, through Christ we are given the Love by which 
God loves God: 
Because God became man, the love of God for God became the love of God for man.  
Because love is for a person, when God became man, when the Word was made Flesh, 
divine love broke the confines of divinity to love a created humanity in the manner that 
God the Father loves God the Son….  This love, then, is the love of God for God.  
Moreover, it too is God, God the Holy Ghost, who is the infinite love proceeding from 
the infinite lovableness of God.366 
 
 In redemption the Father has loved us so much as to send his Son.  The Son has 
become one with humanity, sharing in our situation and loving us even unto death.  The 
Father has blessed the Son’s death with resurrection and with gifts that extend shared 
nature and friendship to all of humanity.  Through this we are given the gift of God’s 
Love, the Holy Spirit.  Lonergan discusses this process with a quote from scripture: 
“In the fullness of time, God sent his Son, born of woman, made under the law, that those 
who were under the law might be redeemed and receive the adoption of sons.  And now 
that you are sons, to show that you are sons, he sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, 
crying; Abba, Father!’”  (Galatians 4.4-6).  The mission of the Son and the mission of the 
Holy Ghost is the basis of a new society in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in which there is 
communicated to us personally, through the person of the Son and through the person of 
the Spirit, a participation of divine perfection, a participation of the order of truth and love 
that binds the three persons of the Blessed Trinity.367 
 
                                                 
365 Ibid., 6. 
366 “The Mystical Body of Christ,” 107. 
367 Topics in Education, 68. 
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 In giving us some participation in the life of the Trinity, Christ and the Spirit that 
he sends bring us to closer relationship with the Father, so that in sum we become 
“temples of Christ’s Spirit, members of his body, adopted children of the Father.”368  
Participation in the life of the Trinity is not something held off to the future, but it is now, 
“part of our concrete reality,” “the fundamental fact about us.”369 
Through this participation in the life of the Trinity we are given many gifts; “there 
is implanted within us a new principle of a higher life and from it there flow the infused 
virtues and gifts of the Holy Ghost.”370 This new life and these new gifts are the basis of 
a new society, not only with God but also with other human beings as members of the 
body of Christ.   
This life, these virtues, and this society are ours, not by nature but by grace.371  
Initially they are a reality that is immediate but not known or developed.  It is only 
through prayer and perseverance that this life becomes known and these virtues become 
practiced with spontaneity and consistency.372 
The “guiding thread” in all of this—through the Incarnation, the precept and 
example of Christ, the promise and hope for the resurrection, God’s self-gift and the 
graces we come slowly to know and to practice—is love.373  Love is central from the 
beginning through the end of redemption: 
                                                 
368 “Existenz and Aggiornamento,” an address given At Regis College, Willowdale, Ontario in 1964, 
published in Collection (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 249.  See also “The Mediation of Christ in 
Prayer,” 178-79. 
369 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 179-180. 
370 “The Mystical Body of Christ,” 109. 
371 Ibid., 108-111; “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 178. 
372 “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” 178; “The Mystical Body of Christ,” 5. 
373 “The Mystical Body of Christ,” 106. 
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Hence the great commandment is to love God with all one’s heart and all one’s soul, with 
all one’s mind and all one’s strength.  And the second is like unto the first, to love one’s 
neighbor as oneself, to love one another as Christ has loved us, toward the fulfillment of 
Christ’s prayer at the last Supper: “I in them, and Thou in me, that they may be completely 
made one in us, that the world may believe that Thou hast sent me and that Thou hast 
loved them as Thou hast loved me” [John 17:23].374 
 
Christ’s prayer has been answered.  His work is done.  However, redemption is 
achieved in two stages.375  The reign of God is both at hand and still to come.  Though its 
fullness is eschatological, there is already a new society of humanity reconciled in love to 
God and each other.  This new community, this new set of right relations is the “supreme 
good,” the good for which Christ worked “according to the just and mysterious Law of 
the Cross.” 
                                                 
374 “The Mystical Body of Christ,” 111. 
375 The fullness of this reality, is, of course, in the life to come, the second stage of redemption as end.  DVI 
(trans., Hefling), 481.  Cf. “Mission and the Spirit,” 26. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 In this part we have sought to understand Lonergan’s understanding of 
redemption, particularly his understanding of the role of the crucifixion.  Redemption 
through Christ Jesus is a mystery that has been revealed.  Through the grace of faith and 
the natural gifts of reason, one can seek a fruitful understanding of this mystery through 
an analogy with natural things and in relation to other revealed mysteries and our ultimate 
end.  This was our method.376   
We have not, however, sought a perfect or comprehensive understanding of the 
mystery.  With Lonergan, we have considered the intelligibility of redemption as fitting, 
dynamic, incarnate, complex, and multiple.  We have examined the basic but 
fundamental ways of understanding Christ’s work, ways presented by scripture and 
tradition, namely redemption, paying a price, vicarious suffering and death, sacrifice, 
meritorious obedience, the risen lord, and eternal priest.  We have distinguished two 
possible theories for understanding these diverse scriptural analogies as a united whole:  
Anselm’s theory of satisfaction versus its problematic aberration, called substitutionary 
penal atonement or satispassion. 
 In the third and fourth chapters, we studied Lonergan’s two privileged analogies 
for understanding Christ’s work on the cross.  These analogies are higher viewpoints or 
                                                 
376 The analogies of nature include the revealed analogies of thesis 15, satisfaction, and the Law of the 
Cross.  These were our focus, but other mysteries, such as the Incarnation, the resurrection, and the mission 
of the Spirit, played important roles. Of course, the cross’s role in redemption as means was considered in 
relation to redemption as our ultimate end—the loving relationship with God, each other, and all things, 
i.e., the reign of God. 
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larger contexts within which the various aspects of redemption become related as a 
whole.  The first analogy is satisfaction.  For Lonergan, satisfaction is not simply the 
payment of a debt.  It is an expression of a person’s soul that is intended to create a 
concord of wills and the union of persons.  When one has done something wrong and 
offended another person, one might rub it in, but the better response is to express a 
heartfelt detestation of the wrong and sorrow for the harm it has caused.  Furthermore, 
one could be punished in retribution.  The better way, however, is to ask for pardon and 
to make that request more appropriate by willingly taking on the consequences of one’s 
actions.  This better way is satisfaction. 
 Christ’s work on the cross is satisfaction.  But it satisfaction of a particular kind.  
Christ offers vicarious satisfaction—the satisfaction for another’s offense—and he does it 
not merely for those friendly to him, but for those who act as his enemies, for all of us in 
our sinfulness.  Christ’s work is not intended to appease God; on the contrary, it is 
motivated by God.  It is a divine initiative.  Fully divine and fully human, Jesus Christ 
knows human sin in the entirety of its intrinsic evil and in the evil of its consequences, 
particularly the way sin ruptures our relationships with God, with ourselves, and with 
each other.  Moved by a perfect knowledge of sin and its consequences and by a perfect 
love for God and humanity, Christ is able to offer a satisfaction that encompasses all sins.  
He is able to feel and to express perfect detestation of sins and perfect sorrow for the 
damage that they do. 
 Furthermore, moved by this knowledge and this love, Christ expresses his perfect 
detestation and sorrow in a manner that is perfectly fitting—on the cross.  Instead of 
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responding to evil with evil, Jesus accepted the consequences of our sins.  He broke the 
chain reaction of sin and violence.  Instead of doing away with evil by coercive force or 
magical power, he wisely and lovingly accepted the consequences of sin.  He acted not 
out of defeat but out of hope and prayer.  Accepting the evils of sin, he overcame them.  
He converted them into the means for new life and new community, namely, a 
communication of God’s wisdom and love.  Christ on the cross communicates the order 
of the universe, an order in which good leads to good, good can choose to sin, sin leads to 
evil consequences, and sinful consequences can be transformed into good.  Christ on the 
cross transforms suffering and death into a communication of Love that invites us and 
inspires us to repent of our sins, to love God and all things, and to follow him in his work 
of overcoming evil with good, thus reversing decline, liberating progress, and mediating 
redemption.  This is the Law of the Cross, the law Christ decreed as precept and example, 
by both linguistic and incarnate word. 
 The Law of the Cross explains not only how we are redeemed, but why we are 
redeemed in this way.  Our God is infinitely wise and good.  This is the world which God 
has chosen from among all possible worlds. It works not through universal, necessary 
laws but through emergent probability.  Human persons are essentially intelligent and 
free, capable of discovering and directing their/our progress.  Human nature is good in 
potential and desire, but it is open to sin and bias.  Sin, bias, and their evil consequences 
dispose human persons to further sin and shrink their horizons of concern.  God’s grace 
breaks through the harmful and cumulative effects of sin, liberating human society and 
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human hearts and minds by a threefold conversion, particularly by faith, hope, and love.  
Christ’s work on the cross is the focal point of redemption. 
 The Law of the Cross works with emergent probability.  It shifts probabilities 
from a tendency to do evil to a tendency to do good.  It is a mediation and an object of 
faith, hope, and love, grounding the conversions and liberating from sin and bias the 
good, natural, human orientation toward self-transcendence on physical, intellectual, 
emotional, existential, social, historical, and religious levels. 
Because God willed the good of human freedom and a just world order, God 
permitted sin and indirectly willed the harmful consequences of sin.  The redemption that 
God has chosen does not destroy a fallen nature and start anew.  Rather, God has chosen 
to redeem nature by working with nature through the Law of the Cross.  Furthermore, 
God did not have to redeem this fallen world, and God did not have to redeem it on the 
cross.  Nevertheless, from all possible means of redemption, God—in infinite wisdom 
and charity—chose the cross.  God chose this way because it is the wisest and the most 
loving way.  It fits with the order God has willed for creation since its beginning (a 
dynamic, interdependent hierarchy governed by emergent probability), and it fits with the 
end that God has in store (that all things be one with God in love). 
It is this final end that makes Christ’s work on the cross most fitting.  The 
redemption that God has willed from eternity out of infinite love and wisdom is not the 
creation of automatons that do God’s will by necessity, but free sons and free daughters 
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who freely love God, each other, and all things.377  This is the supreme good, the final 
end of creation.  Because God willed that through love we might share in the divine life 
and become co-creators of a community bound by love, God willed human persons to be 
free, and God willed to redeem us from the aberrations of our freedom not by destroying 
our freedom but by working with our freedom, by communicating incarnately, and by 
inviting us lovingly into a redemption that is reconciliation
 
377 “[F]aith recognizes that God grants men their freedom, that he wills them to be persons and not just his 
automata, that he calls them to the higher authenticity that overcomes evil with good” (Method, 117).  See 
note 307, above, and part 1, section 3.3.2. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
In the introduction, as well as at other points in this dissertation, I have asserted 
that my purpose is not so much to judge the merits of Lonergan’s understanding of how 
Christ’s suffering and death saves as simply to understand his understanding.  In this 
conclusion, however, I would like to provide a brief assessment of what I find to be the 
strengths in Lonergan’s thought.  This assessment will consider two parts: first, the 
harmony of Lonergan’s cosmology and anthropology with his soteriology, and second, 
the pastoral/practical helpfulness of Lonergan’s soteriology for Christian discipleship. 
In my opinion, there is a real beauty to the way Lonergan’s soteriology functions 
in relation to his cosmology and anthropology, and vice versa.  As Lonergan indicates in 
Thesis 17 of De Verbo Incarnato, to solve the problem of human sin, God could have 
totally destroyed creation and started anew.  But in infinite wisdom and love, God 
thought it fitting instead to work redemption in harmonious continuity with the order of 
the cosmos as God created/creates it. 
We can imagine God “up there” horrified that creation has gone wrong “after” it 
has been made, but this is not the way Lonergan would have it.  As he writes in Insight, 
“There are no divine afterthoughts.”1  God did not choose to solve the problem of evil 
after realizing God has “messed up.”  Rather, from the beginning, from all eternity, God 
has willed this creation, and this redemption.  From all possible world orders and all 
                                                 
1 Insight, 717, cf. 718. 
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possible solutions to the problems of this world order, this order and this redemption are 
the ones that God has chosen from eternity out of infinite love and wisdom. 
God did not choose to eliminate the evils of human sin through a simple, coercive 
power, because that would not have been compatible with God’s original intention for 
creation and humanity.  God did not will a clockwork creation governed simply by 
absolute, universal, necessary rules, and God did not will a humanity that automatically 
chooses the good.  Instead, God willed that the world be governed by emergent 
probability, and that human beings be given freedom.  This nature, according to 
Lonergan, God willed directly, and it is good.  But in willing freedom, God 
allowed/allows the possibility of sin and evil.  God does not will these things, but permits 
them, because God wills freedom. 
Why would God permit sin and evil in willing freedom?  An intelligible answer 
can be given only in light of, or in relation to, the ultimate purpose of creation.  For 
Lonergan, God’s ultimate intention in creating human freedom and a world order of 
emergent probability is the eventual emergence of the union of all things with God, 
particularly a union of human life with the divine life through free, cooperative love.  
This, for Lonergan, is the “supreme good” in light of which God’s permission of sin 
makes sense.2 
Consequently, the redemption works in harmonious continuity with the structure 
of creation as a whole as well as with the human person and the human community as 
                                                 
2 “The Mystical Body of Christ,” Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 20: Short Papers (Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 2008), 108-109.  See also DVI (trans., Hefling), 446, 530, 552, 586; Topics in 
Education, 68; Method, 117. 
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they exist in history.  Fundamentally, the world order as Lonergan conceives of it is one 
of cooperation.  Things and events on the lowest, earliest levels of creation work together 
in intelligible relationships that are more or less probable to form recurrent cycles that set 
the conditions for the emergence of higher levels of things, events, and recurrent cycles.  
The higher depends on the lower for its emergence and survival, but the higher also takes 
up the lower into more complicated, more integrated patterns of cooperative relationality.  
So chemical conditions set the stage for biological systems, and chemical and biological 
systems set the stage for psychological, spiritual, and communal systems.  Higher 
systems depend on the lower for their proper functioning, but they also make the lower 
capable of leaps in capacity.  Thus, carbon and oxygen are not capable on their own of 
sensing, questioning, thinking, feeling, deciding, loving, and building communities based 
on these operations, but in human persons they become capable of this. 
The human person, for Lonergan, is a part of an emergently probable world order.  
But s/he is a special part of that order, capable to some degree of discovering and 
directing the development of that order.  Such human-directed development is through 
the transcendental method and the cooperative activity of a human community brought 
together primarily by shared meanings and values.  The community is not static.  
Through the interplay of social tradition and individuals’ new insights and free choices, 
human communities develop in history.  If the operations and cooperations are authentic, 
then individuals and communities will progress.  If they are inauthentic, whether 
mistakenly so or willfully so, there will be decline.  Individual acts of bias, sin, and evil 
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will set the conditions for the emergence of an accelerating downward spiral of lies and 
hatred, apathy and ideology, violence and oppression. 
The good news is that while any given concrete society will be comprised 
simultaneously of both authenticity and inauthenticity, nature and sin, progress and 
decline, it will also be comprised to some degree of God’s grace:  the divine self-
communication that becomes effective through converted persons and communities.  Just 
as progress and decline operate according to the divinely chosen world order of emergent 
probability, so too does redemption.  God’s grace does not destroy human freedom; 
rather, it shifts probabilities.  It transforms one’s orientation from a damaged tendency 
toward falsehood and evil to a renewed desire for the true and the good, a renewed desire 
that directs renewed authentic operation and cooperation. 
How does Christ’s passion function in this emergently probable order of progress, 
decline, and redemption?  Redemption, for Lonergan, is a cooperation of multiple things 
and events, as are the functioning of the created world order, the human person, and the 
human community.  Since sin is primarily a human problem (at least, and certainly, in its 
causes) redemption is a cooperation primarily between the human and the divine.  It is, to 
be sure, a divine initiative, but it is also constituted by human cooperation. 
The already achieved, or “objective,” elements of Christ’s work on the cross are 
emphasized by Lonergan in his discussion of the traditional, biblical analogies.  As 
Lonergan affirms, Christ’s work is one of multiple intelligibility.  It is redemption—the 
deliverance from sin for right relationship.  It is the paying a price, in the sense of 
willingly taking on the consequences of sin in the context of satisfaction.  It is vicarious 
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suffering and death, since Christ dies for us and on account of our sin.  It is a unique 
sacrifice offered once and for all as a worshipful act directed to God on behalf of people 
for the remission of their sins, but not to appease an angry Father.  It is a meritorious 
obedience, in that it is the product not of coercive force, but of a pleasing union of heart 
and mind, worthy of the gift of salvation.  Then redemption is also a work of Christ as 
risen lord and eternal priest, for the resurrection conveys in incarnate meaning the truth 
that sin and death have been overcome.  Christ as risen lord and eternal priest sanctifies 
us in his life with the Father, intercedes for us, and with the Father sends us the Holy 
Spirit, so that sins are forgiven and divine love is shared. 
Including and going beyond these ways of understanding Christ’s passion, 
Lonergan adds satisfaction and the Law of the Cross. Christ’s work does not satisfy in the 
sense of appeasing an angry Father through the forced punishment of the Son.  What is 
satisfying is the Son’s free acceptance of the evil consequences of human sin, in an 
infinitely wise and loving way that communicates to God and to humanity a perfect 
human and divine (1) detestation of sin, (2) sorrow for sin’s evil consequences, and (3) 
love for God and humanity.  It functions in a context of interpersonal relationships by 
coming from and seeking to produce a concord of wills.  It is the product of the union in 
Christ of divine love and wisdom with human love and wisdom.  It is the product of the 
supernatural friendship of charity, the love that enables one to be friends with one’s 
enemy.  And it intends to produce for, with, and in human persons the union of divine 
and human love.  Its method, explained according to the Law of the Cross, is to transform 
the evil consequences of human sin into an incarnate, twofold communication of the evils 
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of human sin and the goodness of divine love.  It is an invitation to sinful humanity to a 
twofold response: the repentance of sin and the return of love for love. 
The Word of God revealed on the cross is the good news passed on in history by 
the human community through shared symbols, texts, songs, and lives of testimony.  It is 
the divine self-communication of divine love for human persons, a love revealed to be 
true and operative even in our sinful state.  Its effects on human persons, the human 
community, and human history are pervasive.  It works on both vectors of human self-
transcendence:  “the way from below upwards” and “the way from above downwards.”  
Christ’s loving passion is an historical event, one that can and must be experienced, 
questioned, understood, and judged.  It is the occasion not only for an “outer word” to be 
experienced, judged and decided upon, but also an “inner word,” the word of Love that 
floods the peak of human consciousness, transforming us from individuals with narrow-
minded bias to persons with an unrestricted horizon of concern.  Through the inner word, 
we are given not merely impersonal data but interpersonal commitments, life-
transforming world-views that provide new contexts and orientations for the emergence 
of our future decisions, judgments, ideas, and experiences. 
Through both vectors, Christ’s passion provides the opportunity for ongoing 
religious, moral, and intellectual conversion.  Of course, such vectors are abstractions, 
and human living is always a concrete composite of these components.  The inner and the 
outer words operate not with absolute, ineluctable necessity, but with human cooperation 
in human living—which is ever a matter of tension between authenticity and 
inauthenticy.  Despite the precariousness of human authenticity, it is certain that if we are 
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to be redeemed, the divine meanings and values incarnated on the cross and 
communicated in inner and outer words must become an operative source for authentic 
human decisions, commitments, and actions. It must be accepted by human responsibility 
(augmented by charity and hope) and assented to by human reason (informed by hope 
and faith). 
Furthermore, if Christ’s work on the cross is to become effective in concrete 
human experience and living, it must be understood by human intelligence, not 
comprehensively but in some fruitful measure.  Such understanding is the job of 
systematics, as conceived by Lonergan.  We have sought understanding primarily for the 
sake of understanding.3  However, as the introduction indicated, human understanding is 
a foundation for human living, both in its personal and its communal aspects.  
Consequently, I would like to end this dissertation with some comments on what I 
believe to be the pastoral and practical benefits of Lonergan’s systematic soteriology.4 
To guide this consideration, I would like to return to the questions posed at the 
very beginning of the dissertation, in its introduction.  There I mentioned that people find 
the affirmation that the passion of Christ saves humanity is problematic.  First of all, 
given the facts of sin and evil in the world, we might wonder, What actual effect(s) has 
the cross had, if any, on human history?  To this question, I would say that Lonergan’s 
thought helps us to understand that the effectiveness of the cross, as mentioned above, is 
                                                 
3 And more as an interpretive exercise in understanding Lonergan than a comprehensive systematic effort 
to understand the doctrine. 
4 Lonergan defines “systematics” as the branch of theology that seeks to understand the judgments of truth 
and value made in “doctrines.”  After systematics, the next step in theological method is 
“communications.”  This is where the continually-renewed understandings of systematics are brought to 
bear on pastoral and practical matters, in other words, the complicated and essential tasks of living in 
community.  See Method, chs. 5, 12-14. 
 
 283
in some ways objective and already achieved.  But in some ways, for the fullness of 
redemption to actually occur, there is still required the ongoing participation of human 
persons more or less transformed by the message of Christ’s passion (as well as his life 
and resurrection, and the workings of the Holy Spirit).  What is key for Lonergan is that 
through the cross, sin and evil become transformed into the conditions of the possibility 
for the emergence of greater goods: 
The redemption in Christ Jesus does not change the fundamental fact that sin continues to 
head for suffering and death.  However, the suffering and death that follow from sin 
attain a new significance in Christ Jesus.  They are no longer the sad, disastrous end to 
the differential of sin, but also the means towards transfiguration and resurrection.  
Beyond death on the cross, there is the risen Savior.5 
 
 The fact that sin, suffering, and death remain in the world but now as the 
opportunity for resurrection and reconciliation may answer the question about the effects 
of redemption, but it can also give rise to new, perhaps more difficult questions.  If after 
Christ’s passion, sin and evil remain as the opportunity for good, then might not people 
be tempted, to value sin and evil as goods themselves.  This possibility, Dorothea Sölle 
has named “Christian sadism” and “Christian masochism.”6  Might we not value 
suffering as something good, to be given and/or received at every opportunity, since these 
become in some way the means of redemption?  Might we not also, as mentioned in the 
introduction, fail to console and otherwise aid others in their time of need since suffering 
is the occasion for transcendence?  Might we not think sins that produce suffering are in 
some way good?  Might we not blame God for sin and suffering?  Might God’s ways not 
seem totally foreign to human intelligence and love? 
                                                 
5 Topics in Education, 66-67, also quoted above in part 2, ch. 4. 
6 This possibility, Dorothea Sölle has named “Christian sadism” and “Christian masochism,” as discussed 
in part two, chapter two, above. 
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I believe that Lonergan’s understandings of both cosmology and redemption 
mitigate greatly the possibilities for these and other abuses of Christian understanding 
and imitation of the divine.  First of all, as mentioned many times, Lonergan affirms that 
God (1) wills directly only the good, (2) in no way wills but permits the evil of sin in 
willing the goodness of freedom and love, and (3) indirectly wills evil consequences of 
sin, such as suffering, as part of willing a world order where freedom is real, justice is 
operative, and people may learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of others.7  The 
world order is a product of infinite intelligence, goodness, wisdom, and love.  This divine 
intelligence, goodness, wisdom, and love is not totally foreign to human intelligence, 
goodness, wisdom, and love.  It is like it, or analogous to it.  Thus, there is no consequent 
separation of knowledge of divine things and knowledge of human things, i.e. of faith 
and reason.   God permits sin and indirectly wills suffering and death, only because God 
wills a greater good to arise from the possibility of sin, namely the free and loving union 
of humanity with God, the supreme good. Thus, the divine will cannot be made out to be 
cruel and sadistic, or even arbitrary.  God has a purpose for allowing sin and indirectly 
willing suffering, and this purpose is not simply God’s “pleasure.”8 
Lonergan is clear that human beings, not God, are responsible for sin and its evil 
consequences.  This is true for the workings of the world in general, and it is true in 
particular for the events of Jesus’ suffering, death, and resurrection.  If we apply 
                                                 
7 “Mistakes” includes but is not identical to sin. 
8 I have in mind John Calvin when thinking of these positions:  (1) that God alone is sole the cause of all 
things, including sin and suffering, (2) that God’s will may seem to be cruel or arbitrary according to 
human knowing, and (3) that this is because God’s reasons are so far above human capacities for knowing.  
These positions come to light most clearly when Calvin discusses predestination, such as in Bk. 3, Ch. 21 
of the Institutes of Christian Religion. 
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Lonergan’s threefold scheme to Christ’s passion we see that the Father (1) wills only the 
good of Jesus’ unconditional and unfailing love, even in the face of sin and its evil 
consequences, (2) permits the sinful choices of Judas, the soldiers, the priests, Pilate, the 
crowd, and indeed of all of us, and (3) indirectly wills the suffering of Jesus by willing 
that there be real consequences to human action. 
Thus, by no means did the Father wish for the Son to suffer in order to appease 
himself, as those whom Rita Nakashima Brock so adroitly critiques hold.  Christ’s 
satisfaction is not “satispassion.”  It is not Christ’s pain that the Father wills, but Christ’s 
love for God and human persons and Christ’s detestation and sorrow for sin and its 
consequences.  Christ’s passion is not the sadistic pleasure of an all-powerful Father.  Nor 
is it the masochistic pleasure of a submissive Son.  Rather, it is the result of human sin 
and evil meeting divine love and wisdom.  It is the result of an all-powerful God, but a 
God whose infinite power is one with infinite wisdom and love, a power so wise and 
loving that it chose to create human freedom and to redeem it on the cross. 
Not the perverse pleasure of the Father or the Son, the cross is the communication 
of divine wisdom and love to humanity.  Just as redemption in general does not operate 
by violent or coercive force, Christ on the cross chose not to respond to human sin and 
evil with violence but to accept our violence and to do so wisely and lovingly in a way 
that incarnated wisdom and love.  In particular, the cross is the communication of the 
evils of human sin and the goodness of divine love, an incarnate communication that 
moves us and invites us to be reconciled with God, one another, and all things. 
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What does all this mean practically, pastorally for Christian discipleship?  Are we 
called upon to imitate God’s role in regard to creation?  Are we, thus, called upon to will 
the good directly, to permit sin in willing freedom and love, and to indirectly will 
suffering as a consequence of sin that will educate persons to do the good?  As strange as 
it may sound to permit sin and indirectly will suffering, I think that we are called to such 
action.  As Lonergan writes, retributive punishment is a just option.  While we cannot 
forbid others from sinning, we can work to create and sustain social conditions that 
minimize the propensity of people to sin.  This is a measure of progress for Lonergan.  
Part of this would be the drafting, the passage, and the enforcement of laws in a wise, 
just, and perhaps even loving manner.  Retributive punishment can be an authentic option 
for human society. 
However, satisfaction, even vicarious satisfaction, is also a potentially wise, just, 
and loving options.  Vicarious satisfaction is the option God chose when Christ accepted 
the evils of our suffering on the cross. In our imitation of the Father, we are to will the 
good of a loving response to sin as well as the reward of such response, to permit the sins 
of others, and to indirectly will the consequences for sins.  In our imitation of the Son, of 
Jesus on the cross, we are to participate in his act of satisfaction, to act like him in a 
loving manner and satisfy for the sins of others, even while they are our enemies. 
What is absolutely essential to such vicarious satisfaction is that it be motivated, 
like Christ’s, by divine, unrestricted, unconditional love and wisdom.  On the cross, 
Christ absorbed the evil consequences of sin in order to transform them into the good of 
an inviting and inspiring communication of love.  Like Christ, we can absorb the evil 
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consequences of others’ sins.  We can accept unjust suffering in order to manifest the 
evils of sin and the goodness of love to others in a way that, through the Law of the 
Cross, will invite and inspire them to repent of their sins and return love for love. 
But again, while such vicarious satisfaction is an option, it is not the only 
legitimate option.  To be a legitimate option, however, it must be for us, as it was for 
Jesus, an expression of a concord of wills with God; it must be an expression of divine 
wisdom and love.  It can never be an effort to earn God’s love.  We can choose to accept 
suffering if we are moved by the divine charity that is communicated by Christ and 
poured into our hearts by the Spirit.  A choice to accept suffering is not necessary and it 
is not the only way of imitating Christ,9 but it can be wise and fitting if it will 
communicate both detestation of sin and love for persons in a way that would invite the 
sinner doing harm to repenting his/her sins and to love God, people, and all things. 
These criteria do not comprise a foolproof plan, but I believe and I pray that they 
are the beginning of a helpful guide for Christian discernment.  A complete guide is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  It would be a complex project involving such 
things as what scholastic theologians and contemporary ethicists call the virtues, 
especially prudence.  It would also involve a focused study of Lonergan’s notions of 
authenticity, conversion, and “the way from above downwards.”  Ultimately, it would 
require a work just not of systematics, but of ethics, of pastoral, and practical theology. 
I hope it will suffice for now to say that Christian discipleship must consist in 
some way of imitation of and participation with Christ’s passion.  The burden of the Law 
                                                 
9 Christ also responded to evil with words of correction, with avoidance, and with other, more 
controversial, action. 
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of the Cross can be heavy, but in addition to remembering that there are conditions for its 
application, we should keep in mind that no single person can do it all.  The work of 
saving the world is a tremendous task.  It began at least 2000 years ago (if not since the 
advent of humanity or earlier), and it will continue until the end of time as we know it.  
Because the path chosen by God promotes the freedom of humanity, imitating Christ is a 
humble and humbling task.  It requires all the natural and the supernatural, the personal 
and the communal resources we can muster.  With God, we can communicate and invite 
ourselves and others to conversion and right relationship.  We can shift probabilities.  But 
ultimately, conversion is personal and free.  It is the product of God’s operation and the 
cooperation of individuals. 
Theology is faith seeking understanding, and this certainly has been my aim in 
writing this dissertation.  To a large degree, the aim for me has been fulfilled—from 
Bernard Lonergan I have learned much.  But in the end I am left in some ways at the 
beginning, with a simple faith in the goodness of a Father who loved us so much as to 
give us his only Son, and a Son who loved us so much as to give us his life, both with the 
intention that we might repent of our sin, love God, each other, and all things, and live 
according to this love.  This is my hope and this is my prayer. 
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